Factual and Procedural Background
The Plaintiff, chief executive of Company A, promoted plans to commercialise natural spring water. The Plaintiff sought injunctive relief under section 33 of the Defamation Act 2009 against Company B and three other defendants concerning an online article published on 9 December 2025. [1]
The Plaintiff did not challenge the article’s principal fact-checking content concerning alleged exaggeration of Irish government aid to Ukraine. The dispute concerned descriptions that she “runs a company selling water”, later amended to state that she “runs a company which intends to enter the luxury water market”. [2]
The Plaintiff commenced proceedings after correspondence with the defendants and an amendment to the article. She sought orders restraining publication or republication and requiring removal of the article. [3][4]
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the impugned statement was defamatory for the purposes of section 33 of the Defamation Act 2009. [5][6][7]
- Whether the defendants had a defence reasonably likely to succeed, including truth and fair and reasonable publication in the public interest under section 26 of the Act. [5][6][8][9]
- Whether injunctive relief should be granted, having regard to the discretionary and exceptional nature of the jurisdiction, freedom of expression, responsible journalism, proportionality, and the alleged harm. [10][11][12][13][14]
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff’s Arguments
- The statement was false because neither the Plaintiff nor Company A had ever sold water. [5][15][16]
- The statement allegedly conveyed that the Plaintiff engaged in commercial exploitation, acted dishonestly or without integrity, misrepresented her activities, and deserved public disrepute. [5]
- The amendment to the article was said to be an implicit admission that the original statement was false. [17]
- The Plaintiff alleged reputational, emotional, professional, and commercial harm, including consequences arising from a social-media misinformation label. [18][16]
- She argued that the case was exceptional, that damages would be inadequate, and that the balance of justice favoured injunctive relief. [16]
Defendants’ Arguments
- The application sought extreme relief against responsible journalism intended to correct online disinformation. [19]
- Selling or intending to sell water was a reasonable commercial activity and was not defamatory, particularly in light of the Plaintiff’s public statements about Company A’s commercial intentions. [20][21]
- The defendants relied on the Plaintiff’s social-media content, media appearances, company website, and other materials referring to bottling, commercialisation, investors, and the luxury-water market. [22][23][24][25]
- They invoked the defences of truth and fair and reasonable publication in the public interest under section 26. [5][8][9]
- They argued that the additional defendants had been improperly joined because only Company B exercised editorial control over the article. [20]
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Gilroy v. O'Leary [2019] IEHC 52 |
Section 33 relief requires the court to be satisfied that the statement is defamatory and that no defence is reasonably likely to succeed; the case must be clear, and an issue as to meaning may defeat the application. |
The Court treated Gilroy as authoritative and held that the Plaintiff failed to satisfy either limb of the test. [26][27][28][29] |
| Lowry v. Smyth [2012] 1 I.R. 400 |
The absence of a defence must be very clear before interlocutory relief is granted. |
The principle supported the requirement that the Plaintiff establish a clear defamatory meaning and the absence of a likely defence. [30] |
| Sinclair v. Gogarty [1937] I.R. 377 |
Interlocutory restraints on publication should be granted only in the clearest cases where any jury would find the material libellous. |
The Court applied this caution against granting relief where the alleged defamatory meaning was not clear. [31][32] |
| Coulson v. Coulson 3 T.L.R. 846 |
Authority concerning the delicate nature of restraining publication by interlocutory injunction. |
It was cited within the formulation of the applicable clear-case test. [33] |
| Bonnard v. Perryman [1891] 2 Ch. 269 |
Authority supporting restraint of publication only in the clearest cases. |
It was cited as part of the established caution governing publication injunctions. [33] |
| Lidl Ireland v. Irish Farmers Association & Ors [2021] IEHC 381 |
The plaintiff must establish that the words clearly bear the pleaded defamatory meanings and that the defendants clearly have no reasonably likely defence. |
The Court relied on this formulation in assessing whether the impugned statement clearly bore the alleged meanings. [34][35] |
| Beaumont Hospital Board & Anor v. O'Doherty [2021] IEHC 469 |
The jurisdiction is delicate; courts must protect free speech, responsible journalism, and press freedom, while intervening where statements lack a reasonable basis. |
The Court emphasised that the present circumstances did not justify interference with fact-checking or journalistic activity. [36][10][11][12] |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Section 33 required the Plaintiff to establish both that the statement was defamatory and that the defendants had no defence reasonably likely to succeed. The applicable threshold was higher than showing a serious issue to be tried: the case had to be exceptionally clear. [6][37][26][35]
The Court found no basis for interpreting the reference to selling or intending to sell water as an accusation of dishonesty or lack of integrity. Selling water was not inherently defamatory, and the Plaintiff had not shown how the alleged inaccuracy could damage her reputation. [28]
The Plaintiff’s own public statements and Company A’s website referred to commercialisation, luxury water, bottling, investors, and future sales. Those materials undermined the complaint and provided strong grounds for the defendants’ truth and section 26 defences. [29][38]
The Court also considered the article as a whole. The disputed reference was a minor aspect of an article principally addressing alleged disinformation about government aid to Ukraine, which the Plaintiff did not challenge. Restraining the article would therefore be disproportionate. [12][39][13][40]
The Court placed substantial weight on the importance of responsible fact-checking and press freedom. The circumstances did not come close to justifying judicial intervention. [41][12]
The alleged harm was insufficiently connected to the disputed reference to selling water. The Court considered it more likely that any social-media consequences resulted from the unchallenged fact-checking issues. [14]
The Court also questioned the joinder of the additional defendants, observing that no coherent basis had been articulated for holding them responsible for the article. Such joinder could affect the exercise of discretion and expose the Plaintiff to costs or other procedural consequences. [39][42][43]
Holding and Implications
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF REFUSED. The Plaintiff failed to establish a defamatory meaning and failed to show that the defendants lacked reasonably likely defences. The applications to restrain publication or republication and to require removal of the article were therefore refused. [12][43][13][44][45]
The Plaintiff remained able to pursue the substantive claim at trial against properly identified and particularised defendants; the Court expressed no opinion on the claim as currently pleaded. The defendants were presumptively entitled to standard party-and-party costs, subject to further submissions. [44][45]
No broader implication or new precedent was stated; the decision directly concerned the refusal of interim relief on the evidence and pleadings before the Court. [44][45]