Taylor, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant was convicted after pleading guilty in the magistrates' court of one offence of stalking involving serious alarm or distress contrary to section 4A(1)(a)(b)(i) and (5) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. On 12 March 2026 the Appellant was sentenced at the Crown Court at The City to 14 months' imprisonment; that custodial sentence is not challenged on this appeal. The Appellant was made subject to a Restraining Order the terms of which were agreed by the prosecution and on behalf of the Appellant at the sentencing hearing; leave to appeal was granted only against the indefinite duration of that Restraining Order.

The conduct underlying the conviction arose from the Appellant's prolonged fixation on the Complainant, a urological surgeon who had treated the Appellant following gender affirming surgery in 2021. The conduct included repeated unwanted emails and hospital attendances, threats of violence in an email in November 2025, false assertions of being under the Complainant's care, and other contacts and enquiries causing the Complainant serious alarm and distress between 2021 and 2025. The Appellant was sectioned under the Mental Health Act in April 2021 and was subsequently assessed in psychiatric and pre-sentence reports provided to the sentencing court.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether it was lawful and proportionate for the sentencing judge to make the agreed Restraining Order operate indefinitely (i.e. "until further order") rather than for a specified limited period.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• Attorney Baggaley submitted that an indefinite Restraining Order was inappropriate and disproportionate and that a time-limited order should have been made.
• It was submitted the Appellant's previous good character, the significant gap between the 2021 and 2024 offending, the Appellant's genuine and persistent mental health difficulties (as evidenced in the psychiatric report), and the absence of prior breaches of court orders indicated no need for an indefinite order.
• It was further argued that the judge should have confined the inquiry to proportionality of the order itself rather than considering future applications to vary or discharge the order.

Prosecution's Response

• Attorney Dixon argued that an indefinite order was justified because of: (a) fluctuating insight and attitude by the Appellant; (b) psychiatric assessment indicating high risk of persisting in stalking and moderate risk of recurrence; (c) pre-sentence report assessing high risk of re-offending and of causing serious psychological harm; (d) connection between mental disorder and offending; (e) the Appellant's prior resumption of stalking after a multi-year gap; and (f) the Complainant's public-facing role making professional contact information publicly available.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began with the statutory powers under sections 359 and 360 of the Sentencing Act 2020, which permit a restraining order either for a specified period or until further order and allow such orders only when made in addition to dealing with the offender for the offence. The court treated proportionality between imposed restrictions and the harm to be prevented as the guiding principle.

Applying the guidance from R v Khellaf, the court observed that the judge had properly considered the Complainant's views and the necessity for an order. The court analysed the factual matrix: repeated stalking conduct over several years, threats in November 2025, significant intrusion into the Complainant's day-to-day life, the Appellant's psychiatric assessment showing fluctuating insight and a long-term prognosis with potential for recurring behaviour, and a pre-sentence report assessing high risks of re-offending and of serious psychological harm.

The court balanced the restrictions on the Appellant—preventing direct or indirect contact and attendance at known addresses except in limited circumstances—against the ongoing risk and the substantial harm to the Complainant. It concluded that the agreed terms imposed limited interference with any legitimate need for contact and that the evidence did not show the risk would be reduced to a level making the order unnecessary in any foreseeable finite period. The judge's view that an indefinite order was exceptional was recorded, but the court accepted he was entitled to conclude that only an order "until further order" would adequately address the continuing risk. The judge's comment that the order could be varied or discharged in exceptional future circumstances was noted but did not alter the proportionality assessment at sentence.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED. The Court of Appeal dismissed the Appellant's challenge to the duration of the Restraining Order and upheld the sentencing judge's decision to make the Restraining Order operate "until further order".

Implications: The direct effect is that the Restraining Order as made remains in force indefinitely and the Appellant's appeal against sentence is dismissed. The opinion did not identify or purport to create new legal precedent beyond applying existing statutory provisions and the principles from R v Khellaf.