| Merck, Sharp & Dohme Corporation v. Clonmel Healthcare Limited [2020] 2 I.R. 1 |
Restatement of steps a court should follow when considering interlocutory injunctions. |
Used as a starting point for the legal framework governing interlocutory relief. |
| Maha Lingam v. HSE [2005] IESC 89 |
Where the injunction sought is in effect mandatory, applicant must show a strong case likely to succeed at trial (not merely a fair question). |
Cited to emphasise the higher threshold for mandatory interlocutory injunctions in employment contexts. |
| Earley v. HSE [2015] IEHC 520 |
Applicant must show they are "probably going to be successful at trial" for interlocutory relief. |
Adopted as authority for the requisite strength of the plaintiff's case. |
| Clare County Council v. McDonagh [2022] 2 I.R. 122 |
Applicant for mandatory interlocutory relief must generally show a particularly strong and powerful case; injunctions must be a "stepping stone" to trial. |
Relied upon to underline reluctance to grant mandatory relief and risk of using injunctions to obtain summary judgment. |
| Tenant v. Reidy [2022] IECA 137 |
Court should be slow to grant mandatory orders in presence of a colourable defence. |
Cited to support caution where defendant has plausible defence. |
| Mason v. ILTB Ltd. t/a Gillen Markets [2021] IEHC 477 |
Clarification that "strong case" means a case which will probably succeed at trial; the case must exceed the fair question threshold. |
Applied when assessing whether the Plaintiff had raised a case with real prospect of success. |
| KWIK-Fit (GB) Ltd v. Lineham [1992] IRLR 156 |
On unambiguous words of resignation and the concept of "special circumstances" requiring inquiry before acceptance. |
Considered in evaluating whether the Plaintiff's averments of resignation could be treated as unambiguous and whether Company A should have inquired further. |
| Millett v. Shinkwin [2004] 15 E.L.R. 319 |
Requirement for prompt retraction of resignation in appropriate cases. |
Referenced to contrast plaintiff's behaviour (no timely retraction) with authorities requiring prompt retraction. |
| Brennan v. Irish Pride Bakeries (In Receivership) [2017] IECA 107 |
Decision on substance of claim and applicability of statutory protections (TUPE) — context differs. |
Found to be distinguishable on its facts and not supportive of the Plaintiff's position. |
| An Operations Coordinator v. A Facilities Management Service Provider ADJ-00028293 |
Employment-related WRC decision concerning a work-from-home request (COVID context). |
Held to be non-comparable and of limited application to the present facts. |
| O'Sullivan v. HSE [2023] IESC 11 |
Comments on expedition in disciplinary investigations (context of suspension and public purse). |
Distinguished on the facts: the present disciplinary timeline differed materially. |
| Gibbons v. Commissioner of An Garda Siochana [2007] IEHC 266 |
Delay in investigation: "inordinate and inexcusable delay" may amount to denial of procedural fairness. |
Found inapplicable given the timeline and reasons for delay in the disciplinary process here. |
| Orr v. Zoomax ltd. [2004] 1 IR 486 |
Where a statutory basis for a claim exists, plaintiff may not import statutory procedures into common law to obtain relief. |
Applied to support the proposition that statutory remedies preclude parallel common law relief. |
| Nolan v. Emo Oil Services Ltd. [2010] 1 I.L.R.M. 228 |
Refusal to allow High Court interlocutory relief when statutory scheme provides exclusive remedies for employment disputes. |
Relied upon to restrict High Court intervention where statutory forum is available. |
| Johnson v. Unisys Limited [2003] 1 A.C. 58 |
House of Lords authority on employment law principles cited in discussion of statutory regimes and common law limits. |
Referenced in broader argument that statutory scheme governs unfair dismissal remedies. |
| Eastwood v. Magnox Electric plc [2004] 3 All E.R. 991 |
House of Lords authority concerning scope of common law and statutory remedies in employment law. |
Used in conjunction with Johnson to support statutory primacy in employment disputes. |
| Kearney v. Byrne Wallace [2017] IEHC 713 |
High Court declined injunction in context where claim was in substance statutory (redundancy/unfair dismissal) and not for common law injunction. |
Applied to characterise the Plaintiff's claims as essentially statutory and therefore inappropriate for High Court interlocutory relief. |
| G.McG. v. D.W. (No. 2) [2000] 4 I.R. 1 |
Caution against creation of parallel jurisdiction where Oireachtas has delineated statutory jurisdiction. |
Relied upon to support restraint in exercising inherent jurisdiction where statutory scheme exists. |
| Power v. HSE [2019] IEHC 462 |
High Court should not grant interlocutory injunctions in cases where it lacks jurisdiction to decide the substance because statutory forum exists. |
Applied to reinforce that statutory bodies are the proper fora for certain employment disputes. |
| McGrath v. Athlone Institute of Technology [2011] IEHC 254 |
Statutory scheme's structure excludes parallel High Court jurisdiction at first instance for certain employment claims. |
Used to emphasise limits on High Court jurisdiction where statute provides remedies. |
| Doherty v. South Dublin County Council (No.2) [2007] IEHC 4, [2007] 2 I.R. 696 |
Authority on statutory jurisdictions and limits on parallel common law relief (cited in McGrath). |
Referenced within discussion of statutory exclusivity. |
| Nowak v. Moorehall Disability Services [2025] IEHC 758 |
General comment about standards of conduct for represented and unrepresented litigants. |
Cited in context of the Plaintiff's conduct and the court's expectations about litigation conduct. |
| Moylist Construction Ltd v. Doheny & Ors [2010] 2 I.L.R.M. 470 |
Consideration in balance of convenience whether any useful purpose would be served by granting an injunction. |
Applied to question the utility of restoring pay when the employment relationship had broken down. |
| Nolan v. Science Foundation Ireland [2024] IEHC 368 |
Reluctance to order courts to micro-manage employment relationships by ordering return to work. |
Relied upon to support refusal to compel employer to facilitate plaintiff's return to work. |
| Fennelly v. Assicurazioni Generali SpA [1985] 3 I.L.T.R. 73 |
Authority concerning intervention to protect livelihood where serious difficulties between parties are absent. |
Distinguished on the facts: serious rift existed here, so Fennelly was held inapplicable. |
| Buttimer v. Oak Fuel Supermarket Ltd [2023] IEHC 126 |
High Court declined to restore salary where there was a serious rift and plaintiff had not given evidence of means to satisfy undertaking as to damages. |
Cited to support refusal to restore pay absent evidence and given risk of non-repayment and a broken relationship. |
| Petkus v. Complete Highway Care Ltd [2017] IEHC 12 |
Distinguishable authority on wage deductions/reductions where employees continued to perform contractual obligations. |
Distinguished: present facts were materially different. |
| Giblin v. Irish Life & Permanent Plc [2010] IEHC 36 |
Willingness to intervene where employer conduct threatens livelihood, but only where a strong case is shown. |
Distinguished and held not to establish a general rule entitling employees to interlocutory pay restoration absent a strong case. |
| Other cited authorities (e.g., Glynn v HSS trading as Citywest Hotel [2010]) |
Various supporting propositions; some decisions unreported or fact-specific. |
Not relied upon as determinative; treated as distinguishable or of limited assistance. |