Anonymized Summary of Judgment
Factual and Procedural Background
The Plaintiffs commenced proceedings on 12 March 2025 initially against a single Defendant. The Plaintiffs allege that that Defendant acted covertly to provide the Plaintiffs' trade secrets and confidential information to Company A and that Company A and certain individuals conspired with that Defendant (the "Scheme") to create a false narrative and to induce the Defendant to make false statements to the regulator and others. Urgent ex parte relief was granted on 12 March 2025; the original Defendant did not comply and the Plaintiffs issued related proceedings in the United States.
Company A applied by notice of motion (10 July 2025) pursuant to Order 19 rr.27 and/or 28 and/or the court's inherent jurisdiction to strike out eleven paragraphs of the Amended Statement of Claim (ASOC). At hearing the parties narrowed the dispute so that relief was pursued only in respect of paras. 30, 54 and 67. The application was heard together with a separate inspection motion and a joinder/jurisdiction motion relating to the individual defendants; those matters are the subject of separate but related judgments. Judge Sanfey delivered the decision on 20 March 2026.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether para. 30 of the ASOC discloses a reasonable cause of action or is bound to fail because, if the pleading is that the false narrative was communicated to the Plaintiffs' co‑conspirator, that publication could not be defamatory.
- Whether para. 54 of the ASOC is impermissibly a jus tertii or otherwise unnecessary or prejudicial and should be struck out as irrelevant to the Plaintiffs' case.
- Whether para. 67, which seeks an order that Company A be made liable for all costs of the proceedings (including costs prior to Company A's joinder), is legally untenable in light of the Plaintiffs' settlement with the original Defendant and the operation of s.17(2) and related provisions of the Civil Liability Act 1961.
Arguments of the Parties
Company A's Arguments
- Para. 30: If Company A told the original Defendant that the narrative to be promoted was false, that publication to a co‑conspirator could not injure the Plaintiffs' reputation and therefore could not be defamatory (relying on the statutory definition in s.2 of the Defamation Act 2009).
- Para. 54: The paragraph effectively advances a jus tertii claim by seeking to rely on alleged injury to the reputations of third‑party law firms and is therefore not a proper part of the Plaintiffs' claim; alternatively it is unnecessary or prejudicial.
- Para. 67: The Plaintiffs cannot recover all costs of the proceedings from Company A, particularly costs incurred before Company A's joinder where the Plaintiffs compromised their claim against the original Defendant; s.17(2) Civil Liability Act 1961 precludes or reduces such recovery.
Plaintiffs' Arguments
- Para. 30: The question for strike‑out is arguability; the plaintiffs' pleading should be taken at its height and it is arguable that the words pleaded are capable of bearing a defamatory meaning (relying on the test in Conlon v Times Newspapers Limited).
- Para. 30 (alternative): The wording of para. 30 is open to interpretation and it is arguable that the pleading does not merely allege communication that the narrative was false but alleges a narrative that was in fact false.
- Para. 54: The material is part of the context of the alleged conspiracy and is relevant and central to the Plaintiffs' case rather than an unnecessary sideswipe; it is not pleaded to ground a separate claim for the reputations of third parties.
