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Bunting v Revenue and Customs

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Appellant funded Company, a sports-history and memorabilia business, through unsecured interest-free loans totalling £3,452,771. [1] As the business became unsustainable, Appellant released £1,325,771 of indebtedness in exchange for Company assets and capitalised a further £2,200,000 of the loan in exchange for shares that had no significant value. Company subsequently entered members’ voluntary liquidation. [2][3]

After abandoning an intended income-tax-loss claim concerning the shares, Appellant sought relief under section 253 of the Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992. Respondents refused the claim. The First-tier Tribunal allowed Appellant’s appeal, but the Upper Tribunal reversed that decision. Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal. [4][5][6][7]

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Appellant was entitled to relief under section 253 of the Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992 where the loan debt had been released in exchange for shares of no significant value. [8]
  2. Whether an amount is “outstanding” for section 253 purposes only where there remains a legal right to pursue it, or whether “outstanding” means merely unpaid. [9][10]
  3. Whether the statutory provisions concerning assignment, recovery, insolvency and guarantors supported Appellant’s interpretation. [11][12]

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • “Outstanding” should mean “unpaid”, rather than “remaining legally due”, consistent with the approach in Crosby v Broadhurst. [11]
  • The provisions concerning assignment and subsequent recovery supported Appellant’s interpretation rather than that of the Upper Tribunal. [12]
  • The Upper Tribunal’s construction could produce unintended consequences in insolvency cases and was inconsistent with the guarantor provisions. [12][13][14]

Respondents’ Arguments

  • “Outstanding” ordinarily means that a debt remains legally due and has not been released. [15]
  • The statutory references to a right to recover, assignment and recovery of the outstanding amount supported that interpretation. [16]
  • Potential difficulties arising from insolvency did not justify departing from the ordinary meaning of the statutory language. [17][18]
  • In the guarantor context, payment could transfer the borrower’s relevant liability to the guarantor through indemnity and subrogation. [19][20]

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Crosby v Broadhurst [2004] SpC 416 The Special Commissioners treated relief as available where the lender would not receive the money again, even though the loan had been waived before the claim. The Court held that this construction was erroneous because section 253 requires an outstanding amount to remain legally enforceable when the claim is made. [21][22][23][24][25][26]
Darwall v Dartmoor National Park Authority [2025] UKSC 20, [2025] AC 1292 Statutory interpretation requires the meaning of statutory words to be determined in light of context and legislative purpose. The Court applied this interpretive approach to the meaning of “outstanding” in section 253(3)(a). [9]

Court’s Reasoning and Analysis

The Court accepted that the loans were qualifying loans and focused on whether the £2,200,000 released in exchange for shares remained an “outstanding amount” when the claim was made. [27][9]

The ordinary meaning of “outstanding” can include being unpaid, but in the statutory context it normally indicates that a debt remains legally due. A debt that has been released is not naturally described as still outstanding. [28][15]

The references in section 253 to a claimant’s right to recover, assignment of that right, and later recovery of the outstanding amount supported the conclusion that a continuing legal right was required. Other uses of “outstanding” in the legislation were consistent with that meaning. [29][16]

The Court rejected the argument that the word “amount”, rather than “loan”, required a merely factual test of non-payment. The statutory wording could instead be understood as addressing part of the principal, excluding interest, and permitting relief where only part of a legally enforceable loan had become irrecoverable. [10][29]

The possible adverse consequences in insolvency situations did not justify a different interpretation, even though exceptional cases might arise in which a claim would be unavailable after dissolution or an arrangement affecting legal liability. [30][18]

The guarantor provisions did not produce a different result. Where a guarantor pays the lender, the guarantor may obtain indemnity and subrogation rights against the borrower, meaning that the relevant legal liability can continue in substance even though it is no longer owed to the original lender. [31][32]

The Court did not decide the disputed interpretation of section 253(9) concerning the treatment of “money’s worth”, because that issue was not necessary to determine the appeal. [33][34]

Because Appellant had released the £2,200,000 debt, there was no continuing legal right to pursue that amount when the claim was made. It therefore was not “outstanding” for section 253 purposes. [35][36][37][38][39][26]

Holding and Implications

Appeal dismissed. The Court held that an amount is “outstanding” under section 253(3)(a) only if there is a legal right to pursue it. Appellant was therefore not entitled to relief in respect of the released debt. [26][40]

The direct consequence was that the Upper Tribunal’s decision was upheld. The opinion does not state broader implications or that a new precedent was set.

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Bunting v Revenue and Customs

Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Justice Licence v1.0.

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Bunting v Revenue and Customs
(Oct 16, 2026)