Summary of Opinion — High Court (Wards of Court)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an ex tempore ruling delivered by Judge Nolan on 20 March 2026 concerning an application under the Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015 (as amended) to discharge the Ward from wardship and to appoint a Decision-Making Representative (DMR) chosen from the panel. The Ward suffers significant medical issues and resides in a care home. The committee for the Ward is the General Solicitor, appointed by the President of the High Court. An independent solicitor, holding a legal aid certificate issued in the name of the General Solicitor, brought the application on behalf of the committee. The Ward's Sister seeks appointment as a co-decision-maker limited to personal welfare matters.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Ward should be discharged from wardship and a DMR appointed from the panel pursuant to the Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015 (as amended).
2. Whether the Sister should be appointed as a co-decision-maker for the Ward in relation to personal welfare.
3. Whether the court may direct an authorised person to sign documentation to enable a separate legal aid certificate to be granted so the Ward (as opposed to the committee) has separate legal representation.

Arguments of the Parties

Sister's Arguments

• The Sister sought appointment as a co-decision-maker for personal welfare only (not financial matters).
• She asserted the Ward had expressed a wish that she be appointed and that the Ward can express will and preference in familiar contexts.
• She described herself as a suitable candidate: she is a qualified social worker with social care experience, speaks with the Ward daily by phone, and says she meets the statutory eligibility criteria in Section 39 of the Act.
• She sought legal aid or the ability for the Ward to have a separate legal representative to give the Ward "a voice."

Independent Solicitor / Committee's Position

• The independent solicitor (holding the legal aid certificate in the name of the General Solicitor) reported multiple meetings with the Ward and formed the view that the Ward could not express a clear will or preference regarding appointment of a DMR or co-decision-maker.
• The independent solicitor relied on the medical visitor's opinion that the Ward lacked capacity even with assistance and would benefit from a DMR.
• On legal aid, the independent solicitor and the court treated the committee's solicitor as the Ward's legally aided representative and opposed the granting of a separate legal aid certificate for a third solicitor to represent the Sister or to give separate representation to the Ward.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court considered and weighed the following materials and factors:

• Medical evidence: the medical visitor met the Ward, reviewed history (including prior diagnosis of mild intellectual disability and an acute episode leading to hospital admission), and concluded the Ward had very limited understanding and retention, lacked capacity in relation to personal welfare even with assistance, and would benefit from appointment of a DMR.
• Independent solicitor's interactions: three interviews were conducted; the solicitor could not reliably elicit a will or preference regarding a co-decision-maker. On occasions the Ward expressed a desire to live with the Father but also expressed contentment with remaining in the current care home.
• Independent social worker's report: the Ward was described as well cared for, settled, and content in her current placement with daily one-to-one support and good quality of life.
• Sister's affidavit: the Sister described a close historic relationship, daily telephone contact, professional suitability, and asserted the Ward had expressed a preference for her appointment; she also explained practical reasons (medical conditions) limiting frequent long-distance visits.
• Legal aid procedure and statutory interpretation: the court reviewed the Legal Aid Act 1995 and regulations and concluded that a legally aided person is represented under one legal aid certificate by one set of legal representatives; the independent solicitor already held the certificate in the name of the committee (General Solicitor). The court found no basis to order an authorised official to sign documentation for a separate legal aid certificate in this matter.
• Eligibility under Section 39 of the Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015: the court noted Section 39 lists persons not eligible to be DMRs but that the listed disqualifying categories did not bar appointment of the Sister for personal welfare matters.
• Best interests assessment: although the Sister and Ward were close, the court was concerned about practical realities (geographic distance, lack of recent in-person contact), inconsistent accounts about the Ward's expressed wishes, and the risk that appointment of a family co-decision-maker could lead to pressure to change the Ward's settled residence. The court emphasised that a co-decision-maker has a role that can affect residence decisions.
• Balancing these considerations, the court concluded the Ward's best interests would be served by discharge from wardship and appointment of an independent DMR from the panel rather than appointment of the Sister as co-decision-maker.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The court ordered that the Ward be discharged from wardship and an independent Decision-Making Representative from the panel be appointed pursuant to Section 55(1)(b)(ii) of the Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015 (as amended). The court declined to appoint the Sister as a co-decision-maker for personal welfare and declined to direct any authorised person to sign documentation to obtain a separate legal aid certificate for separate representation.

Implications: The direct effect is that the Ward is discharged from wardship and an independent DMR from the panel will be appointed; the Sister was not appointed as co-decision-maker and no additional legal aid certificate was ordered. The opinion did not purport to establish a new legal precedent beyond the application of the statute and the court's best-interests assessment in the particular circumstances of this case.