Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
The Appellant and the Complainant had been in a relationship for eight years and share a six‑year‑old daughter. It was common ground that the Appellant entered the Complainant's property on the night of 24/25 June 2023 and that he attended the daughter's school on the morning of 26 June 2023; the surrounding circumstances were disputed.
The Crown's case was that the Appellant caused the Complainant to fear violence when he entered her bedroom in the early hours of 25 June and by following and striking her van on 26 June. The Complainant gave evidence she was not living with the Appellant at the time, described a pattern of threatening behaviour in the preceding week, and reported the incidents to the police. Independent witnesses and CCTV were relied on for the school incident.
The Appellant's defence was that he was living at the Complainant's address, had permission/keys to enter, and that no offence was committed: he denied colliding with the van and said he attended the school to recover his phone. The Appellant accepted CCTV appeared to show he had \"clipped\" the car.
On 19 December 2024 at the trial before Judge Pugh the Appellant (unrepresented at trial but later with a section 36 advocate) was convicted of stalking (count 1) and dangerous driving (count 3) and acquitted of making a threat to kill (count 2). On 12 March 2025 the Appellant was sentenced to 26 months' imprisonment for stalking (with a concurrent 10 months for dangerous driving). The Appellant renewed applications for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence, for extensions of time, and to admit fresh evidence under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. The Single Judge refused leave and the panel (including Judge O'Farrell) refused the renewed applications.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the trial was unfair and the convictions unsafe because the trial judge failed to explain or adequately explain court processes to the unrepresented Appellant.
- Whether late service of prosecution papers and alleged disclosure failures prejudiced the Appellant's ability to prepare and render the convictions unsafe.
- Whether there was ineffective assistance of the section 36 advocate (failure properly to consult or follow instructions) rendering the trial unfair.
- Whether the judge failed to make adequate allowance for the Appellant as a litigant in person and unreasonably restricted his ability to adduce evidence and call witnesses.
- Whether the application to admit fresh evidence under section 23 should be allowed.
- Whether the custodial sentence was wrong in principle and a community sentence should have been imposed.
Arguments of the Parties
The Crown's Case
- The Appellant entered the Complainant's bedroom without permission and by that conduct, together with following and deliberately hitting the Complainant's van, caused the Complainant to fear violence on at least two occasions.
- There was corroborative evidence for the school incident, including CCTV and independent witnesses.
Appellant's Case (Defence)
- The Appellant asserted he was living at the Complainant's property and had keys; his entry therefore did not amount to an offence.
- He denied deliberately colliding with the van and suggested alternative explanations (e.g. the Complainant hit a post); he said he attended the school to retrieve his phone.
- The Appellant relied on additional witness statements (including from his mother and others) which he now seeks to adduce as fresh evidence on appeal.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| R v Pendleton [2001] UKHL 66 |
Cited for the principle that an appeal based on fresh evidence remains subject to the ultimate question of whether the conviction is unsafe. |
The court relied on this principle when assessing the Appellant's fresh evidence and emphasised that the fresh evidence must be capable of showing the conviction unsafe; it found the proposed evidence would not afford any ground for allowing the appeal. |
| R v Pabon [2018] EWCA Crim 420 |
Cited in support of the same proposition regarding fresh evidence and the court's approach (see [60]–[64]). |
The court referred to this authority alongside R v Pendleton in determining that the additional statements did not meet the statutory and common‑law criteria for admission and would not make the conviction unsafe. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court reviewed the full trial transcript and the Single Judge's reasons. It applied the statutory test in section 23(2) Criminal Appeal Act 1968, considering whether the fresh evidence was capable of belief, whether it might afford grounds for allowing the appeal, whether it would have been admissible at trial on an issue subject to appeal, and whether there was a reasonable explanation for the failure to adduce it at trial.
On the question of fresh evidence, the court found the proposed additional statements addressed historical or peripheral aspects of the relationship and did not provide direct evidence about the incidents charged. The witnesses stated they had not been asked to give evidence at trial; consequently there was no reasonable explanation for their absence at trial. The court therefore concluded the statements would not afford any ground for allowing the appeal and refused to admit them.
On the procedural and fairness grounds the court concluded the Appellant had ample opportunity to prepare (trial dates and a written guide were provided), the prosecution served the full bundle including unused material on 10 December 2024, and the trial transcript showed the trial judge explained processes, was patient, and provided opportunities to the Appellant. The court accepted the trial judge was entitled to exclude irrelevant or prejudicial material and that the section 36 advocate had properly examined witnesses.
On sentencing the court set out the judge's categorisation: stalking as high culpability B and harm category 2 (starting point 36 weeks, range 12 weeks–18 months); dangerous driving as high culpability A and harm category 1 (starting point 18 months, range 1–2 years). The judge treated stalking as the lead offence, uplifted for overall offending, and imposed concurrent sentences to reflect totality. Aggravating factors (previous relevant convictions, domestic context, presence of the child) and mitigation (employment, anxiety) were recorded. The judge concluded custody at 26 months could not be suspended; the panel found no error in principle in that approach.
Holding and Implications
The renewed applications for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence, to admit fresh evidence, and for extensions of time are refused.
Direct effect: the Appellant's convictions for stalking and dangerous driving and the sentence (26 months' imprisonment, with 10 months concurrent for dangerous driving) remain in force. The court did not establish a new legal precedent; it applied established tests for fresh evidence and conventional sentencing principles.
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