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Solicitor General for England and Wales v Seale

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant was committed to prison for contempt of court by Judge Rajah on 2 July 2025: six months' imprisonment suspended for two years for breaches of a court order dated 30 March 2023 ("the 2023 Order"). The Appellant and family members are engaged in long-running probate litigation. Prior to the 2023 Order an Extended Civil Restraint Order ("ECRO") had been made against the Appellant in November 2021, restricting applications in those proceedings unless the court gave permission.

Judge Bacon made the 2023 Order (endorsed with a penal notice) prohibiting the Appellant from sending emails to individual court staff and limiting correspondence to a generic Chancery email address for routine administrative matters; it required formal applications (with fee) for substantive relief. The 2023 Order was served on the Appellant.

The Solicitor General ("the SG") issued committal proceedings on 12 June 2024 alleging 28 breaches of the 2023 Order (emails/letters sent between 24 April 2023 and 25 April 2024); seven counts also alleged breach of the requirement to use formal application procedure. Company A (the Government Legal Department) wrote warning the Appellant in December 2023 that committal proceedings were contemplated.

The committal hearing proceeded before Judge Rajah. The Appellant represented herself. Claimant A, Claimant B and Claimant C (parties to the underlying probate proceedings) were joined as respondents but no relief was sought against them; they attended as observers and filed material the SG did not rely upon, and Judge Rajah expressly did not take that material into account for liability.

Judge Rajah found that 27 of the 28 communications breached the 2023 Order and that the elements of contempt were established: (a) breach of a clear order, (b) notice of the order, (c) intentional conduct, and (d) knowledge of the relevant facts. The judge imposed an aggregate appropriate sentence of six months' imprisonment (after mitigation from nine months) and suspended it for two years. The Appellant appealed; the appeal was heard and dismissed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the communications alleged constituted breaches of the clear and unambiguous terms of the 2023 Order limiting correspondence to routine administrative matters and requiring formal applications for substantive relief.
  2. Whether the elements of contempt were proved beyond reasonable doubt (including notice of the order and intentionality of the breaches).
  3. Whether Judge Bacon (and the High Court generally) had jurisdiction under the court's inherent powers to make the 2023 Order limiting manner of communications, and whether such an order unlawfully infringed the Appellant's right of access to the court (including under Article 6 and Article 8 ECHR).
  4. Whether the SG had standing and acted in the public interest in bringing the committal proceedings.
  5. Whether the sanction (six months suspended for two years) and costs order were excessive, disproportionate or procedurally unfair.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The judge applied the civil standard (balance of probabilities) rather than the criminal standard (beyond reasonable doubt).
  • The judge relied on his own interpretation of the phrase "routine administrative matters" rather than an objective standard.
  • The SG lacked standing; the evidence of authority/public interest was insufficient.
  • The 2023 Order was beyond jurisdiction or a nullity and could only validly be made in the Divisional Court on an Attorney-General application (s.42 Senior Courts Act 1981); litigants have a constitutional right to correspond with the court.
  • The communications were attempts to obtain permission under the ECRO and therefore lawful.
  • The 2023 Order extinguished the Appellant's access to justice and breached the Human Rights Act 1998 and Articles 5, 6 and 8 ECHR.
  • The hearing and sanction were procedurally unfair, the sanction disproportionate, and the costs order inappropriate.

