Latty, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

The Applicant pleaded guilty on 15 November 2024 in the Magistrates' Court to an offence of burglary of a dwelling with intent to cause damage contrary to section 9(1)(a) of the Theft Act 1968 and was committed for sentence under section 14 of the Sentencing Act 2020. On 24 January 2025 the Crown Court sentenced the Applicant to three months' imprisonment consecutive to an existing sentence of six years and nine months. The Applicant sought leave to appeal against sentence; leave was refused by a single judge and the Applicant renewed the application to the full Court of Appeal.

The Applicant had prior relevant convictions (suspended sentence in 2008 and a 2014 sentence of 28 months for two dwelling burglaries). The offence occurred on 22 February 2023; arrest was on 16 June 2023. The Applicant had earlier pleas and sentences at another Crown Court on 9 October 2024 for multiple offences, receiving an aggregate sentence on 24 January 2024.

It was subsequently identified that, because section 314 of the Sentencing Act 2020 applied (third domestic burglary conviction), the offence was triable only on indictment and thus should have been sent for trial under section 51(1) and (2)(a) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. The Magistrates' Court had no power to accept a guilty plea and commit for sentence in respect of an indictable-only offence. The Court of Appeal addressed the validity of the committal and the resulting Crown Court proceedings and proceeded to deal with the matter under the Divisional Court/judicial review procedure.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Magistrates' Court's acceptance of a plea and committal for sentence under section 14 of the Sentencing Act 2020 was lawful where the offence was indictable only and thus triable only on indictment.
2. If unlawful, whether the committal and subsequent Crown Court proceedings were nullified and what remedy should follow (including whether the case should be reopened and sent for trial).
3. What sentencing disposition should be made once the procedural defect was corrected and the Applicant was properly arraigned in the Crown Court.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

• Attorney Manning agreed that the sentence imposed on 24 January 2024 (sic as recorded) was unlawful because the Applicant had not been arraigned as required; he agreed with the remedial course proposed by the Crown's counsel.
• In mitigation, Attorney Manning raised the effect of any new sentence on the Applicant's release date and argued for concurrency rather than consecutiveness, and sought to avoid extending the Applicant's release date.

Crown's Arguments

• Attorney Blick accepted that the sentence imposed on 24 January 2024 was unlawful due to the lack of arraignment and accepted the proposed remedial course.
• At sentencing the prosecution submitted the offence was a domestic burglary of high culpability (category 1) with an element of threat, placed the starting point at three years with a category range of two to six years and submitted the mandatory minimum three-year term applied; it applied the guideline discount for guilty plea (20%).

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analysed whether the Magistrates' Court had jurisdiction to accept a plea and commit for sentence where the offence was triable only on indictment. The Court noted section 51(1) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 is imperative when subsection (2) conditions apply (including indictable-only offences). Applying the principles in Butt and Gould on statutory construction and jurisdictional defects, the Court concluded that the Magistrates' Court's committal under section 14 of the Sentencing Act 2020 (where it had no power to do so) was an error so fundamental that it nullified the committal and invalidated the subsequent Crown Court proceedings. The Court observed that nothing that followed could confer jurisdiction where none existed.

Because the defect was jurisdictional, the appropriate remedy was to proceed under the Divisional Court/judicial review procedure. The Court (sitting as a Divisional Court) dispensed with formal service requirements, extended time, granted permission for judicial review, quashed the committal for sentence and set aside the conviction. The Court nominated Judge Goose to sit as a District Judge of the Magistrates' Court under section 66 of the Courts Act 2003 to reopen the case under section 142 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 and to send the case for trial under section 51(1) and (2)(a) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. Pursuant to section 8 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, Judge Goose would then sit as a Crown Court judge for arraignment and subsequent steps.

Judge Goose, sitting in those capacities, directed the sending of the matter to the Crown Court, arraigned the Defendant (who pleaded guilty), heard prosecution opening facts and defence mitigation, and imposed sentence taking into account the applicable guideline starting point, mandatory minimum term provisions, plea discount, concurrency, delay and effect on release date.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Court quashed the Magistrates' Court committal for sentence and set aside the Applicant's conviction on the basis that the Magistrates' Court lacked jurisdiction to accept a plea and commit for sentence in respect of an indictable-only offence.

Consequences and immediate effects:

• The Court granted permission for judicial review and quashed the committal and conviction.
• The Court directed that the matter be reopened in the Magistrates' Court and sent to the Crown Court for proper arraignment and further steps; Judge Goose was nominated to perform those functions.
• Having been properly arraigned in the Crown Court, the Defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 426 days' imprisonment to be served concurrently with the sentence she was already serving; the Court treated the sentence so as not to extend the Defendant's release date.

No novel legal precedent was created by this decision; the Court applied established authorities (Gould and Butt) concerning jurisdictional defects and appropriate remedies.