Summary of Judgment — High Court (Judge Gearty) delivered 19th March, 2026

Factual and Procedural Background

The Applicant applied to quash a District Court safety order granted on 24 September 2024. Instead of lodging an appeal, the Applicant sought an order to state a case and obtained leave to apply for certiorari to quash the safety order on grounds that the District Judge misapplied the Domestic Violence Act 2018 and that the original hearing was unfair. Leave was confined to the September decision. The Judicial Respondent sought removal from the title of the proceedings. The complainant in the District Court was joined as the Respondent in the High Court proceedings but did not participate. The High Court heard the motion and substantive application on 19 February 2026 and delivered judgment on 19 March 2026.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Judicial Respondent should remain named in the judicial review proceedings in the absence of evidence of mala fides.
2. Whether the District Court Judge erred in law or denied the Applicant a fair hearing when granting the safety order under the Domestic Violence Act 2018.
3. Whether the Applicant is entitled to relief by certiorari when an adequate statutory appeal to the Circuit Court was available and not exhausted.
4. Whether the Domestic Violence Act 2018 (s.6(1)(a)(iii) and s.16) was properly applied to a person described as a neighbour but later disclosed to have been a former intimate partner.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

• The District Judge misapplied the Domestic Violence Act 2018 by treating the Applicant's neighbour as an applicant under the Act when, the Applicant said, she was only a neighbour (the Applicant later confirmed she had been a former intimate partner).
• The Applicant alleged he was not given a fair hearing on 24 September 2024, was prejudiced by the Judge, and that the Judge had a predetermined outcome.
• The Applicant contended the Judge ignored evidence, did not permit cross-examination, did not afford the presumption of innocence, and acted mala fides (bad faith), supporting the contention that the Judge should be named as a respondent.
• The Applicant sought quashing of the safety order by certiorari rather than pursuing an appeal to the Circuit Court.

Judicial Respondent's and Respondent's Position

• The Judicial Respondent argued that the November hearing was irrelevant to the leave granted (which related to the September decision) and sought removal from the title on the basis that no mala fides had been shown.
• The Respondent from the District Court (the applicant for the safety order) did not take part in the judicial review proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first addressed whether the Judicial Respondent should be named. Applying O.84 r.22(2A) and authorities requiring proof of deliberate bad faith, the Court found no evidence of mala fides. The November hearing transcript was examined to assess the allegation of bad faith, but the transcript showed interruptions largely aimed at assisting the Applicant and directing him to the appropriate remedy; this did not amount to dishonesty or an interest in the outcome. The Court therefore removed the Judicial Respondent from the title and left the original opposing party as Respondent.

On the substantive challenge to the September safety order, the Court confined review to the September decision (leave was limited). The Court considered alternative remedies and concluded the Applicant had an adequate statutory right of appeal to the Circuit Court (de novo review) which he did not pursue. Authorities establish judicial review is a remedy of last resort; absent fundamental unfairness that removes the effective right of appeal, judicial review is inappropriate. The Applicant failed to identify an error of law in the District Judge's handling or in the proposed case to be stated.

The Court analysed the Domestic Violence Act 2018. Section 6(1)(a)(iii) expressly covers persons who "was in an intimate relationship with the respondent prior to the application"; the papers disclosed (only belatedly) that the Applicant and the complainant had been in an intimate relationship that ended over four years earlier. The Court held the statute contains no temporal proximity requirement and a judge could not read such a requirement into the text. Section 16 restricts personal cross-examination in such proceedings; the refusal to permit personal cross-examination was consistent with the Act. The Applicant had not placed sufficient evidence before the Court about what was before the District Judge and therefore did not demonstrate a legal error or procedural unfairness so fundamental as to defeat the appeal remedy.

Accordingly, the Court concluded certiorari was not appropriate and the proper remedy for any grievance was the statutory appeal which remained available.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Court ordered that the Judicial Respondent be removed from the title of the proceedings and refused the remedy of certiorari to quash the District Court safety order.

Implications: The direct effect is that the Applicant's application for certiorari is dismissed; the Judicial Respondent's name and title are removed from the proceedings and the original applicant for the safety order remains as Respondent. The Court found no novel legal principle was established; the decision emphasizes (a) the high threshold for naming a judge as a respondent (mala fides), (b) the correctness of applying the Domestic Violence Act 2018 to a former intimate partner, and (c) the requirement to exhaust the statutory appeal remedy before resorting to judicial review. No final costs order was made; parties may make written submissions on costs within the time and form directed by the Court.