Summary of Judgment — Administrative Court

Factual and Procedural Background

On 22 April 2023 the Plaintiff was involved in an incident with Officer A as the Plaintiff drove into a supermarket car park in The City. On 23 April 2023 the Plaintiff was charged with: (i) an offence under section 5(1) of the Public Order Act 1986; and (ii) an offence under section 6(6) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (failing to cooperate with a preliminary drugs test). A further charge under the Bail Act 1976 arose from an alleged failure to surrender on 27 September 2023.

The Plaintiff represented himself throughout. Multiple hearings in The City magistrates' court were adjourned; on 24 September 2024 the Plaintiff did not attend the listed trial. The magistrates allowed Company A (the prosecutor) to prove the case in the Plaintiff's absence under Magistrates Courts Act 1980, section 11, resulting in conviction and financial penalties. The Plaintiff issued successive judicial review claims challenging procedural fairness and related matters; some were transferred between regional Administrative Courts and various Orders were made by Judges Saffman, Lang and Jackson. This judicial review (filed as AC-2025-LDS-000018 on transfer) challenged the decision to proceed and seeks quashing of conviction and sentence.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Was the magistrates' court's decision to proceed in the Plaintiff's absence on 24 September 2024 unlawful?
2. If unlawful, what relief (if any) should be granted?

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

• He was not informed of several hearing dates (including 24 September 2024) and did not receive relevant notices or translated CPS materials.
• The trial proceeded contrary to Judge Lang's order that judicial review challenges ought be determined before trial; proceeding was therefore procedurally unfair.
• He attempted to progress alternative remedies (appeal to the Crown Court and a section 142 application), and in any event the procedural unfairness justified judicial review relief.

Company A's (Interested Party) Arguments

• It was plausible the magistrates and their legal adviser were unaware of the outstanding judicial review or misapprehended its status when deciding to proceed.
• The Plaintiff had not properly exhausted alternative remedies (appeal to the Crown Court or an application under Magistrates Courts Act 1980, section 142), which Company A contended was a relevant consideration.
• Practical matters at the magistrates' court (late transfer between courtrooms and limited time for advisers/prosecutors) explained aspects of the hearing note and conduct.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in stages.

1) Whether proceeding in absence was unlawful: the magistrates had before them an Administrative Court order but, due to a mistaken understanding conveyed by their legal adviser, believed prior judicial review proceedings were concluded. The prosecutor present did not appear to be aware of Judge Lang's order. The magistrates therefore proceeded under Magistrates Courts Act 1980, s.11, but the court found that Lang J's order required that the trial not proceed until the judicial review challenges were determined. The magistrates' decision was therefore contrary to the interests of justice, procedurally improper and unfair, and vitiated by mistake. The court concluded the decision to proceed was unlawful.

2) Relief: the court analysed the suitable alternative remedy principle (Glencore) and considered two alternatives: (a) appeal to the Crown Court (s.108) and (b) an application under s.142 to re-open. Evidence showed the Plaintiff had attempted to lodge an appeal but that no judicial determination on the merits of that appeal occurred (issues of timeliness and lack of response from the Plaintiff were noted). The availability of appeal did not preclude JR where procedural impropriety is alleged (Rowlands; Ford).

The court then considered s.142. Citing Williamson, s.142 is a limited "slip rule" but, on the facts, s.142 was an appropriate alternative remedy that could have provided the relief sought. The court found the Plaintiff had not properly pursued s.142 (record unclear whether it was filed or misplaced), and some delay was attributable to the Plaintiff's conduct and multiple JR claims. Despite these factors, the court exercised its discretion to grant relief because (i) the conviction and sentence were obtained by procedural unfairness; (ii) further delay in requiring s.142 would not serve the public interest given the passage of time and the need for expedition; (iii) duplicative adjudication of matters already considered by this court would be inefficient; and (iv) it was likely the magistrates would accede to s.142 in any event, so granting relief now caused no prejudice to Company A.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The court allowed the claim. The Plaintiff's conviction and sentence (and related financial penalties) obtained on 24 September 2024 were quashed.

Direct consequences ordered by the court:

• Company C (the licensing authority) must remove the penalty points from the Plaintiff's driving licence forthwith.
• Company B (the enforcement and collection centre) must cease enforcement of the financial penalties ordered on conviction.

Implications: The judgment confirms that where a magistrates' court proceeds in the face of an extant High Court order requiring determination of judicial review challenges first, the resulting conviction can be quashed for procedural unfairness. Although section 142 and appeal routes are suitable alternatives in many cases, the court will exercise its discretion to grant relief where fairness and expedition of criminal proceedings so require. No wider novel legal principle was established beyond application of existing authorities to the facts; the direct effect is quashing of the Plaintiff's conviction and the administrative steps ordered above. If a fresh trial is to be held, it should be conducted as soon as practicable given the delay to date.