Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes

Grosvenor Property Developers Ltd v Portner Law Ltd

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Company A, acting through its joint liquidators, claimed that Company B, an incorporated firm of solicitors, dishonestly assisted breaches of fiduciary duty by Company A’s former directors. Approximately £7 million had allegedly been misappropriated from Company A, and £2,399,000 of its funds, or traceable proceeds, passed through Company B’s client account in three property-related transactions. [1][2][3]

The trial judge found Company B liable, principally on the basis that its solicitor had acted dishonestly. Company B appealed, contending that the judge had applied the wrong approach to dishonesty. [1][4]

The Court of Appeal considered whether the findings supported dishonesty, whether the matter should be remitted for a retrial, and whether the claim should instead be dismissed. [5][6]

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial judge applied the correct two-stage test for dishonesty. [7][8][9]
  2. Whether the findings established actual or blind-eye knowledge, including a targeted suspicion and a conscious decision not to inquire. [10][11][12]
  3. Whether the solicitor’s conduct amounted only to negligence or lax professional practice rather than dishonesty. [13][14]
  4. Whether the appeal should result in a retrial or dismissal of the claim. [5][6][15]

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • The trial judge failed to make proper findings about the solicitor’s actual beliefs in relation to each transaction. [16][17]
  • The judge wrongly treated the question as whether an honest solicitor would have acted in the same way, thereby applying a negligence-based standard. [7][18]
  • The evidence did not establish the targeted suspicion and deliberate decision not to inquire required for blind-eye knowledge. [10][12]
  • The solicitor’s conduct, although potentially careless or professionally deficient, did not establish dishonesty. [19][20][15]

Respondent’s Arguments

  • The respondent relied on the solicitor’s repeated failures to undertake checks, obtain documentary evidence, distinguish between legal persons, and comply with undertakings. [21][22]
  • The respondent argued that the judge’s observations about blind-eye dishonesty were unnecessary to the decision and should be treated as obiter. The Court rejected that submission. [11]
  • The respondent argued that targeted suspicions could be inferred from the judgment. The Court rejected that submission because the judge had not considered such findings necessary. [11]

Table of Precedents Cited

PrecedentRule or Principle Cited ForApplication by the Court
Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Philip Tan Kok Ming [1995] 2 AC 378Dishonesty is an essential ingredient of accessory liability; the relevant standard is objective but applied to the defendant’s actual knowledge and beliefs.The Court treated the case as foundational but held that the more recent formulation in Ivey v Genting should be applied. [23][24][25]
Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd (trading as Crockfords Club) [2017] UKSC 6, [2018] AC 391Dishonesty requires a subjective assessment of actual knowledge or belief followed by an objective assessment against ordinary standards of honesty.The Court held that this mandatory two-stage approach had not been applied by the trial judge. [24][26][27][28]
Grupo Torras SA v Al-Sabah & Anor [2001] CLC 221Application of the dishonesty test in a dishonest-assistance case.The Court held that the case did not create a separate “honest solicitor” test and had been misunderstood by the trial judge. [29][30][31]
Clydesdale Bank Plc v Workman [2016] EWCA Civ 73Reckless disregard may be evidence of dishonesty but is not itself dishonesty; the defendant’s reasons and circumstances remain relevant.The Court described the trial judge’s reliance on recklessness as an overstatement and stressed that recklessness is distinct from dishonesty. [32][33][34][35]
Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164Discussion of knowledge and blind-eye knowledge.The case was cited as part of the development of the modern dishonesty test and the treatment of deliberate abstention from inquiry. [36][37][38]
Barlow Clowes International Ltd v Eurotrust International Ltd [2005] UKPC 37, [2006] 1 WLR 1476Dishonest assistance may involve suspicion combined with a conscious decision not to inquire; the standard of dishonesty is objective.The Court relied on this formulation in explaining the two-stage test. [36][26][39]
R v Ghosh [1982] QB 1053The former requirement of subjective awareness that conduct would be regarded as dishonest.The Court noted that this second limb had been disapproved by Ivey v Genting. [36][25][40]
Group Seven Ltd v Nasir [2019] EWCA Civ 614, [2020] Ch 129Confirmation of the two-stage test and the requirements for blind-eye knowledge.The Court adopted its explanation that negligence or untargeted suspicion is insufficient. [41][42][43][37]
Stanford International Bank Ltd v HSBC Bank plc [2021] EWCA Civ 535, [2021] 1 WLR 3507Blind-eye knowledge requires a firmly grounded, targeted suspicion and a deliberate decision not to inquire.The Court applied this principle and found that the necessary findings were absent. [44][45][46][47]
Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v Uni-Polaris Insurance Co Ltd (The Star Sea) [2003] UKHL 1, [2003] 1 AC 469Blind-eye knowledge requires both suspicion of specific facts and a conscious decision to avoid confirming them.The Court treated these as subjective requirements essential to the first stage of dishonesty. [43][37][48][49][50]
NatWest Markets Plc v Bilta (UK) Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ 680Subsequent discussion of the blind-eye knowledge doctrine.The Court noted that part of the reasoning in Group Seven had been considered in this case. [51][52]
Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 3) [2001] UKHL 16, [2003] 2 AC 1Dishonesty is proved on the balance of probabilities, but the evidence must justify an inference of dishonesty rather than negligence.The Court included this principle in its discussion of proof. [53][54]
In re D (Secretary of State for Northern Ireland intervening) [2008] UKHL 33, [2008] 1 WLR 1499The seriousness of the allegation and consequences may be considered when assessing proof.The Court cited the case as part of the applicable approach to proving dishonesty. [53][54]
Bank St Petersburg PJSC v Arkhangelsky [2020] EWCA Civ 408, [2020] 4 WLR 55Further authority concerning proof of dishonesty.The Court cited it alongside Three Rivers and In re D. [54][55]
R v G [2004] 1 AC 1034Recklessness involves subjective appreciation of risk and objectively unreasonable risk-taking.The Court distinguished recklessness from actual or blind-eye knowledge and from the second stage of dishonesty. [34][56]
Potter v Canada Square Operations Ltd [2023] UKSC 41, [2024] AC 679Distinction between knowledge and recklessness.The Court used it to support the conclusion that recklessness is not equivalent to dishonesty. [34][56]
Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson [1990] Ch 265The relevant distinction is between honest failure to inquire and failing to inquire because the person does not want to know.The Court relied on the “why” question when assessing whether non-inquiry was dishonest. [57][58]
Optis Cellular Technology LLC v Apple Retail UK Ltd [2025] EWCA Civ 552, [2025] RPC 18A retrial is appropriate only where it is the only just course.The Court held that a retrial was not appropriate and that allowing another attempt would be unfair. [15]
Simetra Global Assets Ltd v Ikon Finance Ltd [2019] EWCA Civ 1413, [2019] 4 WLR 112Principle governing whether a case should be remitted for retrial.The Court cited it through Optis when declining to remit the matter. [15]

