Morgan, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant, aged 20 at the time of the offending and 21 at conviction and sentence, was convicted on 6 May 2026 at The Magistrates' Court of one count of dangerous driving contrary to section 2 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and committed for sentence. The offence occurred on 12 July 2025. On 3 June 2026 The Crown Court (Judge Bull) imposed an immediate sentence of eight months' imprisonment and disqualified the Appellant from driving for 22 months (an 18‑month discretionary period plus a four‑month extension under section 35A of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 and until an extended driving test is passed). The Registrar referred the Appellant's application for leave to appeal against sentence to the full court; leave was granted.

Factually, on 12 July 2025 the Appellant followed and chased a motor vehicle driven by Victim A, containing Victim B and a child, after an earlier argument involving Victim B (the Appellant's partner). The Appellant rammed Victim A's vehicle multiple times, struck and wrote off a parked vehicle belonging to Victim C, and carried out further dangerous manoeuvres. The Appellant was intoxicated (blood alcohol recorded at not less than 84 mg/100 ml some hours after the driving), tested positive for cocaine and cannabis metabolites, was uninsured and had never passed a driving test. The Appellant sustained serious injuries in a subsequent crash (including fractured skull and broken neck). He has previous good character. A pre‑sentence report described him as extremely immature and proposed rehabilitative requirements. The Appellant pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentencing judge erred in failing to consider section 277A of the Sentencing Act 2020 (as brought into force on 22 March 2026), which makes a suspended sentence order mandatory for adult offenders convicted after the commencement date where the immediate custodial term would be not more than 12 months unless there are "exceptional circumstances".
2. If the judge did err, whether the circumstances of the offending or the offender were "exceptional" so as to justify an immediate custodial sentence despite section 277A.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Attorney Harmes)

• The sentencing judge failed to consider section 277A when imposing an immediate custodial sentence of eight months; under that provision a suspended sentence order was mandatory unless exceptional circumstances existed, so the sentence should have been suspended.

Prosecution's Arguments (Attorney Desai)

• Even if section 277A applied, the facts of this case (the nature and seriousness of the offending) would have justified a finding of exceptional circumstances permitting an immediate custodial sentence.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first determined that section 277A applied because the Appellant was convicted after the commencement date (22 March 2026), was over 21 at conviction, the sentence imposed was not more than 12 months and none of the section 277A(3) exemptions applied. Section 277A(1)–(2) therefore required a suspended sentence unless the court was of the opinion that there were exceptional circumstances relating to the offence or the offender justifying an immediate custodial sentence.

The judgment records that the sentencing judge did not consider section 277A or the revised Sentencing Council guideline distinguishing cases before and after 22 March 2026, and instead explained the decision not to suspend by reference to the seriousness of the offending. The Recorder reached an adjusted sentence by taking an 18‑month starting point for category A1 dangerous driving, increasing for aggravating features to 21 months, reducing to 12 months for mitigation and then applying a guilty plea reduction to reach eight months' imprisonment.

The court analysed whether seriousness alone could amount to the "exceptional circumstances" required by the statute and concluded it was unlikely: the statute applies precisely to cases where the immediate sentence is not more than 12 months, so shortness of the term (or the view that the sentence should have been longer) cannot by itself be exceptional. The court emphasised the strong statutory language "exceptional" and noted there was nothing in this case that was uncommon or extraordinary in the relevant sense. Because the sentencing judge made no finding of exceptional circumstances required by section 277A, he lacked power to impose immediate custody and was obliged to make a suspended sentence order.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED

Holding: The court quashed the immediate sentence of eight months' imprisonment and substituted a suspended sentence order of eight months' imprisonment suspended for two years, with a requirement of 15 Rehabilitation Activity Requirement sessions. The Appellant's period spent in custody (two weeks) was noted as time he ought not to have served under the correct application of section 277A.

Driving disqualification: The four‑month extension originally added to reflect anticipated time in custody falls away; the disqualification is 18 months and remains subject to passing an extended driving test.

Implications: The direct effect is to replace the immediate custodial sentence with a suspended sentence and specified rehabilitative requirement. The decision applies section 277A as enacted by Parliament; no new common‑law precedent beyond the application of that statutory provision is asserted in the opinion.