Mey v University Of Limerick (Approved)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiff is an employee of Company A since April 2018 and was appointed President in October 2021. Company A purchased a property in 2023 (the "Rhebogue transaction"), which generated investigations and media coverage. On 18 May 2023 Company A's delegation (including the Plaintiff) attended a Public Accounts Committee hearing ("PAC1") where the Plaintiff explained the non-attendance of Employee A as due to a long-standing personal engagement and approved leave. A protected disclosure was made on 15 August 2023 and Company A's Special Disclosures Group appointed Attorney Jenkinson to investigate under written Terms of Reference. The Plaintiff, Employee A and Attorney Given were interviewed; Attorney Jenkinson issued a report on 2 April 2024 finding the Plaintiff's account truthful and correct.

By letter dated 2 April 2024 Company A indicated an intention to proceed with disciplinary action. The Plaintiff took sick leave and Attorney Kilcommins became Acting President. On 9 May 2024 a different delegation attended PAC2 and Attorney Kilcommins gave a different account of Employee A's absence. Company A's Protected Disclosures Group accepted Attorney Jenkinson's report in April 2024, but following correspondence from the Chair of the Audit and Risk Committee the Group recommended referring material from PAC2 back to Attorney Jenkinson. On 14 June 2024 the parties entered a written settlement agreement containing clauses 20 (a warranty not to proceed with disciplinary action subject to a narrow exception) and 23 (an obligation on the Plaintiff to cooperate with processes).

On 24 October 2024 Company A wrote to Attorney Jenkinson referring PAC2 material back to her. Over a year after the settlement, on 2 July 2025 Company A advised the Plaintiff it had asked Attorney Jenkinson to re-examine the issues; by 18 July 2025 Company A referenced clause 20 of the settlement. The Plaintiff applied for interlocutory injunctive relief to restrain Company A from proceeding with the re‑examination/investigation pending trial. Judge Bolger delivered judgment on 14 July 2026 granting the injunctive relief sought and directed an early trial timetable.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the settlement agreement dated 14 June 2024 precludes Company A from proceeding with the re‑examination/investigation (the "impugned process").
2. Whether s. 6A of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (as amended) requires Company A to proceed with the impugned process irrespective of the settlement agreement.
3. Whether the Plaintiff has established a fair/serious question to be tried and that the balance of convenience favours interlocutory injunctive relief to restrain the impugned process pending trial.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

• The Terms of Reference and the settlement agreement preclude the impugned process; the Plaintiff settled matters up to the date of the agreement and accepted less favourable terms in compromise.
• The impugned process is focused on whether the Plaintiff committed a relevant wrongdoing and is, in substance, a pretext for disciplinary action despite clause 20's warranty not to proceed with disciplinary action.

Company A's Arguments

• Company A contends no new evidence within clause 20 has emerged but that it has a statutory obligation under s. 6A of the Protected Disclosures Act to diligently follow up alleged wrongdoing and take appropriate action.
• Clause 23 requires the Plaintiff to cooperate with investigations and the impugned process is an exercise of statutory duties rather than pure disciplinary action.
• The Plaintiff's application is premature (reliance on Rowland v An Post) and she seeks effectively a quia timet injunction without establishing a real and substantial risk.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Judge Bolger applied the two-stage interlocutory test: (i) whether the Plaintiff has established a fair or serious question to be tried; and (ii) the balance of convenience. The Court analysed the settlement agreement (clauses 20 and 23) in context, accepting contextual construction principles. Clause 20 contains a strong warranty not to proceed with disciplinary action save where "evidence emerges" that, in Company A's opinion, warrants investigation for serious misconduct/fraud. The Court analysed three elements: the force of "warrant", the meaning of "disciplinary action", and the temporal scope "matters to the date of this Agreement".

The Court found: (a) the impugned process addresses whether the Plaintiff's PAC1 reply amounts to serious wrongdoing—a matter that was investigated by Attorney Jenkinson and accepted by Company A's Disclosures Group in April 2024; (b) Company A knew of PAC2 and related minutes before executing the settlement but did not expressly reserve a right to recommence the Jenkinson investigation; and (c) there is a serious question that the Plaintiff compromised claims including concerns arising from PAC2 when she accepted the settlement and demoted position.

On "emerging evidence", the Court accepted Company A's concession that no such evidence within clause 20 had yet emerged and held it would be impermissible to allow the impugned process to proceed simply on the anticipation that evidence might emerge. The Court analysed s. 6A of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (as amended), noting that the only potentially relevant statutory obligation was s.6A(1)(d)(iii) (diligent follow-up and taking appropriate action where there is prima facie evidence). The Court found a fair/serious question that s.6A does not impose an open-ended obligation that cannot be compromised by agreement and that obligations under s.6A can form part of a compromise reached between employer and employee.

The Court further held it arguable that the impugned process is a re‑examination of a matter previously investigated and therefore may not fall within the statutory steps required to "address the relevant wrongdoing" under s.6A(1)(d)(iii). Even if s.6A applied, the Court found a serious question that appropriate action had already been taken by Company A via the settlement (demotion and less favourable terms) and that Company A's statutory obligations had been compromised by agreement.

On balance of convenience, the Court accepted the Plaintiff would suffer grave reputational harm and irreparable damage if the impugned process continued; by contrast, any delay to Company A could be addressed by case management and early trial. The Court therefore concluded that the balance favoured granting interlocutory relief.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Court granted the Plaintiff interlocutory injunctive relief restraining Company A from proceeding with the impugned re‑examination/investigation pending trial.

Implications:

• The impugned process is stayed until trial; the case is to proceed to trial on an agreed timeline and a further hearing for final orders and costs was listed for 29 July 2026.
• The Court held there is a serious/fair question that the settlement agreement precludes the re‑examination and that s.6A of the Protected Disclosures Act does not impose an unfettered statutory obligation to proceed irrespective of the settlement.
• The Court reserved costs to the trial judge (indicative view referencing Yoplait) and noted that its interlocutory findings are arguable points for trial rather than final determinations; no novel binding precedent was declared beyond the interlocutory ruling.