Court’s Reasoning and Analysis

The Court held that dishonesty requires two distinct stages: first, determining the individual’s actual knowledge and beliefs; and second, assessing whether the conduct was dishonest by the standards of ordinary decent people. [27][59][60]

Blind-eye knowledge is treated like actual knowledge, but requires a firmly grounded and targeted suspicion together with a deliberate decision not to inquire because confirmation is unwanted. Mere suspicion, negligence, failure to follow policies, or gross carelessness is insufficient. [61][47][53][10][62]

The trial judge instead compressed the two stages into the question whether an honest solicitor with the solicitor’s experience would have acted similarly. That formulation risked substituting professional diligence or negligence for dishonesty. [7][9][63][18]

The factual findings did not establish the required state of mind. The trial judge accepted that the solicitor genuinely believed the relevant family members were legitimately wealthy and did not find that he suspected that the funds came from outside the family unit. [6][64][65]

The solicitor’s failure to distinguish between family members and companies, inaccurate certificates, breach of undertakings, and failure to complete checks were wrong and potentially negligent, but did not establish targeted suspicion or a deliberate decision to avoid confirmation. [66][67][68][69][20][15]

The Court also found no adequate basis for treating later conduct as proof of dishonesty. The trial judge’s findings that the solicitor’s conduct was “incredible” or knowingly false were made against the background of the erroneous legal approach and did not necessarily mean that the solicitor was disbelieved or had deliberately avoided discovering the truth. [70][71][72][73][74][75]

The finding that the solicitor was knowingly cutting corners with clients generally, during a busy and stressful period, did not demonstrate a specific suspicion concerning these transactions. Indeed, it provided an innocent explanation for the failure to make further inquiries. [75][76]

The Court declined to order a retrial because the required findings had not been sought or secured at trial, and permitting another attempt would be unfair. The evidence supported, at most, negligence or lax conduct, not dishonest assistance. [15][13]

Holding and Implications

Appeal allowed; trial judgment set aside; claim dismissed. The Court held that the allegation of dishonesty was not made out on the trial judge’s findings of fact. [77][78]

The direct consequence was that Company B was not liable for dishonest assistance in relation to the transactions. The decision did not condone lax professional conduct, but reaffirmed that even gross negligence is distinct from dishonesty and cannot replace the required findings of targeted suspicion and deliberate non-inquiry. [13][14]

To access the original judgment, please Sign In or Subscribe.

Grosvenor Property Developers Ltd v Portner Law Ltd

Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Justice Licence v1.0.

Use AI to get other relevant cases.

Comments

Grosvenor Property Developers Ltd v Portner Law Ltd
(Oct 2, 2026)