| Party A v Party B [1989] AC 177 |
General proposition that the employer of an independent contractor is, in general, not liable for torts of the contractor. |
Used to support proposition that liability ordinarily does not extend to torts committed by employees of an independent contractor. |
| Quarman v Burnett (1840) 6 M&W 499 |
Early statement that master-servant liability ceases where the relation ceases; third parties contracting with master not liable as master. |
Referenced as historical authority for the distinction between employer liability and liability for independent contractors. |
| Market Investigations Ltd v Minister of Social Security [1969] 2 QB 173 |
Fundamental test: whether the person performs services "as a person in business on his own account". |
Adopted as foundational guidance on distinguishing independent contractors from employees. |
| Lee Ting Sang v Chung Chi‑Keung [1990] 2 AC 374 |
Discussed multi-factorial approach to employment/contractor distinction. |
Referenced for the proposition that control is relevant but not determinative. |
| E v English Province of Our Lady of Charity [2013] QB 722 |
Definition: employee paid a wage/salary working under some control; independent contractor works for own business at risk of profit or loss. |
Quoted to encapsulate distinction between employees and independent contractors. |
| Hawley v Luminar Leisure Ltd [2006] PIQR P17 |
Illustration of "temporary employer" where substantial transfer of control can render hirer vicariously liable. |
Identified as factually distinguishable; Court noted Hawley involved greater subordination and control than present case. |
| Viasystems (Tyneside) Ltd v Thermal Transfer (Northern) Ltd [2006] QB 510 |
Recognition of potential for dual vicarious liability in certain contexts. |
Mentioned as background on dual liability but not outcome-determinative here. |
| Various Claimants v Catholic Welfare Society [2013] 2 AC 1 ("Christian Brothers") |
Two‑stage test: (1) relationship akin to employment; (2) connection between relationship and tort; policy reasons for vicarious liability. |
Framework applied: stage 1 inquiry considered, including the "incidents" identified by Lord Phillips; used to structure analysis of whether Company B was vicariously liable. |
| Woodland v Swimming Teachers Association [2014] AC 537 |
Clarified limits of vicarious liability and that it does not extend to true independent contractors. |
Referred to for the proposition that the expansion to "akin to employment" does not encompass true independent contractors. |
| Cox v Ministry of Justice [2016] AC 660 |
Confirmed relationship other than employment can give rise to vicarious liability where individual carries on activities as integral part of defendant's business and risk created by defendant. |
Quoted to emphasize that activities entirely attributable to a recognisable independent business are unlikely to attract vicarious liability. |
| Armes v Nottinghamshire County Council [2018] AC 355 |
Held foster parents' care was integral to local authority's organisation such that relationship akin to employment could arise. |
Used to illustrate that where individuals are not carrying on own business but act as part of defendant's organisation, stage 1 may be satisfied; contrasted with present facts. |
| Various Claimants v Barclays Bank plc [2020] AC 973 |
Emphasised continued distinction between independent contractors and relationships akin to employment; factors to consider when not clear. |
Applied to stress that where tortfeasor carries on own business (portfolio practice, freedom to refuse work, insurance), defendant not vicariously liable. |
| BXB v Trustees of the Barry Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses [2024] AC 567 |
Summarised principles; stage 1 is whether relationship is employment or akin to employment; provided list of potentially relevant features. |
Cited as the formulation the trial judge applied; Court of Appeal analysed how that formulation must be used and whether it displaced traditional independent contractor analysis. |
| X v Lord Advocate [2026] 2 WLR 43 |
Discussed limits of akin to employment in specific institutional contexts (judiciary not akin to employment). |
Referred to as part of the modern authorities clarifying scope of vicarious liability. |
| Ng Huat Seng v Munib Mohammed Madni [2017] 2 SLR 1074 |
Singapore authority refining doctrine to accommodate varied relationships and emphasising independent contractor exception. |
Referenced to support caution against expanding vicarious liability to torts of independent contractors. |
| Party C v Party D [1947] AC 1 (Mersey Docks Harbour Board v Coggins and Griffith) |
Authority on "temporary deemed employer" / transfer of control principles. |
Mentioned in particulars but not pursued on appeal; Court noted facts did not support finding of temporary deemed employer. |
| In re Sprintroom [2019] 2 BCLC 617 |
Authority on appellate interference with trial judge findings in commercial contexts (referenced by Appellant). |
Cited by Appellant to argue Judge Sweeting should not have overturned trial judge's evaluative findings; Court considered but concluded appellate interference was justified here. |
| Volpi v Volpi [2022] 4 WLR 48 |
Authority on limits to appellate review of findings. |
Relied upon by Appellant in submissions; Court nonetheless held appellate intervention appropriate on the legal approach adopted by trial judge. |
| Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (24th ed.) |
Textual statement that employer of an independent contractor is generally not responsible for torts of that contractor and that the contractor's employees stand in same position as employer. |
Quoted to support the conclusion that Company B, who engaged an independent contractor, would not normally be vicariously liable for torts of the contractor's employees. |