Mohammed & Anor, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

Judge Popplewell delivered an opinion on an application by Attorney [Polnay] seeking referrals under the Attorney-General's Reference procedure of sentences imposed by Judge Henderson in the Crown Court at The City on 9 October 2025. Two defendants, referred to here as Defendant 1 and Defendant 2, were sentenced following convictions on two separate indictments.

The first indictment ("kidnap indictment") comprised six counts for offending on the night of 6 June 2024. Both defendants were convicted on all six counts after a 7-week trial before Judge Henderson. The judge treated the kidnapping as the lead offence and imposed concurrent sentences on counts within that indictment, arriving at a sentence of 9 years' custody for the kidnapping count for each defendant.

The second indictment ("drugs indictment") charged conspiracies to supply Class A drugs (crack cocaine and heroin) in relation to a 7-month enterprise. The trial for those counts was before Judge Ash. Defendant 1 pleaded guilty early in that trial; Defendant 2 pleaded guilty later after prosecution evidence had begun. Defendant 1 received concurrent 3-year terms of detention in a young offender institution on those counts; Defendant 2 received concurrent 2-year terms of detention in a young offender institution. Those terms were ordered to run consecutively to the kidnap sentences.

The resulting total sentences were 12 years' detention in a young offender institution for Defendant 1 and 11 years' detention in a young offender institution for Defendant 2. The opinion noted that Defendant 2's sentence had been announced correctly as detention in a young offender institution but recorded incorrectly as imprisonment and required correction.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentences imposed by Judge Henderson were unduly lenient such that they should be referred and altered under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Attorney-General's Reference procedure).
2. More specifically, whether the reduction applied for totality to the drugs-indictment sentences (from the judge's abstract starting points to the imposed consecutive terms) was so large as to make the overall sentences unduly lenient.

Arguments of the Parties

Attorney [Polnay]'s Arguments

• Criticised the brevity of sentencing remarks and identified omissions (including not stating any credit for late guilty pleas on the drugs counts).
• Main substantive point 1: The 9-year sentence for kidnapping should have been uplifted to reflect the other five counts and associated serious offending (section 18 wounding and aggravated burglary); the judge failed to give sufficient weight to those aggravating factors.
• Main substantive point 2 (principal contention): The reductions for totality applied to the drugs sentences (to 3 years and 2 years) were excessive; the judge's large totality reduction produced overall sentences that were unduly lenient.

Attorney [Unwin]'s Arguments (for Defendant 2)

• Submitted the judge properly considered the incident and was well placed to assess sentencing; the 9-year kidnap sentence was appropriate.
• Explained that the abstract starting point for Defendant 2 on the drugs indictment reflected his role but was reduced for totality, youth and personal mitigation (including mental health, background, and compliance). A total sentence of 11 years was long for a young, largely first-time offender and the addition of 2 years for the drugs offences produced an appropriate total.
• Alternatively argued that even if lenient, the sentence was not unduly lenient and there was no gross error.

Attorney [Hill]'s Arguments (for Defendant 1)

• Made submissions similar in nature to those for Defendant 2, emphasising the judge's assessment and mitigation for youth and limited previous offending.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed two linked sentencing exercises: the kidnap indictment sentencing by Judge Henderson and the consecutive drugs-indictment sentences imposed after applying a totality reduction.

On the kidnap indictment the court accepted the judge's factual findings about a violent, machete-armed ambush, injuries to the victims and associated aggravated burglary and wounding. The judge categorised the kidnapping as Category 1A harm under the Sentencing Council Guideline (starting point 11 years, range 8–16 years) because of the very serious injuries. The judge identified culpability factors (use of a highly dangerous weapon = culpability A; but certain culpability B factors and limited duration and sophistication) and significant mitigation (youth, good character, delay). The judge imposed 9 years for the kidnapping, treating concurrent sentences for related counts as reflected in that lead sentence. The court concluded these kidnap sentences were appropriate rather than unduly lenient.

On the drugs indictment the judge identified the conspiracies operated a large-scale line (over 7 months, at least 8 kg of Class A drugs). He identified abstract starting points for roles he found (9 years for Defendant 1; 7 years for Defendant 2) but then substantially reduced consecutive sentences for totality, imposing consecutive terms of 3 years (Defendant 1) and 2 years (Defendant 2). The appellate court found that the judge's abstract starting points already reflected mitigation (age, character) and that the reductions were applied solely for totality, resulting in very large reductions (6 years and 5 years respectively) applied to the drugs sentences.

The central question was whether the aggregate sentences (12 and 11 years) were unduly lenient. The court reviewed the leading authorities on the meaning of "unduly lenient" and the standard for intervention under section 36 CJA 1988. Weighed the defendants' youth, mitigation (including Defendant 2's personal mitigation and Defendant 1's limited previous record), the judge's position as trial judge and the need to apply totality. Although the reductions for totality were substantial and produced lenient drugs sentences in isolation, the court concluded that the overall sentences, while lenient, were not unduly lenient in all the circumstances.

Holding and Implications

The court granted leave for the Reference but declined to interfere with the sentences.

Direct consequences: the total sentences as imposed (12 years' detention in a young offender institution for Defendant 1; 11 years' detention in a young offender institution for Defendant 2) remain in force. The court also noted an administrative correction was required to record Defendant 2's sentence correctly as detention in a young offender institution rather than imprisonment.

The opinion did not establish a new legal precedent; it applied existing authorities on Attorney-General's References and the meaning of "unduly lenient" to the facts, concluding that leniency justified by the circumstances did not warrant interference.