Respondent's (the SG) Position as Summarised by the Court

  • The 2023 Order was a valid exercise of the court's inherent jurisdiction to protect its processes and staff; it limited communication to routine administrative matters and required formal applications for substantive relief.
  • The Appellant continued to send abusive, hostile and substantive communications (many alleging judicial misconduct and criminality) to the court, contrary to para 2 and para 3 of the 2023 Order.
  • The SG had authority and acted in the public interest to bring committal proceedings to uphold court orders and protect court resources.
  • Sanction principles from National Highways v Heyatawin were applied; the breaches were serious and culpability high, justifying a custodial sentence, mitigated to a suspended term due to age and medical factors.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bhamjee v Forsdick (No 2)
[2003] EWCA Civ 1113,
[2004] 1 WLR 88
The court's inherent jurisdiction to control its processes and regulate litigation; power to make orders about how litigation is conducted (additional to statutory powers). Relied upon to hold that Judge Bacon had jurisdiction to make the 2023 Order and that the High Court divisions may exercise inherent jurisdiction to limit communications and regulate proceedings.
Attorney General v Ebert
[2001] EWHC Admin 695,
[2002] 2 ALL ER 789
Example of prohibiting communication with the court except in a specified manner as an exercise of inherent jurisdiction to protect staff and processes. Used to support the proposition that an order limiting communications to protect court staff and resources is a recognised exercise of inherent jurisdiction.
National Highways v Heyatawin
[2021] EWHC 3078 (QB),
[2022] Env LR 17
Guidance on principles applicable to sanctioning for contempt (culpability, harm, mitigation, minimum sanction, totality). The judge recited these principles when imposing sentence; the Court of Appeal accepted that summary and applied it when reviewing sanction.
Attorney General v Times Newspapers Limited
[1974] AC 273
The Attorney General's (and by extension the Solicitor General's) right to bring contempt proceedings in the public interest. Relied upon to uphold the SG's standing to bring the committal application and to permit the SG to act in the public interest.
Golder v The United Kingdom
(1980) 1 E.H.R.R. 524
Principle that Article 6 includes the right of access to a court, but that access is not absolute and may be subject to regulation proportionate to legitimate aims. The court rejected the Appellant's broad reliance on Golder to assert an unqualified right to correspond with the court; Golder was treated as supporting that access can be limited proportionately.
Raymond v Honey
[1983] AC 1
Reiterates the constitutional principle of access to justice and that restrictions must be sufficiently clear to take away that right. Taken as affirming the importance of access to courts but held not to undermine the court's power to regulate the manner of litigation so long as access's essence is preserved.
[2025] EWHC 1911 (Ch) Reference to the full trial judgment containing the particulars of the 28 communications and the trial-level findings. Cited as the detailed source of the communications and judge's step-by-step findings; the appellate court directed readers to that judgment for the full particulars.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appellate court accepted Judge Rajah's factual findings and legal analysis. It proceeded in stages:

  1. Characterisation of the 2023 Order: The court treated para 2 as a clear, unambiguous limitation to routine administrative matters (examples given in the order) and para 3 as requiring formal applications for substantive relief. The order had been served and the Appellant accepted notice.
  2. Assessment of communications: Judge Rajah examined each communication against para 2 and para 3. Examples (letters/emails) showed substantive allegations of judicial misconduct, demands for recusal, threats of criminal proceedings, and applications made informally. The court upheld the trial judge's conclusion that 27 of 28 communications breached the order; one communication about a transcript was arguably administrative and was not proved as a breach.
  3. Elements of contempt: The court agreed the judge properly identified the elements to be proved beyond reasonable doubt: breach of a clear order; notice; intentional conduct; and knowledge of facts making the conduct a breach (though knowledge that the act breached the order was not a strict requirement to establish liability). The judge's findings satisfied this test.
  4. Jurisdictional arguments and access to court: The court applied the inherent jurisdiction principles (Bhamjee and Ebert) to reject the Appellant's contention that only the Divisional Court or Attorney-General could authorise such an order. The court held that orders regulating the manner of litigant communications are permissible if they preserve the essence of access to justice and are proportionate to a legitimate aim.
  5. Standing of the SG: The court relied on Attorney General v Times Newspapers Limited and statutory provisions (Law Officers Act 1997) to conclude the SG had authority and acted in the public interest to bring committal proceedings.
  6. Sanction: Applying the principles from National Highways v Heyatawin, the judge assessed culpability as high (persistent, deliberate breaches), harm to administration of justice as moderate, and allowed mitigation for age and medical matters. The judge concluded only a custodial sanction would suffice, reduced by mitigation to six months, and suspended it for two years. The appellate court found no error in that sentencing exercise and no basis to reduce the sanction as manifestly excessive.
  7. Procedural fairness and evidence: The court reviewed procedural complaints (e.g., third-party submissions by the claimants) and accepted the trial judge's approach not to take those submissions into account for liability; it found no denial of a fair hearing.
  8. Costs: The court upheld the costs order, noting civil practice permits costs against a losing party and there was no rule preventing the SG from seeking costs in these civil contempt proceedings.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED

Holding: The appeal was dismissed. The trial judge's findings that 27 of 28 communications breached the 2023 Order were upheld; the committal for contempt was established; the sentence of six months' imprisonment suspended for two years and the costs order were affirmed.

Implications: The direct effect is that the Appellant's conviction for contempt, the suspended custodial sentence and the costs order stand. The court reaffirmed the High Court's inherent jurisdiction to regulate litigant communications to protect court processes, subject to preserving the essence of access to justice; no new legal principle or binding novel precedent was established beyond the application of existing authorities.

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Solicitor General for England and Wales v Seale

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Solicitor General for England and Wales v Seale
(Mar 27, 2026)