Wheatley-Taylor, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

The Solicitor General applied under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 for leave to refer a sentence as unduly lenient. The matter concerned the Respondent, aged 36 at sentence. On 29 May 2025 the Respondent pleaded guilty to criminal damage (earlier incident). On 13 October 2025 the Respondent pleaded guilty to intentional strangulation (count 1) and to arson reckless as to whether life was endangered (count 4) on a separate indictment; no evidence was offered on counts 2 and 3 and not guilty verdicts were entered on those counts under section 17 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967.

On 3 December 2025 the Crown Court sentenced the Respondent to four years' imprisonment for the arson (count 4) and one year consecutive for the strangulation (count 1), a total of five years' custody. The judge declined to make a dangerousness finding and did not impose an extended sentence. The Solicitor General sought leave to refer the sentence on the basis that the judge erred in not finding the Respondent dangerous and that an extended sentence should have been imposed.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentencing judge erred in concluding that the Respondent was not "dangerous" for the purposes of imposing an extended sentence.
2. Whether the absence of a dangerousness finding rendered the sentence unduly lenient such that this Court should intervene under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.

Arguments of the Parties

Attorney Husbands (for the Solicitor General)

• The overall custodial term was not in issue, but the judge erred by not finding the Respondent dangerous and by failing to impose an extended sentence.
• The judge was wrong to describe the present offending as of a "wholly different nature" to past offending when there was prior serious offending including domestic battery and criminal damage; the present offences remained in a domestic context and should have been assessed under the domestic violence guideline.
• The judge impermissibly relied on the length of sentence the Respondent would serve when deciding dangerousness, which is not a proper factor in that assessment.

Attorney Styles (for the Respondent)

• The sentencing judge properly exercised his discretion and was entitled to disagree with the probation report's view of dangerousness; disagreement with the report does not amount to gross error.
• The Respondent's prior domestic convictions were isolated and dated; it would be wrong in principle to treat every domestic abuse case as demonstrating a high risk to the public generally.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appellate panel (Judge May, Judge McGowan and Judge Plaschkes) accepted that the total custodial term of five years was not itself plainly unduly lenient, but held that the judge erred in his assessment of dangerousness and that this error produced a sentence outside the reasonable range.

The court reviewed the agreed facts: prolonged strangulation in the Victim's home, followed within weeks by deliberate arson in the Victim's bedroom using an accelerant, and noted the Respondent's pattern of domestic offending and significant antecedents. The probation report had assessed the Respondent as a high risk of causing serious harm to known adults and the public; there was no psychiatric report.

The court considered sentencing guidance and authorities on section 36. It concluded that the present offences represented an escalation and a continuing pattern of domestic offending; the arson in particular indicated risk extending to the public. The judge at first instance had relied on reasons (including the length of sentence) that the appellate court found unreasonable as a basis for declining to make a dangerousness finding.

Applying the section 36 approach (as explained in the cited authorities), the court decided intervention was appropriate: though the custodial element remained within a range the court might have considered, the failure to make a dangerousness finding meant the sentence did not adequately address future risk and therefore fell outside the reasonable range.

Accordingly the court substituted disposals to address future risk while keeping the custodial element at five years.

Holding and Implications

The court granted leave to refer and found the original sentence unduly lenient for want of a dangerousness finding.

Disposition substituted by the Court of Appeal:

• Count 4 (arson reckless as to whether life was endangered): original determinate sentence of four years quashed and replaced with an extended sentence of nine years comprising a five-year custodial term and a four-year extended licence.
• Count 1 (intentional strangulation): the consecutive one-year sentence was quashed and replaced with a concurrent determinate sentence of three years.
• The total custodial element remains five years. All other sentences and orders (including the 10-year restraining order and ancillary orders) remain unchanged.

Release implications (as explained to the Respondent): the Respondent will serve two-thirds of the five-year custodial term before Parole Board consideration; thereafter any remaining custodial period is served on licence and, in addition, the Respondent will be subject to the four-year extended licence. The court did not purport to create new legal precedent; it corrected the sentence applied to the present facts.