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A Reeves v Kier Ltd (England and Wales : Race Discrimination)

Smart Summary

Summary of Employment Tribunal Judgment — Case No: 6026175/2025

Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiff was employed by Company A as a Commercial Administrator from 18 November 2024 until she resigned with immediate effect on 3 July 2025. The claim form was presented on 14 July 2025 following ACAS early conciliation that ran from 22 May 2025 to 3 July 2025. A Preliminary Hearing identified complaints of harassment related to race, victimisation and direct race discrimination. A full hearing was held over multiple days in May 2026 before Judge Ayre. The Tribunal heard evidence from the Plaintiff and witnesses on behalf of Company A, including the Operations Manager, the Quantity Surveyor (who became the Plaintiff's line manager), and the HR Business Partner. The Plaintiff represented herself; Company A was represented by Attorney Mather. The Tribunal made findings of fact, applied the Equality Act 2010 provisions and reached conclusions on harassment, victimisation and direct discrimination.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the acts alleged amounted to harassment related to race under section 26 of the Equality Act 2010 (was the conduct unwanted, related to race, and did it have the purpose or effect set out in section 26(1)(b)?).
  2. Whether the Plaintiff had performed protected acts and, if so, whether she was subjected to detriments because of those acts constituting victimisation under section 27 of the Equality Act 2010.
  3. Whether the alleged acts amounted to direct race discrimination under section 13 of the Equality Act 2010 (was there less favourable treatment and was it because of race, applying comparator principles and the burden of proof framework)?
  4. Whether any alleged breaches of contract by Company A amounted to constructive dismissal, and whether any such constructive dismissal (if established) was linked to protected acts.
  5. Time limit issues under section 123 of the Equality Act 2010 and whether any complaints were brought within the appropriate period or should be extended as just and equitable.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The Plaintiff alleged multiple incidents between November 2024 and June 2025 amounted to harassment related to race, victimisation and direct race discrimination (examples included racially descriptive or mocking comments, exclusion from team photographs, whispering, rebukes in meetings, deletion of tasks and changes to her HR record).
  • The Plaintiff asserted that her 4 March 2025 message to the Operations Manager and her formal grievance of 1 May 2025 were protected acts and that subsequent acts (including perceived poor handling of the grievance, change to contract end date on HR systems and workplace behaviours) were retaliatory or discriminatory.
  • The Plaintiff contended Company A breached contract and that she resigned in response to those breaches.

Defendant's (Company A) Arguments

  • Company A accepted some conduct (for example deletion of tasks) but provided non‑discriminatory management explanations (e.g. task reallocation during sickness absence, steps to avoid overloading on return and to correct errors).
  • Company A disputed that several alleged comments/events occurred and provided alternative explanations (e.g. the Eid meeting dispute arose because the Plaintiff had changed the event date without informing others; HR system changes were a business‑wide IT reporting code update and did not alter the contract end date).
  • Company A argued the 4 March message to the Operations Manager was not a protected act (it characterised it as vague) — the Tribunal rejected that point and found it was a protected act; otherwise Company A argued there was no causal link or knowledge by relevant individuals of protected acts and that it had acted reasonably in offering welfare support and investigating the grievance.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Richmond Pharmacology v Dhaliwal [2009] ICR 724 Context and intent matter; not every racially slanted adverse comment will constitute violation of dignity; effect assessed by considering whether offence was reasonably apparent. Used to conclude certain descriptive/offhand remarks did not meet the threshold for harassment in the circumstances (e.g. "black" used descriptively; "coloured" used descriptively and one‑off).
Hartley v Foreign and Commonwealth Office Services [2016] ICR D17 Wide meaning of 'related to' for protected characteristic; context is important. Guided assessment of whether conduct was related to race when considering each incident.
Warby v Wunda Group plc EAT 0434/11 Context as factor in deciding relation to protected characteristic (referenced). Referenced as part of contextual approach; applied in evaluating incidents.
Land Registry v Grant [2011] ICR 1390 Context is highly material when assessing the effect of a remark; intent relevant to assessing effect. Applied in assessing whether remarks had the proscribed effect on the Plaintiff.
Martin v Devonshires Solicitors [2011] ICR 352 Burden of proof provisions in victimisation; claimant must establish protected act and detriment. Referenced when assessing the Plaintiff's victimisation claims and burden of proof.
Derbyshire and ors v St Helens Metropolitan Borough Council and ors [2007] ICR 841 Three‑stage test for victimisation under pre‑Equality Act legislation (adapted for Equality Act analysis). Adapted to structure Tribunal's victimisation analysis (did a protected act occur, was there detriment, was there causal link).
Nagarajan v London Regional Transport [1999] ICR 877 Victimisation need not be consciously motivated; subconscious influence may suffice. Explained that motive need not be conscious when assessing whether detriments were linked to protected acts.
Igen Ltd (formerly Leeds Careers Guidance and others) v Wong [2005] ICR 931 Part of two‑stage burden of proof framework in discrimination cases. Used with Barton to explain burden shifting mechanics applied to direct discrimination and harassment claims.
Barton v Investec Henderson Crosthwaite Securities Ltd [2003] ICR 1205 EAT guidance on two‑stage burden of proof in discrimination cases. Referenced in explaining burden of proof and applying it to the Plaintiff's allegations.
Ayodele v Citylink Limited and anor [2017] EWCA Civ. 1913 It is fair to require claimant to bear burden at first stage of proof (prima facie case requirement). Supported Tribunal's approach to assessing whether the Plaintiff established facts from which discrimination could be inferred.
Royal Mail Group Ltd v Efobi [2021] ICR 1 Claimant must establish a prima facie case at stage one of burden of proof under s.136 Equality Act. Applied to require Plaintiff to prove facts that, absent other explanation, could indicate discrimination.
Glasgow City Council v Zafar [1998] ICR 120 Discriminators often do not advertise prejudices; direct discrimination can be covert. Supported Tribunal's awareness that discrimination can be covert, but evidence must support inference.
London Borough of Ealing v Rihal [2004] IRLR 642 Tribunal may consider full material background when determining less favourable treatment. Referenced in assessing comparator and less favourable treatment issues.
Madarassy v Nomura International plc [2007] ICR 867 "Something more" than mere difference in treatment is required to shift burden of proof; bare difference is not sufficient. Guided Tribunal in assessing whether there was sufficient material to shift burden to Company A.
Deman v Commission for Equality and Human Rights and others [2010] EWCA Civ 1276 Affirmed Madarassy approach; a small amount of additional material can suffice to shift burden. Used in burden of proof discussion.
Bahl v The Law Society [2004] IRLR 799 Unreasonable behaviour alone is not evidence of discrimination. Referenced when distinguishing poor/insensitive management from unlawful discrimination.
Anya v University of Oxford & anor [2001] ICR 847 Unreasonable behaviour may support an inference of discrimination absent alternative explanation. Referenced as part of the factors that may permit drawing inferences.
Gould v St John's Downshire Hill [2021] ICR 1 On the "reason why" question: whether the protected characteristic had a significant influence on the decision. Applied in considering whether race had a significant influence on the alleged acts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Tribunal proceeded by identifying the legal tests (harassment under s.26, victimisation under s.27, direct discrimination under s.13, and the burden of proof rules under s.136). It made detailed findings of fact on each alleged incident and then applied the legal tests to those facts.

