Summary of Judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant (a minor) was injured on 22 August 2011 when an unidentified, untraced vehicle struck his pram. A claim for compensation was made under the Untraced Drivers' Agreement dated 1 June 2004 ("the 2004 Agreement") administered by Company B. Company B investigated and, after correspondence and review, issued a notice of award increasing the offer to £2,500 plus interest (total £2,901.28) and proposed mechanisms for holding the funds pending the Appellant's majority, including engagement with the Official Solicitor and reference to court procedures.

The Appellant contended that Company B refused to allow court approval of the settlement or to have the funds held/invested under court supervision and brought judicial review proceedings on 4 February 2020. The amended Order 53 statement considered by the lower court is dated 21 January 2021. The High Court (King's Bench Division) dismissed the challenge (reserved decision delivered by Judge Rooney on 1 October 2025). The Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal. This judgment (delivered 17 June 2026 by Judge McAlinden on behalf of the court of three judges) affirms the lower court decision.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the 2004 Agreement complied with the EU law principles of equivalence and effectiveness in light of Directive 2009/103/EC (in particular articles 3 and 10), including whether those provisions encompass a right to court approval of an award to a minor and/or a right to court investment of such an award.
2. Whether the 2004 Agreement unlawfully curtailed the Appellant's access to court (article 6 ECHR and common law) by precluding court approval and investment of a minor's award.
3. Whether differences in procedure for claims against insured/identified drivers and untraced drivers amounted to unlawful discrimination contrary to article 14 ECHR in combination with article 6 and/or A1P1.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The 2004 Agreement failed to give proper effect to Directive 2009/103/EC (articles 3 and 10) and thus breached the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.
• The Appellant had a right to court approval of any settlement and to have the awarded funds invested under court supervision until majority; Company B's procedures prevented effective access to court.
• The different procedural routes for untraced-driver victims (arbitration/administrative scheme) versus victims of identified/insured drivers amounted to unjustified discrimination in breach of article 14 ECHR read with article 6 and A1P1.

Respondents' Arguments (Company A, Company B and Notice Party)

• The 2004 Agreement, when read with available remedies (internal review, independent arbitrator, limited rights of judicial review and appeal under the Arbitration Act 1996 and contractual/ statutory remedies), satisfied the EU principles of equivalence and effectiveness.
• There is no EU-law right to sue Company B as a surrogate tortfeasor; Article 10 requires ability to apply directly to the compensation body but does not convert that body into a defendant in ordinary tort proceedings.
• The procedural protections available (including the arbitrator's independence, powers to obtain evidence, rights to oral hearing and the possibility of court challenge under sections 67/68 Arbitration Act 1996) and Company B's offers in the present case (cost undertakings, engagement with the Official Solicitor, willingness to meet investment/fees) were sufficient to address the Appellant's concerns.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by reference to Directive 2009/103/EC (articles 3 and 10) and the established EU principles of equivalence and effectiveness as explained by the CJEU and the UK Supreme Court authorities. The analysis followed these main strands:

• Scope of Directive rights: the court accepted the correct legal starting point in Evans—that article 10 requires Member States to ensure victims may apply directly to a compensation body and that the body must provide reasoned replies, but the Directive does not, of itself, create a right to treat the compensation body as if it were a defendant in ordinary civil litigation.
• Comparator and procedural assessment: applying guidance from PSNI v Agnew and Levez, the court assessed the MIB procedure as a whole rather than by isolated features, identifying the appropriate comparator (claims against identified insured drivers) but recognising that Member States may adopt different procedural mechanisms so long as equivalence and effectiveness are preserved.
• Adequacy of MIB procedure in this case: the court accepted that the 2004 Agreement provided a layered procedure—internal review, an independent arbitrator (appointed from a qualified panel), powers to require further investigation and evidence, rights to oral hearing and representation, and limited court challenges under the Arbitration Act 1996—and that these features, together with Company B's specific undertakings in this case (costs undertakings, willingness to engage the Official Solicitor, indemnify fees, and to allow independent arbitrator scrutiny), meant the tests of equivalence and effectiveness were satisfied on these facts.
• Right to sue Company B and common law claims: the court concluded that Evans and domestic authority do not support a free-standing common-law cause of action against the compensation body as a surrogate tortfeasor; Morrison remained applicable on this point.
• Article 6 and discrimination claims: the court held that, assuming engagement, once equivalence and effectiveness are established on the facts, generic article 6 or article 14/A1P1 discrimination challenges could not succeed; the available routes to judicial review, arbitration appeal and contractual remedies further limited such claims.
• Investment/protection of funds for minors: clause 25 of the 2004 Agreement permitted Company B to establish trusts or to seek appointment of an appropriate representative; Company B's proposals to involve the Official Solicitor and to meet associated costs were sufficient in this case to satisfy equivalence/effectiveness, though the court recommended consideration of a more formal, bespoke investment arrangement for future cases.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Holding: The Court of Appeal affirmed the High Court's decision (Judge Rooney) and dismissed the Appellant's appeal. The court concluded that, on the facts of this case and in light of the specific assurances and procedural features described, the 2004 Agreement (as operated by Company B here) satisfied the EU principles of equivalence and effectiveness and did not breach the Appellant's article 6/access to court rights or give rise to an established discrimination claim.

Implications: The direct effect on the parties is that the Appellant's application for judicial review is refused and the MIB's award and proposed arrangements stand subject to the avenues of arbitration and limited court review described. The court made recommendations that Company B consider formalising arrangements (modelled on other compensation schemes) for investment/management of awards to minors or protected persons to provide consistency and reduce future litigation risk. The court did not purport to establish a new general rule beyond the application of equivalence/effectiveness to the facts here.