City Outdoor Media Ltd v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government & Anor

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant owned and operated a large-format illuminated advertising display on a frontage of a surfaced car park in The City (the site). Express consent was granted for a static display in 2013; that consent expired in 2018, giving rise to deemed consent. The static display was replaced in April 2021 by a digital display with changing images.

The Second Respondent served a Discontinuance Notice ("DN") under Regulation 8 of the Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements) (England) Regulations 2007, stating that the use of the site for the display of advertisements for which there is deemed consent caused substantial injury to amenity and posed a danger to highway safety. The Appellant appealed to the Secretary of State; an inspector determined the appeal (hearing and site visits on 16–17 June 2024) and dismissed it, concluding the DN was issued under Regulation 8(1)(b) (use of the site).

The Appellant sought statutory review in the High Court under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. Judge Pearce dismissed the claim on 18 July 2025 but granted permission to appeal on one ground. The appeal was heard in the Court of Appeal and the judgment was handed down on 29 June 2026.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether, where a DN targets the use of a site for advertisements and thereby affects all classes of deemed consent under the 2007 Regulations, the decision-maker is required to consider the necessity of removing all those classes of deemed consent (rather than only the existing display).
2. Whether the Court of Appeal's decision in Putney Bridge Approach Limited v SSCLG [2019] PTSR 1431; [2018] EWCA Civ 2268 is authority for the proposition that an inspector need only consider the display on site if no alternatives are proposed regardless of whether a DN is issued under Regulation 8(1)(a) or 8(1)(b), and, if so, whether that decision should be overruled.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The inspector and judge erred by focusing only on the existing display and failing to consider whether it was necessary to remove all classes of deemed consent affected by the DN.
• Because the DN removed all deemed consent rights, and Regulation 8(1) requires that a notice be "necessary" to remedy substantial injury, the inspector was obliged to assess necessity in relation to removal of all deemed consent classes; otherwise any subsequent express-consent application would be foredoomed.
• If Putney Bridge stands for the proposition that an inspector need only consider the on-site display regardless of which limb of Regulation 8(1) applies, Putney Bridge was wrongly decided and should be overturned.

Respondents' Arguments

• Putney Bridge correctly interprets Regulation 8(1)(b): an inspector is not required to consider every hypothetical alternative advertisement or every class of deemed consent unless such alternatives are properly raised and evidenced.
• The appellant did not advance or evidence specific alternative classes or displays that would avoid substantial injury; absent that material, the inspector was entitled to decide on the evidence focused on the existing display.
• The distinction between deemed and express consent remains real: withdrawal of deemed consent does not preclude an application for express consent, and a DN's existence is a material consideration but not necessarily dispositive.
• No basis was shown for this Court to depart from Putney Bridge under the Young v Bristol Aeroplane criteria.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began from the statutory wording of Regulation 8(1): a DN may be served if the local planning authority "is satisfied that it is necessary to do so to remedy a substantial injury to the amenity of the locality or a danger to members of the public." That test is the same for Regulation 8(1)(a) (particular advertisement) and 8(1)(b) (use of a particular site).

The court held that the language of Regulation 8(1)(b) does not, expressly or impliedly, require the decision-maker to assess every possible form of deemed consent in Schedule 3 when considering whether discontinuance of the use of a site is "necessary". Requiring such an exhaustive inquiry would be impractical and would amount to adding words to the statute.

The court emphasised procedural reality and the limits of the decision-maker's task: the inspector decides on the material and arguments presented. If the appellant wished the inspector to examine specific alternative classes or hypothetical forms of advertisement, the appellant needed to put forward evidence and argument to that effect. The appellant did not do so; its submissions and evidence were focused on the existing display.

The court considered the consequences of a DN for subsequent express-consent applications and concluded (following Putney Bridge) that withdrawal of deemed consent does not in itself make an express-consent application impossible; the LPA must still determine any such application on its merits. The court found no legal error in the inspector's reasoning or in Judge Pearce's analysis that the inspector applied the correct legal test to the evidence before him.

Finally, the court concluded there was no basis to depart from Putney Bridge under Young v Bristol Aeroplane, and that Putney Bridge's analysis supports the result in the present case.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the inspector's decision to dismiss the appeal against the DN. The direct effect is that the DN remains upheld and deemed consent for the use of the site for the display of advertisements is discontinued as specified in the DN. The court held that an inspector considering a DN under Regulation 8(1)(b) is not obliged to assess all hypothetical classes or forms of deemed consent unless such alternatives are properly advanced and evidenced; Putney Bridge remains good law and was not overruled. No new precedent altering that principle was established.