| Gilchrist v Sunday Newspapers [2017] IESC 16, [2017] IR 284 |
Common-law jurisdiction to hear proceedings otherwise than in public for confidentiality/commercial sensitivity reasons. |
Referenced by the Defendant as fallback authority for hearing otherwise than in public; court relied on statutory s.45(3) power and made a closed hearing order on case-specific grounds. |
| East Donegal Co-Operative Society Limited v Attorney General [1970] IR 317 |
Presumption that statutory discretions and procedures will be exercised in conformity with constitutional requirements of basic fairness. |
Cited to support the proposition that Investigator and Decision-Maker's discretions must be exercised consistent with natural and constitutional justice; court applied that presumption and found breaches. |
| Crayden Fishing Company v Sea Fisheries Protection Authority [2017] 3 I.R. 785 |
Fair procedures assessment depends on the entirety of the process and context; extent of procedures varies with seriousness and consequences. |
Cited as authority for assessing procedural fairness by reference to the whole process; court applied this approach in reviewing the investigation and decision-making sequence. |
| Facebook Ireland Ltd v Data Protection Commission [2021] IEHC 336 |
Procedural fairness depends on context; courts examine whether overall process was fair. |
Used to support examination of entire process and to reject any argument that procedural deficiencies were cured by other process elements. |
| Re Haughey [1971] IR 217 |
Range of procedural rights required in serious inquisitorial processes affecting reputation and liberty ("full panoply" of rights). |
Court held that, given seriousness and consequences, the Defendant was entitled to extensive protections aligned with Re Haughey; found those protections were not provided. |
| Orange Limited v Director of Telecoms (No. 2) [2000] 4 IR 159 |
Phrase "significant and serious error or series of such errors" used as a vitiating standard. |
Section 45(6)(a) drew wording from Orange; court applied that standard to conclude the process was vitiated by significant and serious errors. |
| Ulster Bank Investment Funds Ltd. v Financial Services Ombudsman [2006] IEHC 323 |
Adoption of Orange language in review of administrative decisions. |
Referenced to confirm that serious breaches of natural justice can amount to vitiating "significant and serious errors". |
| O'Neill v Financial Services Ombudsman [2014] IEHC 282 |
Serious breach of natural justice (failure to hold oral hearing) vitiates decision. |
Relied on to support proposition that serious procedural breaches can vitiate administrative decisions; court found analogous breaches here. |
| Hyde v Financial Services Ombudsman [2011] IEHC 422 |
Serious procedural breach (e.g., no oral hearing) can vitiate the outcome. |
Cited as authority that failure to provide an oral hearing may be a significant and serious error; court applied that principle. |
| Fitzgibbon v Law Society of Ireland [2015] 1 IR 516 |
Statutory interpretation: consider language, context, purpose, and consequences; the need to consider body’s nature, expertise, and impact on addressees. |
Cited to frame interpretation of ss.45(5)–(7): court used statutory-contextual approach to construe burden and meaning of "reasonable basis". |
| Heather Hill Management Company CLG v An Bord Pleanála [2024] 2 IR 222 |
Principles of statutory construction (language, context, purpose). |
Cited in support of applying holistic statutory construction when interpreting ss.45(5)–(6). |
| A, B, and C v Minister for Foreign Affairs [2023] IESC 10, [2023] 1 ILRM 335 |
Reaffirmation that language, context and purpose are relevant in statutory interpretation; plain meaning is starting point. |
Cited to support interpretive approach in construing s.25 and s.45 provisions and burden allocation. |
| Medical Council v M.A.G.A [2016] IEHC 779; Medical Council v Lohan - Mannion [2017] IEHC 401 |
Confirmation applications for professional regulators: courts confirm unless "good reason to the contrary"; standards for review explained. |
Discussed as contrast to s.45 regime; court noted s.45 is different and places explicit vitiation conditions in statute. |
| Teaching Council of Ireland v S.R. [2018] IEHC 582 |
Interpretation and application of "good reason" review in professional disciplinary confirmations. |
Referenced to contrast different statutory tests and procedural contexts. |
| Central Bank of Ireland v Lynch [2022] IEHC 319 |
Court's obligation on confirmation applications: satisfy itself that prescribed procedures and natural justice were observed; limited scope of intervention. |
Applied to show that court must ensure adherence to procedures and natural justice when confirming regulator decisions. |
| Fingleton v The Central Bank of Ireland [2016] IEHC 1 |
Statutory interpretation of time-related jurisdictional provisions; refusal to rely on subsequent amending legislation to construe original text. |
Court relied on Fingleton's approach and reasoning to reject ultra vires argument and to decline recourse to later amending legislation in construing s.25. |
| Carney v Balkan Tours Limited [1997] 1 IR 153; Clinton v An Bord Pleanála [2006] IESC 58 |
Limits on using amending legislation as an aid to interpret original enactment. |
Applied to exclude reliance on subsequent amendments (the Individual Accountability Framework) when construing s.25 as originally enacted. |
| Galvin v Chief Appeals Officer [1997] 3 IR 240; J & E Davy v Financial Services Ombudsman [2008] IEHC 256 |
Principles concerning fair procedures and circumstances in which oral hearings are required. |
Referred to support the Defendant's position that oral hearings are required where credibility and contested facts are central. |
| Zalewski v Adjudication Officer [2022] 1 IR 421 |
Quasi-judicial bodies exercising judicial functions must be independent, impartial, dispassionate and apply fair procedures to a high standard. |
Cited to reinforce requirement that investigators/decision-makers exercise powers compatibly with high standards of procedural fairness. |