Summary of Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a reference by the Attorney General under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 challenging the perceived undue leniency of sentences imposed by Judge Crane in the Crown Court at The City on 26 January 2026. The Solicitor General sought leave to refer the two sentences; leave was granted by a panel comprising Judge Stuart-Smith, Judge Cutts and Judge Lickley. Both defendants pleaded guilty on an earlier occasion. Defendant (1) received a reduction for plea of 25%; Defendant (2), who was under 21 when convicted, received a reduction for plea of one-third and should properly have been sentenced to detention in a young offender institution (the record was corrected). The indictment contained seven counts; all counts except Count 6 were jointly committed, with differing roles.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentences imposed on Defendant (1) and Defendant (2) were unduly lenient.
2. Whether Count 2 (the disclosure of the identity of an informant) added criminality that required either a consecutive sentence or a significant uplift to the lead offence where sentences were concurrent.

Arguments of the Parties

Attorney Richardson's (Solicitor General) Arguments

• The sentence imposed would have been appropriate for the charged conduct excluding Count 2, but Count 2 added distinct and significant criminality that required either a consecutive sentence or a substantial uplift to the lead offence.
• For Defendant (2), the judge's notional sentence required a downward adjustment of about 20% for youth and immaturity; applying that adjustment and the reduction for plea shows the aggregate sentence imposed was insufficient.

Attorney Beeson (Defendant (1))

• The sentence was within the range open to the sentencing judge, who correctly addressed aggravating and mitigating factors and totality; the sentence represents a proper exercise of judicial discretion.

Attorney Muir (Defendant (2))

• Mitigation for Defendant (2) included youth, previous good character, evidence that Defendant (1) took the lead, a diagnosis of emotionally unstable personality disorder linked to the offence, prior sexual assault at work increasing vulnerability, and a history of trauma.
• Accepts harm and culpability were high and that Count 2 requires uplift if sentences are concurrent; accepts the sentence was lenient but contends it was not unduly lenient.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court reviewed the facts, sentencing judge's approach, and available materials. It found Defendant (1) was a serving prisoner with an extensive record who groomed and manipulated Defendant (2); Defendant (2) was young, vulnerable and had mitigation (including psychiatric history and previous good character) but committed serious breaches of trust as a prison officer, including supplying items and disclosing the identity of an informant.

The court observed the sentencing judge declared both culpability and harm to be "high" but did not state the notional sentences before mitigation or explain the adjustments applied. The court analysed appropriate notional sentences and mitigating reductions by reference to prior authorities and the individual circumstances of each defendant:

• For Defendant (2) the court concluded the least appropriate aggregate sentence after trial would have been in the region of 6–7 years. The court then illustrated reductions for mitigation (up to one-third) and for plea (one-third), and concluded that the aggregate sentence of 3 years' detention imposed was within the range the judge could properly impose once mitigation and plea reductions were considered; accordingly the reference as to Defendant (2) was dismissed (with the sentence record corrected to detention in a young offender institution).
• For Defendant (1) the court concluded the least appropriate aggregate sentence after trial would have been in the region of 7½–8 years. It assessed that mitigation could not justify more than a 15% reduction, followed by a 25% reduction for plea, yielding an aggregate in the region of 57–62 months (approximately 5 years). The court noted totality issues but found no connection between the current offending and the sentence Defendant (1) was already serving. On that basis the court concluded the sentence imposed on Defendant (1) was unduly lenient.

The court therefore quashed the sentence on Count 2 for Defendant (1) and substituted a sentence such that Defendant (1)'s total sentence became 5 years, to run consecutively to the sentence he was already serving.

Holding and Implications

Defendant (1): Sentence quashed on Count 2 and substituted to produce a total sentence of 5 years, to run consecutively to the existing sentence.

Defendant (2): Reference dismissed; sentence affirmed subject to correction to state a period of detention in a young offender institution.

Direct consequences: Defendant (1)'s aggregate sentence increased to 5 years; Defendant (2)'s aggregate sentence remains 3 years' detention but the record must correctly describe it as detention in a young offender institution. The opinion applies existing authorities to assess seriousness and deterrence; it does not purport to establish a new legal precedent.