| R (Principled Offsite Logistics Ltd) v Trafford Council [2018] EWHC 1687 (Admin), [2018] RA 499 |
Held by the High Court to support “box shifting” as effective occupation for rating purposes. |
The Court of Appeal held it was wrongly decided and overruled it. [Para 36][Para 39][Para 215] |
| Rossendale Borough Council v Hurstwood Properties (A) Ltd [2021] UKSC 16, [2022] AC 690 |
Purposive interpretation of rating legislation; the Ramsay approach applies in rating cases; “owner” analysis under section 65. |
The court treated Rossendale as the governing framework and used it to reject pure rate-mitigation occupation. [Para 47][Para 102][Para 128][Para 140][Para 144][Para 148][Para 162][Para 166][Para 176] |
| John Laing & Son Ltd v Assessment Committee for Kingswood Assessment Area [1949] 1 KB 344 |
The four ingredients of rateable occupation, including that possession must be of some value or benefit to the possessor. |
The court relied on Laing as the baseline common-law test but held that pure rate mitigation occupation did not satisfy the third ingredient. [Para 85][Para 87][Para 88][Para 190][Para 192] |
| Cardtronics UK Ltd v Sykes (Valuation Officers) [2020] 1 WLR 2184 / [2020] UKSC 21 |
Reaffirmed the Laing formulation and confirmed section 65(2) refers to the common law rules. |
The court used it to support the proposition that section 65(2) refers back to the common-law occupation rules, while still holding that purposive interpretation prevents pure rate-mitigation occupation from qualifying. [Para 85][Para 174] |
| Hare v Churchwardens and Overseers of Putney (1881) 7 QBD 223 |
No occupation where the putative occupier cannot derive benefit because the property must be available to the public without charge. |
Cited as part of the line of authority explaining the “beneficial” occupation requirement. [Para 92] |
| Churchwardens and Overseers of Lambeth Parish v London County Council [1897] AC 625 |
Illustrates lack of occupation where benefit is absent; also cited on the additional nature of the third Laing ingredient. |
Used to show that beneficial occupation is a distinct requirement, not redundant. [Para 92][Para 190] |
| Winstanley v North Manchester Overseers [1920] AC 7 |
Contrast with cases where some benefit exists, such as receipt of burial fees. |
Used to reinforce that the third Laing ingredient requires some genuine benefit. [Para 92][Para 190] |
| London County Council v Erith Churchwardens [1893] AC 562 |
Occupation may be beneficial even if not profitable; the test is whether the occupation is “of value.” |
Used to show that profit is not required, but that there must still be independent value or benefit. [Para 93] |
| Wimborne DC v Brayne Construction Co Ltd [1985] RA 234 |
Distinction between purpose and motive in determining beneficial occupation. |
The court used this distinction, but held that pure rate mitigation occupation still fails because the asserted “benefit” depends on motive and statutory effect. [Para 96][Para 191] |
| R v Melladew [1907] 1 KB 192 |
Property kept available for storage can still be in occupation. |
Included among examples where the activity had an independent utility. [Para 97] |
| Associated Cinema Properties Ltd v Hampstead BC [1944] 1 KB 416 |
Property leased in case it was needed was held not occupied. |
Used as an example of an intention-to-use case at the margin of occupation. [Para 97] |
| Arbuckle Smith & Co. Ltd. v Greenock Corporation [1960] AC 813 |
Alterations to make a vacant warehouse suitable for future use did not amount to occupation. |
Cited as part of the court’s survey of borderline occupation cases. [Para 97] |
| Minister of Transport v Holland (1962) 14 P&CR 259 |
Property left with worthless chattels was still held not occupied. |
Used as another example showing that mere presence of items does not automatically amount to occupation. [Para 97] |
| Makro Properties Ltd v Nuneaton and Bedworth BC [2012] EWHC 2250 (Admin), [2012] RA 285 |
Boxes of documents placed in a warehouse for six weeks amounted to occupation where the documents had practical value. |
The court distinguished it from pure rate-mitigation occupation because the storage there had independent practical benefit. [Para 108] |
| Furniss v Dawson [1984] 1 AC 474 |
Cited in the context of the Ramsay principle and pre-ordained transactions. |
Used as part of the Ramsay line of authorities explaining when schemes may be viewed as a whole. [Para 108][Para 132] |
