B-A, Re (Placement Order and Contact Order)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant applied for care orders under Part IV of the Children Act 1989 in respect of four children (Child A, Child B, Child C and Child D). The final hearing was heard by Judge Lazarus in two phases (June 2025 and December 2025), producing two judgments ([J1] and [J2]). By the time of the final hearing placement order applications under Part 1 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 had been issued for the younger two children (Child C and Child D). Final orders (placement and contact) were made on 18 December 2025 (the 94th week of proceedings). The Appellant now appeals only one aspect of the final orders: a section 26 ACA 2002 order providing for limited face-to-face parental contact between Child C and Child D and their father. Permission to appeal was granted on 10 February 2026.

The parties: the First Respondent (the mother) and the Second Respondent (the father of Child A and Child B) were unrepresented on the appeal; the Third Respondent (the father of Child C and Child D, "the father") was represented by Attorney Allison and Attorney Baylis. The children had been represented in the Family Court by their Guardian, who did not participate in this appeal. The Appellant on appeal was represented by Attorney Woodward-Carlton and Attorney Barber.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Family Court judge erred in making a section 26 ACA 2002 order for limited annual face-to-face contact between the father and Child C and Child D, rather than recording non-binding intentions in a recital.
2. Whether the judge failed properly to weigh the family finding evidence about the impact of parental contact orders on the pool of prospective adopters.
3. Whether the judge failed to apply the "no order" principle in section 1(6) ACA 2002 (i.e., whether making the order was "better" for the children than not making it).
4. Whether the judge gave adequate reasons for departing from the recommendations of the Guardian and allocated social worker.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The judge did not carry out a welfare analysis properly comparing advantages and disadvantages of making a section 26 order for the father.
• The judge failed to give adequate weight to the unchallenged family finder evidence that parental contact orders would significantly reduce the pool of prospective adopters (potentially halving it), thereby jeopardising adoption together or at all.
• The judge failed to apply the no-order principle under section 1(6) ACA 2002 and should have preferred a non-binding recital reflecting intentions to arrange post-placement contact.
• The judge failed to explain why she departed from the Guardian's and social worker's recommendations against a section 26 order.

Third Respondent's (Father) Arguments

• The judge's decision was balanced, thorough and focused on the individual circumstances of Child C and Child D.
• The judge was correct to set a template for contact at the placement order stage so prospective adopters understand expectations before they form views, and a section 26 order was therefore appropriate.
• The judge appropriately considered family finding evidence but nonetheless concluded that orders should be made where necessary to meet the children's welfare needs.

Other Positions

• The Guardian supported the Appellant's appeal in the Family Court (opposed a section 26 order for direct contact below) but in writing indicated support for the Appellant's appeal position to the Court of Appeal. (The Guardian did not attend the appeal.)
• Other respondents did not communicate positions to the appellate court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appellate court summarised the factual matrix: Child C and Child D had strong sibling ties and enhanced developmental needs; the father had a warm, positive relationship with them but was significantly cognitively impaired and illiterate; family finding evidence indicated parental contact orders can reduce the pool of prospective adopters. The judge's analysis focused on whether a section 26 order was necessary to meet the boys' welfare needs or whether a non-binding recital would suffice.

The judge had regard to the statutory welfare checklist (section 1 ACA 2002), the placement and post-placement provisions (sections 21, 26, 27, 46, 51A ACA 2002), and recent authorities emphasising the court's role in "setting the tone" at placement stage (Re R and C, Re S, Re B). The judge concluded there was an "established need" for a minimum single annual direct face-to-face contact between the father and the boys, jointly, because:

• the father is the boys' sole connection to their paternal identity and the relationship supports their emotional needs and identity;
• the father's cognitive limitations and illiteracy made informal arrangements fragile and unlikely to secure ongoing contact absent a court order;
• indirect contact (letters/cards) would be an inadequate mitigation given the father's illiteracy and limitations.

The judge considered family finding evidence about impact on adopter pool but was not persuaded that this evidence required refusal of a section 26 order. The judge applied the "no order" principle (section 1(6) ACA 2002) and concluded that making the order would be "better" for Child C and Child D than not making it. The appellate court reviewed the judge's reasoning against the standard for appellate intervention (must identify a gap in logic, lack of consistency, or failure to consider material factor) and found no such flaw. The court noted the practical safeguard in section 27 ACA 2002 (variation/revocation) if a section 26 order proved to impede placement, and that the judge could manage future variation applications to ensure continuity.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED

Holding: The appellate court dismissed the Appellant's appeal and upheld the Family Court's section 26 ACA 2002 order requiring at least one joint face-to-face contact per year between the father and Child C and Child D post-placement.

Implications: The direct effect is that the section 26 contact order remains in force pending any variation or revocation application under section 27 ACA 2002. The court emphasised deference to the family judge's evaluative judgment in child cases and noted that no new legal precedent was created beyond affirming established principles about the court's role at the placement order stage and the circumstances in which a section 26 order may be necessary.