- Para. 67: The Plaintiffs assert the costs prior to joinder are claimed as special damages attributable to Company A's alleged wrongdoing and deny that the settlement with the original Defendant precludes recovery against Company A; apportionment under s.34 and contributory negligence principles under s.35(1)(h) make factual assessment appropriate.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Conlon v Times Newspapers Limited [1995] 2 ILRM 76 |
Test for strike‑out: at strike‑out stage the court considers "arguability" that words are capable of bearing the pleaded meaning rather than resolving meaning finally. |
The court applied the Conlon approach: it must assume the plaintiffs' pleaded case at its height and determine whether it is arguable that para.30 bears a defamatory meaning. |
| O'Malley v National Standards Authority of Ireland [2024] IEHC 500 |
Observation that amendment to O.19 r.28 erodes previous distinction between strike‑out jurisdiction and inherent jurisdiction; guidance on use of O.19. |
Cited to explain the amended scope of O.19 r.28 and to support the proposition that summary strike‑out jurisdiction overlaps with inherent jurisdiction in some respects. |
| Jeffrey v Minister for Justice, Equality & Defence [2019] IESC 27 |
Principle that a court may resolve straightforward issues of law in summary proceedings where there is no real risk of injustice; caution about using summary procedure to dismiss cases where there is risk of injustice. |
Relied upon in assessing whether para.67 raised a sufficiently straightforward legal issue to permit in limine strike‑out; the court concluded it was not sufficiently straightforward and risked injustice. |
| Barry v Buckley |
Authority on the limited remit of summary applications to dismiss claims in limine (Barry v Buckley applications cannot be used to dismiss a case merely because a strong defence exists). |
Referenced to underline that only the clearest cases bound to fail may be struck out in limine; applied in deciding para.67 should not be struck out at this stage. |
| St Brigid's RFC v St Laurence O'Toole Diocesan Trust [2026] IEHC 103 |
Recent authority approving the cautious approach to summary dismissal and endorsing the Jeffrey dicta. |
Cited as a recent confirmation of the approach that a court should only strike out claims in limine where the issue of law is very straightforward and poses no risk of injustice. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. The court identified the proper procedural basis for Company A's strike‑out application as Order 19 r.28(1) (strike out of any claim or part of a claim that discloses no reasonable cause of action, is bound to fail or has no reasonable chance of succeeding), noting that r.27 was less apt.
2. The court applied the Conlon test at the strike‑out stage: it must take the plaintiffs' case at its height and ask whether the pleaded matter is arguable that it is capable of bearing the pleaded defamatory meaning.
3. On para. 30 the court accepted Company A's legal proposition in principle that publication to a co‑conspirator of a "false narrative" which the recipient knows to be false cannot injure the plaintiffs' reputation in the recipient's eyes and therefore cannot be defamatory. The court examined the ASOC in context (paras. 19–31) and relevant affidavit material (notably the original Defendant's affidavit para.34) and submissions made immediately before the application. Those materials demonstrated that para.30 conveyed the Plaintiffs' case that the original Defendant was told to promote a narrative known to be false by him and the Company A individuals. Given that pleaded co‑conspirator context, the court concluded the paragraph could not, on the pleaded case, give rise to a defamatory meaning and therefore was bound to fail.
4. On para. 54 the court analysed whether the paragraph was unnecessary or a prohibited jus tertii. The court accepted the Plaintiffs' explanation that para.54 was not intended to ground a separate claim for injury to third‑party law firms but formed part of the contextual allegations of the alleged Scheme. The court observed that the Commercial Court permits informative pleadings and that para.54 was not so gratuitous or irrelevant as to warrant striking out; factual and evidential objections could be addressed at trial.
5. On para. 67 (costs claim) the court considered Company A's contention that the Plaintiffs' settlement with the original Defendant and the operation of s.17(2) Civil Liability Act 1961 would prevent recovery of costs incurred prior to joinder. The court held that the legal questions raised by applicability of ss.17, 34 and 35(1)(h) to these facts were not "very straightforward" and resolution might depend on contested facts and apportionment principles. Given the risk of injustice and complexity, the court refused to strike out para.67 in limine.
6. The court therefore struck out para.30 under O.19 r.28(1)(iii) and (iv) and declined to strike out paras.54 or 67. The court listed the matter for further hearing to consider the terms of consequential orders and costs in conjunction with the related motions.
Holding and Implications
CORE RULING: The court ordered that para. 30 of the Amended Statement of Claim be struck out.
Direct consequences: the deletion of para.30 removes only the Plaintiffs' defamation claim insofar as it alleged publication of defamatory statements by Company A to the original Defendant; other defamation and conspiracy claims in the ASOC remain. Paras. 54 and 67 were not struck out and remain on foot. The court declined to resolve, at strike‑out stage, the complex legal questions under the Civil Liability Act 1961 raised by para.67 due to factual disputes and risk of injustice; no new precedent was purportedly established beyond the application of existing authorities to these pleadings.
Judge: Judge Sanfey
Hearing/date of judgment: Judgment delivered 20 March 2026; further listing 15 April 2026.