Key analytical steps and findings:

  • Evidence evaluation: For several alleged remarks the Tribunal preferred Company A witnesses' evidence and found some alleged comments did not occur (e.g. mockery of names on 19 November and 30 January incidents were found not made).
  • Harassment analysis: For incidents where racially descriptive words had been used (e.g. "little old black lady" and "two coloured ladies") the Tribunal found the words related to race but assessed intent, context, and effect. It accepted some comments were descriptive and not intended to humiliate; in respect of "coloured" the Tribunal accepted the Plaintiff was upset but held it was not reasonable in the circumstances for the comment to have the proscribed effect given it was a one‑off descriptive remark.
  • For conduct admitted (deletion of tasks and change in tone by Colleague C) the Tribunal accepted Company A's non‑discriminatory management explanation (task reallocation during sickness absence and subsequent distancing due to the Plaintiff's repeated complaints) and found no link to race.
  • Protected acts and knowledge: The Tribunal concluded the 4 March message to the Operations Manager and the 1 May formal grievance were protected acts. It then examined whether those acts were known to, or motivated, the persons alleged to have caused detriments. It found no evidence that the majority of individuals implicated were aware of the 4 March message and therefore could not have acted because of it.
  • Victimisation: The Tribunal rejected the first four victimisation allegations because the alleged perpetrators were not shown to have known of the Plaintiff's protected acts. It rejected later allegations (including HR communication failures, the apparent end‑date change and inadequate grievance investigation) on the evidence, accepting Company A's explanations and finding Company A had taken steps to communicate, offer welfare support, investigate and accommodate the Plaintiff.
  • Constructive dismissal: The Tribunal found no fundamental breach of contract by Company A; it found Company A acted reasonably in interactions and grievance handling and therefore the Plaintiff was not constructively dismissed.
  • Direct discrimination: The Tribunal applied the comparator/prima facie framework, found no evidence of less favourable treatment because of race, accepted non‑discriminatory explanations for conduct, and concluded no direct discrimination occurred.
  • Burden of proof: The Tribunal applied the two‑stage burden of proof, noting the Plaintiff had not established facts from which unlawful discrimination could be inferred absent other explanations; Company A's explanations were accepted where credible.

Holding and Implications

Final Ruling: The Tribunal unanimously dismissed the Plaintiff's claims. Specifically:

  • Harassment related to race: Not well founded — dismissed.
  • Victimisation: Not well founded — dismissed.
  • Direct race discrimination: Not well founded — dismissed.

Implications: The direct consequence is that the Plaintiff's claims were dismissed and no remedy was awarded (the Tribunal did not consider remedy because the substantive allegations were not upheld). The Tribunal applied existing case law and statutory tests and did not articulate any novel legal principle or new precedent beyond application of established authorities.

Tribunal: Judge Ayre. Date of judgment: 27 May 2026.

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A Reeves v Kier Ltd (England and Wales : Race Discrimination)

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A Reeves v Kier Ltd (England and Wales : Race Discrimination)
(May 27, 2026)