Dixon, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal concerning sentencing procedure. The Appellant pleaded guilty in the Magistrates' Court to breach of a restraining order and possession of a class B controlled drug, both dated 4 October 2025, and was committed for sentence to the Crown Court on 7 November 2025. Those offences were committed during the operational period of a suspended sentence order imposed on 18 October 2024 for two offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm committed on 2 and 7 April 2024. The suspended sentence comprised two consecutive terms of 10 months' imprisonment (20 months total), suspended for a period (initially 18 months, later extended to 24 months). A restraining order was made with the suspended sentence in October 2024.

At the sentencing hearing on 7 November 2025 (Judge Bradshaw) the judge activated the suspended sentence for breach, dealt with the newly pleaded offences and discussed how to treat a prior period on an electronically monitored qualifying curfew. The judge, after exchanges in which counsel spoke in months, expressed an intention to reduce each 10‑month sentence to reflect the curfew period and announced activated terms of seven months on each consecutive sentence, plus a separate four months' immediate imprisonment for the restraining‑order breach, producing an aggregate of 18 months' immediate custody.

In February–March 2026 the Appellant's solicitors raised concerns with The Prison about calculation of earliest release, prompting the settlement of a ground of appeal on 10 March 2026 (by Attorney Berkson) that the sentencing judge had failed to certify the number of days on qualifying curfew for the activated sentence. The 56‑day slip‑rule period had elapsed; the Court of Appeal granted an extension of time of 97 days to proceed with the appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether, when activating a suspended sentence that is to be treated as a determinate sentence, the sentencing court was obliged under section 325(2) of the Sentencing Act 2020 to specify and certify the credit period (the number of days on qualifying curfew) to count towards the sentence.
2. If the sentencing court omitted to make the required declaration under section 325(2), whether the Court of Appeal may rectify the omission and how to do so consistently with the Court's powers on appeal under section 11(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 so that the appellant is not more severely dealt with on appeal than by the court below.
3. The correct arithmetic application of sections 325–326 Sentencing Act 2020 (including stepwise calculation and halving) to the facts disclosed, and the proper certification of days to count towards sentence.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Attorney Berkson)

• The sentencing judge failed to make the certification required by section 325(2) of the Sentencing Act 2020 specifying the number of days on qualifying curfew to count towards the activated sentence.
• The correct calculation of days on qualifying curfew was 122 days, producing (after division by two) a credit period of 61 days; the court confirmed this calculation.
• Relief was sought from this court to certify the days; Attorney Berkson accepted that any revision must respect section 11(3) Criminal Appeal Act 1968 so the appellant is not more severely dealt with on appeal.

Other Relevant Observations in the Record

• At the sentencing hearing below, Attorney Moran and Attorney Keane contributed: the prosecution counsel indicated halving the number of qualifying‑curfew days as the correct method; defence counsel below had raised the curfew in mitigation but did not provide the sentencing judge with or cite the detailed statutory procedure.
• No detailed adversarial argument from the prosecution in the Court of Appeal on the calculation is recorded in the opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court set out the statutory scheme in sections 325–326 of the Sentencing Act 2020 and related provisions in section 240ZA of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and Schedule 16 paragraph 13. It concluded that activation of the suspended sentence on 7 November 2025 was to be treated as the imposition of a determinate sentence for the purposes of section 325, thereby triggering the mandatory duty in section 325(2) that the sentencing court "must" specify the credit period for time spent on bail under qualifying curfew.

The Court accepted Attorney Berkson's calculation that the Appellant had been on qualifying curfew for 122 days (and was not informed of any deductions under steps 2 or 3 of section 325(3)). Dividing 122 by 2 (and noting no rounding issue) produced 61 days to be certified as counting towards the sentence.

The Court analysed the judge's approach at the sentencing hearing: the judge had attempted to account for the curfew by reducing the activated terms (expressing an intention to activate eight months on each sentence, then announcing seven months on each). To avoid "double recovery" (crediting the 61 days while leaving the reduced terms unchanged) and to comply with section 11(3) Criminal Appeal Act 1968 (which prohibits dealing with the appellant more severely on appeal), the Court found it appropriate to revise the activated sentences upward from seven to eight months each (the level the judge had intended before the procedural error) and to certify 61 days under section 325(2).

The Court also noted that remand time for the 2024 and 2025 proceedings should be counted towards the sentence in the ordinary way under section 240ZA CJA 2003.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED IN PART

Holding:

• The Court certifies that 61 days are to count towards the Appellant's sentence for time spent on a qualifying curfew under section 325(2) of the Sentencing Act 2020.
• The two activated sentences from the 2024 suspended sentence order are increased from seven months to eight months' imprisonment each, to run consecutively (16 months), consecutive to the four months' immediate imprisonment imposed for the restraining‑order breach, giving a revised total immediate custodial term of 20 months.
• The Court ordered that remand time from the 2024 and 2025 proceedings be counted in the usual way under section 240ZA CJA 2003.

Implications:

• The direct effect is neutral as to overall severity: the upward revision of the activated terms offsets the certified 61‑day credit so the Appellant is not more severely dealt with on appeal in accordance with section 11(3) Criminal Appeal Act 1968.
• No case law precedent was created or cited; the decision applies the statutory scheme to the facts and rectifies a statutory omission by the sentencing judge.