Factual and Procedural Background
This is a Commercial Court judgment delivered by Judge Twomey on 14 July 2026. The action was commenced by the Plaintiff against the Defendant by plenary summons dated 6 March 2024. The Plaintiff alleges breach of a Shareholders' Agreement dated 12 February 2021, claiming the Defendant copied the Plaintiff's blockchain technology (referred to as 1DLT), used that technology to develop a rival product (referred to as Wowen) via Company B, caused employees to join Company B, and misrepresented commitments of further funding. The Plaintiff seeks declarations of sole ownership and entitlement to use 1DLT, damages for intentional interference, conversion, misrepresentation, and disgorgement of profits. The Defendant denies the allegations and contends there is no recoverable loss; Company B entered liquidation in August 2023.
Separate criminal proceedings were commenced in Switzerland by Company A (the Plaintiff's parent) against former employees; the Defendant is not a party to those proceedings. By Notice of Motion dated 3 February 2026, the Defendant sought orders requiring the Plaintiff to disclose details of the funding of the Irish litigation, alleging unlawful third-party funding (maintenance/champerty). Affidavits were exchanged, written submissions by the Plaintiff filed 27 April 2026, and the application was heard on 19 May 2026. Judgment was delivered 14 July 2026.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court has jurisdiction/power to order disclosure of litigation funding arrangements (including alleged unlawful third-party funding) as part of its inherent jurisdiction.
- Whether there is sufficient evidence in this case to justify ordering disclosure of the identity of funders, the dates and extent of funding, and any written funding agreements or corporate records relating to Company A.
- Whether disclosure should be made to the Defendant alone or also to the Court, and which categories of documents, if any, should be disclosed.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendant's Arguments
- The Court has power to order disclosure of funding arrangements to enable the Defendant to know his true adversary and to investigate alleged unlawful third-party funding (maintenance/champerty).
- Discovered documents (an email of 30 May 2023, Board minutes dated 19 June 2023, and WhatsApp messages between March 2023 and June 2024) provide cogent evidence that third-party funding (from Attorney Thompson and others) may have been provided, possibly funneled through Company A.
- There is a public interest in disclosure where evidence may show a criminal offence (maintenance/champerty) and where unlawful funding could adversely affect court lists and the administration of justice.
- The Defendant seeks (i) the name and address of each person or entity who provided funding together with dates and extent of such funding; (ii) certain corporate records and financial statements of Company A; and (iii) a copy of any written funding agreement.
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The Plaintiff contends the Court lacks a general power under the Rules to order disclosure of funding arrangements and that disclosure in Persona was in a specific context; alternatively, any jurisdiction derives from inherent jurisdiction only in limited circumstances.
- The Plaintiff says Company A (a shareholder) is the sole funder and that funding from a shareholder does not require disclosure for the Defendant to know his true adversary (relying on Thema).
- Additional objections included alleged abandonment of reliefs, delay by the Defendant, and that the Defendant did not seek security for costs; the Plaintiff also relied on Swiss law considerations regarding availability of Company A corporate records.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Shannon v Shannon [2024] IEHC 291 |
Comparative observation re judges per capita (context on litigation volume). |
Used as factual context on judicial resources and litigation levels in Ireland. |
| Persona Digital Telephony Ltd and another v The Minister for Public Enterprise Ireland and others [2022] 2 I.R. 417 ([2017] IESC 27) |
Third-party funding (maintenance/champerty) contrary to public policy; scenarios where funding disclosure may be ordered. |
Key precedent: informed Court's view on public policy, risks of commoditisation of litigation, and relevance to disclosure jurisdiction. |
| Persona Digital Telephony Limited v Minister for Public Enterprise [2015] 1 I.R. 124 ([2015] IEHC 457) |
High Court consideration of funding agreement described as opposed to public policy. |
Referenced as prior High Court context to Persona and to the practice of disclosure. |
| Kirwan v Connors [2025] IESC 21 |
Recognition of inherent jurisdiction to make orders that protect and ensure efficient administration of justice. |
Foundation for Court's conclusion that it has inherent jurisdiction to order disclosure of funding arrangements. |
| Thema International Fund plc v HSBC Institutional Trust Services (Ireland) Limited [2011] 3 I.R. 654 |
Sets out three scenarios in which funding disclosure may be ordered and reasoning on 'knowing one's adversary'. |
The Court applied the Thema framework (noting shareholder funding need not be disclosed) and drew a corollary that non-shareholder funding may require disclosure. |
| Greenclean Waste Management v Leahy [2014] IEHC 314 |
Discussion of disguised methods of investing in litigation; trafficking in litigation. |
Used to support point that funding via a parent can be a conduit for third-party funding and may amount to unlawful funding if disguised. |
| SPV Optimal Osus Limited v HSBC Institutional Trust Services (Ireland) Limited [2017] IECA 56 |
Authority cited for description of champerty as a more severe form of maintenance. |
Used to define maintenance/champerty concepts. |
| Howley v Howard; Howley v McClean [2026] IESC 34 |
Clarification that maintenance/champerty can operate as a defence to proceedings. |
Not considered to have direct bearing on disclosure question but was noted and parties given opportunity to address it. |
| McCool Controls and Engineering Ltd v Honeywell Control Systems Ltd [2024] IESC 5 |
Consideration of disproportionate relationships between equity and proceeds as relevant to champerty analysis. |
Referenced when assessing Board minutes evidencing disproportionate equity/proceeds proposals. |
| Dublin Waterworld Ltd v National Sports Campus Development Authority [2014] IEHC 518 |
Order requiring plaintiff to disclose identity of funders where defendant alleged third-party funding; public interest justification. |
Used as authority for disclosure to protect public interest and to enable costs/ security for costs applications. |
| Fraser v Buckle [1994] 1 IR 1 |
