| YL (rely on SEF) China 2004 UKIAT 00145 |
Expectation that an asylum seeker should tell the truth. |
Noted as general principle; FtTIAC accepted Appellant's explanation for omission and nevertheless found him credible. |
| Ali Cem Kaya v SSHD [2003] EWCA Civ 1195 |
Example indicating a single beating may not amount to persecution unless particularly vicious or injurious. |
Cited as authority supporting the FtTIAC judge's approach that a single beating, absent particular severity, may not be persecution. |
| Demirkaya v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1999] All ER 659 |
Approach to whether conduct amounts to persecution: fact‑sensitive, question of degree; single acts may suffice if particularly extreme; otherwise persistence may be required. |
Used to frame the correct factual, top‑down approach and to reject a categorical rule that any beating equals persecution. |
| Lavarevic v SSHD [1997] Imm AR 251 |
Authority cited in discussion of analytical approach to persecution. |
Referenced in support of Demirkaya's analysis of persecution as a question of degree. |
| Adan v SSHD [1999] 1 AC 293 |
Cited in context of authorities approving analytical approaches to persecution. |
Used as supporting precedent in the Demirkaya discussion. |
| Ravichandran |
Quoted passage on approach to persecution (composite question to be looked at in the round). |
Court adopted the described approach that assessment should be done in the round, not by compartmentalised legal labels. |
| MI (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 826 |
Discussion of seriousness threshold for persecution and appellate review of tribunal fact‑finding and reasons. |
Applied to show that determination of whether threshold crossed is fact‑sensitive and within tribunal's remit; used to support dismissal of appeal. |
| MF |
Illustrative appeal addressing harassment and whether it crossed the persecution threshold. |
Referred to as part of MI discussion to show tribunals may conclude treatment, though harassing and intimidating, may not meet persecution threshold. |
| Sepet v SSHD [2003] UKHL 15 |
Observation that "persecution is a strong word" and emphasis on substantial seriousness. |
Cited to underline the high threshold for persecution and to support the tribunal's evaluative role. |
| Lucreteanu v SSHD |
Example that telephone threats (without violence) have been held to amount to persecution in some circumstances. |
Referenced to illustrate that diverse fact patterns can meet the threshold and that assessment is context dependent. |
| In the matter of B (A Child) [2013] UKSC 33 |
Framework for analysing statutory thresholds: (1) determine facts, (2) identify threshold, (3) decide whether threshold crossed. |
Adopted as analytical framework for assessing whether FtTIAC had identified and applied the relevant threshold for persecution. |
| Y and Z v Germany (joined cases C-71/11 and C-99/11) [2013] 1 CMLR 5 |
CJEU guidance that severity of measures determines persecution assessment; no core/private distinction for religion; assess nature and consequences of repression. |
Used to support that severity and consequences, not formal categorisation, determine whether conduct is persecution. |
| Bouyid v Belgium (2016) 62 EHRR 32 |
Article 3 requires a minimum level of severity; factors include duration, physical/mental effects, purpose, context; a slap caused degrading treatment. |
Recognised as authority showing a single blow can amount to degrading treatment; Court held facts here differed and FtTIAC's conclusion remained open. |
| Khlaifia v Italy (Application no. 16483/12) |
Reiterates minimum severity for Article 3 and lists factors for assessment (purpose, context, vulnerability, duration, effects). |
Used to summarise ECHR approach to minimum severity and to inform assessment of whether the Appellant's experience met that threshold. |
| Ireland v. the United Kingdom |
Authority referenced among ECHR cases relevant to assessing severity under Article 3. |
Part of the ECHR jurisprudential background cited in support of the minimum severity principle. |
| Price v. the United Kingdom, no. 33394/96 |
Referenced as an ECHR authority on assessing severity. |
Part of the collected authorities informing the Article 3 severity analysis. |
| Mouisel v. France, no. 67263/01 |
Referenced as an ECHR authority on assessing severity. |
Part of the established ECHR factors considered in assessing ill‑treatment. |
| Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no. 54810/00 |
Referenced as an ECHR authority on assessing severity. |
Included among authorities shaping the minimum severity test. |
| Gäfgen |
Referenced among ECHR authorities on Article 3 jurisprudence. |
Used as part of the ECHR context for severity assessment. |
| El-Masri |
Referenced among ECHR authorities on Article 3 jurisprudence. |
Part of the background authorities informing the Court's ECHR analysis. |
| Naumenko v. Ukraine, no. 42023/98 |
Referenced among ECHR authorities on Article 3 jurisprudence. |
Included in the catalogue of ECHR cases relevant to minimum severity. |
| Svinarenko and Slyadnev |
Referenced among ECHR authorities on Article 3 jurisprudence. |
Part of the jurisprudential context cited by the Court. |
| Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986/93 |
Referenced re vulnerability of detained persons and custodial context in Article 3 assessments. |
Used to note particular considerations where detainees or persons confronted with law‑enforcement are involved. |
| V. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24888/94 |
Referenced regarding intention/purpose in Article 3 assessment. |
Part of the authorities explaining that absence of humiliatory intent does not conclusively rule out Article 3 breach. |
| Peers v. Greece, no. 28524/95 |
Referenced among ECHR cases concerning Article 3 factors. |
Included in the Court's survey of relevant ECHR authorities. |
| Rahimi v. Greece, no. 8687/08 |
Referenced among ECHR cases concerning Article 3 factors. |
Part of the authorities cited to illustrate factors relevant to severity. |
| South Bucks County Council v Porter (No 2) [2004] UKHL 33; [2004] 1 WLR 1953 |
Principles on adequacy and intelligibility of reasons for decision (Lord Brown's guidance). |
Applied to assess whether FtTIAC's reasons were intelligible and adequate; Court concluded they were. |
| Clarke Homes Limited v Secretary of State for the Environment and East Staffordshire District Council [1993] 66 P&CR 263 |
"Straightforward down to earth reading" principle for interpreting reasons. |
Cited to support a purposive, practical reading of the FtTIAC decision rather than an over‑forensic critique. |
| HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] 1 WLR 3784; [2022] UKSC 22 |
Guidance on appellate restraint in reviewing specialist tribunal fact‑finding. |
Applied to emphasise deference to tribunal findings and caution in inferring legal error from phrasing. |
| AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] AC 678 |
Referenced in HA (Iraq) for judicial restraint principle. |
Part of the authority base supporting appellate restraint. |
| MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] 2 All ER 65 |
Principle that absence of express mention of a point by tribunal does not mean it was not considered. |
Invoked to caution against inferring oversight from omission of express language. |
| R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] 2 AC 48 |
Further cautionary principle on reasons challenges and appellate restraint. |
Applied to support the conclusion that the FtTIAC's reasons need not recount every step to be adequate. |