| Sunderland CC v Stirling Investment Properties LLP [2013] EWHC 1413 (Admin), [2013] RA 411 |
Minimal use of a property can still amount to occupation. |
Noted as a different arrangement from the present pure rate-mitigation scheme. [Para 110][Para 112] |
| R (Secretary of State for Health and Social Care (on behalf of Public Health England)) v Harlow DC [2021] EWHC 909 (Admin), [2021] 4 WLR 65 |
Minimal use combined with an intention to occupy can be sufficient; occupation may be for rates mitigation. |
The Court of Appeal distinguished the case because it involved real utility in the retained documents, not purely circular rate-mitigation occupation. [Para 121][Para 124][Para 125][Para 213] |
| Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd v Mawson [2004] UKHL 51, [2005] 1 AC 684 |
Ramsay is a purposive approach to statutory construction. |
The court relied on it as part of the interpretive framework governing rating legislation. [Para 128][Para 133][Para 140][Para 162][Para 195] |
| UBS AG v Revenue and Customs Comrs [2016] UKSC 13, [2016] 1 WLR 1005 |
The purposive approach can disregard tax-avoidance steps and is not limited to tax legislation. |
Used to support the broader proposition that purposive interpretation can disregard irrelevant steps or contingencies. [Para 128][Para 212] |
| Collector of Stamp Revenue v Arrowtown Assets Ltd (2003) 6 ITLR 454 |
The “ultimate question” is whether the provision, construed purposively, was intended to apply to the transaction viewed realistically. |
The court adopted this formulation as central to the analysis of the scheme. [Para 130][Para 162][Para 163] |
| Inland Revenue Comrs v Burmah Oil Co Ltd [1982] STC 30 |
Earlier authority on pre-ordained steps in the Ramsay line. |
Cited in explaining that a scheme may be considered as a whole. [Para 132] |
| Inland Revenue Comrs v Scottish Provident Institution [2004] UKHL 52, [2004] 1 WLR 3172 |
A risk that a scheme may fail does not prevent it from being viewed as a whole if it was intended to operate that way. |
Used to support the approach that commercially irrelevant contingencies can be ignored. [Para 132][Para 213] |
| MacNiven v Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2003] 1 AC 311 |
The paramount question is the interpretation of the statutory provision and its application to the facts. |
Used to reinforce the purposive interpretive task under the rating legislation. [Para 139] |
| Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills v PAG Management Services Ltd [2015] EWHC 2404 (Ch), [2015] BCC 720 |
Considered in the context of a winding-up petition and public interest in rate mitigation schemes. |
The court held that its comments did not control the present Ramsay analysis and were in a different context. [Para 154][Para 204][Para 206][Para 207] |
| Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997 |
Discretionary powers must be exercised to promote the policy and objects of the Act. |
Cited to reject the argument that secondary legislation or inaction by the Secretary of State could alter the statutory meaning of occupation. [Para 198] |
| Attorney-General v Clarkson [1900] 1 QB 156 |
Later legislation may, in some circumstances, “fix” the meaning of earlier ambiguous legislation. |
The court held that no such ambiguity or legislative signal existed here. [Para 202] |
| Comr of Inland Revenue v Hang Seng Bank Ltd [1991] 1 AC 306 |
Discussed the limited circumstances in which later legislation may indicate the interpretation of earlier legislation. |
Cited with Clarkson to show that the 2024 Regulations did not fix the meaning of occupation. [Para 202] |
| R (N) v Walsall Metropolitan Borough Council [2014] EWHC 1918 (Admin), [2014] PTSR 1356 |
Modern statement of the “later legislation” point in interpretation. |
The court used it as further support for rejecting reliance on the 2024 Regulations as interpretive guidance. [Para 202] |
| Wigan Council v Property Alliance Group Ltd [2025] EWHC 2336 (Ch), [2025] RA 361 |
Applied Rossendale to a later rating dispute. |
Cited as an example that Rossendale continues to govern rating cases. [Para 208] |
| S Franses Ltd v Cavendish Hotel (London) Ltd [2018] UKSC 62, [2019] AC 249 |
On a different statutory test, a firm and settled intention was required and a conditional intention was insufficient. |
The court found it of limited assistance because it concerned a different statutory context and did not address Ramsay. [Para 210][Para 212] |