Authority discussing reasons common law condemns champerty. |
Cited for the proposition that abuses flow from champerty and relevant public policy. |
| Re Trepca Mines Limited (No. 2) [1963] Ch. 199 |
Quoted observation (via Lord Denning) on why champerty is condemned. |
Used to underscore policy-based condemnation of champerty. |
| Saunders v Houghton [2010] 3 N.Z.L.R. 331 |
Stay application based on litigation funding held to be an abuse of process. |
Referenced to support contention that unlawful funding can amount to abuse of court process. |
| Giles v Thompson [1993] 3 All E.R. 321 |
Champerty law designed to protect integrity of judicial system. |
Cited in support of public policy aim to protect administration of justice. |
| Moorview Developments v First Active Plc [2019] 1 IR 417 ([2018] IESC 33) |
Availability of third-party funder costs orders and non-exclusivity of procedural remedies such as security for costs. |
Used to reject argument that failure to apply for security for costs precludes other pre-trial remedies like disclosure. |
| Dubai Bank Ltd. v. Galadari (No. 2) [1990] 1 W.L.R. 731 |
Referenced in discussion of Order 31, r.15 jurisdictional limits (context from Persona High Court decision). |
Not applied directly; used to discuss procedural routes and limits. |
| Beakonford Limited v Stokes [2025] IEHC 22 |
Reference to long-standing judicial calls to reduce High Court costs. |
Used as contextual support for discussion on costs and access to justice. |
| Word Perfect Translation Services Ltd v Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform [2023] IECA 189 |
Referenced concerning onus on lawyers to take broad approach to costs. |
Cited in concluding procedural directions on costs and listing. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in two main steps: (i) determine jurisdiction to order disclosure of funding arrangements; and (ii) determine whether the evidence in this case justified making disclosure orders.
On jurisdiction, the Court concluded that it has an inherent jurisdiction to order disclosure of litigation funding where necessary to protect the administration of justice and to prevent abuse. The Court relied on Kirwan v Connors to state that courts possess powers to preserve and conserve the administration of justice and to ensure courts operate efficiently and effectively. The Court reasoned that unlawful third-party funding can amount to an abuse of process and that disclosure of suspected unlawful funding is within the inherent jurisdiction to protect court process and efficiency.
Applying the legal framework in Thema, the Court accepted the principle that funding provided by parties with a legitimate interest in the litigation (e.g. a shareholder or creditor) ordinarily does not require disclosure for the defendant to know its true adversary. The Court drew the corollary that where funding may come from third parties without legitimate interest, detailed disclosure of the identity and terms of funding may be necessary and proportionate.
On the facts, the Court examined the evidence supplied: (a) an email dated 30 May 2023 from Attorney Chew referencing sharing of "cash damages" with those that fund litigation and proposing a 50% share; (b) Board minutes dated 19 June 2023 proposing a 50/50 split on damages and unusual equity/proceeds arrangements; and (c) WhatsApp messages between March 2023 and June 2024 among directors (including Attorney McNulty and Attorney OReilly) indicating that "Attorney Thompson has funded a bit" and had "people lined up to provide more funding" and was "pushing for a settlement" for €5 million plus costs.
The Court found that the email and WhatsApp messages, taken at face value, constituted cogent evidence that third-party funding might have been provided and possibly channeled through Company A. The Court rejected Plaintiff's contentions that the messages were casual or disconnected and gave weight to contemporaneous director communications as indicative of the company's intentions and actions. The Court also found issues undermining the credibility of Plaintiff's sworn explanation that the 30 May 2023 email related only to Swiss criminal proceedings.
The Court considered and rejected several procedural objections advanced by the Plaintiff: that the application was time-barred by delay (the Court accepted explanations for the timing and noted delay by the Plaintiff in discovery), that the Defendant's failure to seek security for costs was fatal (citing Moorview), and that reliefs abandoned by the Defendant should bar remaining reliefs. The Court found none of these objections sufficient to refuse disclosure where there was sufficient evidence to justify it.
Having found sufficient prima facie evidence of possible third-party funding without legitimate interest, and given the public interest in identifying potential criminal conduct and protecting court efficiency, the Court ordered disclosure of the identity of funders, dates and extent of funding, any written funding agreement, and certain corporate records of Company A. The Court also ordered that disclosure be made to both the Defendant and the Court, as done in Persona, to assist the Court in ensuring compliance with the law and the efficient administration of justice. The Court addressed Swiss law concerns by reference to expert evidence indicating a High Court letter of request would likely be executable in the competent Swiss court.
Holding and Implications
ORDERED: The Court granted the Defendant's application and ordered that the Plaintiff disclose (i) the name and address of each person or entity who has provided funding to the Plaintiff in this litigation together with the dates and extent of such funding in each case; (ii) any written agreement in relation to the funding of these proceedings; and (iii) corporate documents of Company A sought in the Notice of Motion. Disclosure is to be made to the Defendant and to the Court. A mention listing was scheduled to deal with final orders and costs.
Implications: The direct effect is that the Plaintiff must produce details and documents related to litigation funding to enable the Defendant and the Court to assess whether unlawful third-party funding (maintenance/champerty) exists in these proceedings. The decision affirms that the High Court possesses an inherent jurisdiction to order such disclosure where necessary to protect the administration of justice and prevent abuse; the Court applied established authorities (including Thema and Kirwan) to the facts, but did not purport to create a novel statutory rule beyond its articulation of the inherent-jurisdiction basis for disclosure. No wider statutory reform was ordered; the ruling addresses disclosure in the circumstances of this case and the public-interest concerns identified by the Court.