Factual and Procedural Background
On 9 October 2025, the Appellant pleaded guilty before a magistrates’ court and was committed to the Crown Court for sentence for two offences of carrying out conduct intended to cause children to enter into marriage, contrary to section 121 of the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. [1]
The offences arose from the Appellant, a religious leader, conducting a Nikah ceremony in November 2023 for two 16-year-olds. The children had approached him voluntarily, and there was no evidence of coercion or pressure. [2][3][4]
The Appellant knew the children were 16 but said he was unaware that the law had changed to prohibit marriage under 18. He subsequently changed the Mosque’s internal procedures to prevent such ceremonies. [5][6]
On 19 January 2026, the Crown Court sentenced the Appellant to 15 weeks’ imprisonment, suspended for 12 months. The application for leave to appeal against sentence was referred to the full court. [7]
A reporting restriction protecting the identity of the children remains in force, and identifying details were excluded from the judgment. [8]
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the offence, committed in the circumstances identified by the sentencing judge, was sufficiently serious to require a custodial sentence. [9]
- How culpability and harm should be assessed for offences under section 121 where there is no offence-specific sentencing guideline. [10][11]
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- The offences were at the lowest end of seriousness, involving minimal planning, no coercion, willing participants, no harm, and no financial benefit. [12]
- The Appellant’s ignorance of the law amounted to negligence rather than recklessness, and his mitigation, good character, guilty plea and lack of convictions were substantial. [12]
- The custody threshold had not been crossed; a fine or community-based sentence was appropriate. [12]
Respondent’s Arguments
- The offence was serious because it was committed by a person holding authority and influence as a religious leader. [13]
- The safeguarding concerns underlying the statutory prohibition justified the conclusion that the custody threshold was crossed. [13]
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court’s Reasoning and Analysis
The Court explained that, from 27 February 2023, English law prohibited anyone under 18 from marrying or entering a civil partnership, removing previous exceptions for 16- and 17-year-olds with parental consent. [14]
There was no offence-specific guideline. The sentencing judge was therefore right to consult the general guideline and to use the FGM guideline only as a point of reference, rather than applying it directly because of the material differences between the offences. [15][11]
The Court stated that section 121 covers a broad range of conduct, from coercive removal and forced marriage to assisting willing teenagers in entering a religious union. [16]
Relevant culpability factors include coercion, the offender’s authority, knowledge of the child’s age, whether the conduct was planned or repeated, secrecy, attempts to avoid detection, travel abroad, and any improper advantage. Relevant harm factors include the occurrence of a ceremony, the child’s age, educational impact, physical or psychological harm, sexual exploitation risks, future prospects, consummation or cohabitation, continuing pressure, and the number of children involved. These factors are non-exhaustive. [17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33][34][35][36]
The Court agreed that the Appellant’s culpability was medium to low and the harm was low. The children had acted voluntarily, there was no coercion, and no immediate physical or mental harm was identified. [9]
However, the Appellant’s role as the religious leader responsible for conducting marriages increased culpability. He should have known of the legal change and should have recognised the risks when children approached the Mosque seeking marriage for the first time. [9]
The Court acknowledged the strong mitigation, including the Appellant’s admissions, early guilty plea, good character, lack of previous convictions, and immediate alteration of Mosque guidance. [37]
Despite that mitigation, the offence remained significantly serious. Parliament’s prohibition was intended to safeguard children even from their own or their parents’ decisions, and general deterrence and safeguarding were legitimate sentencing considerations. [38][39]
The Court held that conduct facilitating a child’s marriage would overwhelmingly be expected to attract custody. A community sentence might be appropriate for a fleeting or incidental act by someone with little influence, but this case was different because the Appellant held authority and conducted the ceremony to completion. Religious concerns about preventing sexual relations before marriage could not override compliance with the law. [40]
Holding and Implications
Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed. The custodial sentence of 15 weeks’ imprisonment, suspended for 12 months, therefore remained in effect. [41]
The decision confirms that safeguarding and deterrence may justify custody even where the participants are willing and immediate harm is absent, particularly where the offender occupies a position of authority and completes the ceremony. [40]
The Court also identified non-exhaustive factors relevant to culpability and harm in future section 121 sentencing cases. [17][26][36]