Shafiq, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

The Attorney General sought leave to refer as unduly lenient the sentence imposed on the Defendant for offences of collection of terrorist information contrary to section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000. The Defendant, born June 2006 (aged 17–18 at the time of the relevant offending), pleaded guilty in the Magistrates' Court to four counts: three offences under section 58(1)(c) (accessing three issues of a publication used for Islamic State propaganda) and one offence under section 58(1)(b) (possession of an edition of an Al‑Qaeda publication). The Defendant was committed to the Crown Court for sentence. On 12 January 2026 the sentencing judge imposed concurrent community orders (rehabilitation activity requirement 60 days; electronic whereabouts monitoring 180 days), a serious crime prevention order (5 years), forfeiture of devices, and a surcharge. The Attorney General obtained leave to refer the sentence under section 36 Criminal Justice Act 1988; the reference was heard in the Court of Appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentence imposed was unduly lenient within the meaning of the Attorney‑General reference jurisdiction.
2. Whether the sentencing judge erred in categorising the offending under the offence‑specific guideline (B2 v B3) and, relatedly, whether the starting point and range under the adult guideline ought to have led inexorably to a custodial sentence.
3. Whether the Overarching Guideline on Sentencing Children and Young People applied to the offending committed by the Defendant when under 18 and, if so, how that affected culpability and disposal.

Arguments of the Parties

Attorney McGhee (on behalf of the Attorney General)

• The overall sentence was unduly lenient because the upward adjustment for totality was insufficient or the downward adjustment for mitigation was excessive (or both), given the offence‑specific guideline categorisation and starting point.
• The offending was correctly categorised as B2 under the adult offence guideline with a starting point of 4 years and a range of 3–5 years, making a custodial sentence appropriate.
• The sentencing judge erred in applying the Overarching Guideline on Sentencing Children and Young People to avoid custody.

Attorney Kane (on behalf of the Defendant)

• The Overarching Guideline on Sentencing Children and Young People was applicable and properly applied because the Defendant committed substantial offending while under 18; pre‑sentence reports and a psychiatric report supported reduced culpability from immaturity.
• The sentencing judge gave proper weight to mitigation (youth, immaturity, Asperger's traits, no previous convictions, positive character, guilty plea) and imposed an appropriate sentence for the individual.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court granted leave because of issues about correct categorisation under the offence‑specific guideline. The court reviewed the facts: considerable extremist material accessed and shared, use of encrypted platforms, creation of an extremist group chat, and some indicators of intention to travel to support proscribed organisations. Culpability was agreed to be category B; harm category 2 was satisfied because the material provided instruction for specific terrorist activity endangering life, though harm was not very likely to be caused.

The Court analysed the interplay between the adult offence guideline (starting point 4 years for B2; range 3–5 years) and the Overarching Guideline on Sentencing Children and Young People. Citing the authority on sentencing adults for offences begun when under 18, the Court held the children’s guideline was relevant and must be followed unless it would be contrary to the interests of justice; no submission was made that it would be contrary to the interests of justice here.

The Court examined the sentencing judge’s approach: an initial categorisation slip (B3) was corrected to B2 at a slip rule hearing; the judge expressly accepted and applied the Children and Young Persons Guideline, found reduced culpability due to youth and Asperger's traits, identified aggravating and mitigating factors, and considered that a custodial sentence should be a last resort for young people. The judge concluded that, having given anxious and lengthy consideration, a community disposal best met the aims of the children’s guideline and public protection. The appellate court acknowledged the sentencing judge is best placed to assess facts and temperaments and that the appellate jurisdiction corrects gross errors only.

Balancing the seriousness and the mitigation (age, immaturity, neurodiverse traits, no previous convictions, guilty plea), and noting ongoing supervised measures post‑sentence, the Court concluded that while the sentence was lenient, it was not unduly lenient.

Holding and Implications

REFERENCE REFUSED

Holding: The Court refused the Attorney‑General reference and upheld the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge.

Implications: The direct effect is that the community order (with the specified requirements), the serious crime prevention order (5 years), forfeiture order and surcharge remain in force. The Court emphasised that no gross sentencing error was made and therefore the reference did not result in an increased sentence; the decision does not establish a new precedent beyond applying established principles about sentencing those who offended while under 18 and the standard appellate approach to Attorney‑General references.