| Grant Thornton (a firm) & anor v Scanlan [2022] IEHC 610 |
Earlier procedural and related history of these proceedings. |
Recorded as part of the procedural background; the Court did not repeat that history but referenced it. |
| House of Spring Gardens Limited & Ors v Point Blank Ltd [1984] IR 611 |
Equitable relief for breach of confidence need not depend on contract; courts look to English authorities for guidance. |
Cited in setting out general equitable principles underpinning breach of confidence and as authority that such relief can be independent of contract. |
| Saltman Engineering Co. Ltd. v Campbell Engineering Co. Ltd. [1948] 65 RPC 203 |
Information must "have the necessary quality of confidence" and duty of confidence is not limited to contractual relationships. |
Used to explain the threshold that information must not be public property or public knowledge to be confidential. |
| Fraser v Evans [1969] 1 QB 349 |
Jurisdiction to restrain publication of confidential information is based on duty to be of good faith; no person may divulge information received in confidence without just cause. |
Cited to support the equitable basis of the duty of confidence and its scope. |
| Seager v. Copydex Ltd. [1967] 1 W.L.R. 923 |
Duty of confidence depends on equity principle that a recipient shall not take unfair advantage; difficulty arises when information is partly public and partly private. |
Applied in discussion of mixed documents containing both public and confidential elements and the recipient's obligations. |
| Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers (No. 2) [1990] 1 AC 109 |
Restated principles of breach of confidence; duty may arise independently of contract; third parties in possession may be restrained if they know the information is confidential. |
Heavily relied upon for broad principles including third-party liability and for examples of duty arising even where information is acquired accidentally. |
| Moorgate Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Philip Morris Ltd. (No. 2) (1984) 156 C.L.R. 414 |
Equitable jurisdiction to grant relief against abuse of confidential information is founded on obligation of conscience arising from circumstances in which information was communicated or obtained. |
Quoted in support of the equitable basis for relief and third-party restraints. |
| Coco v A.N. Clark (Engineers) Ltd. [1969] R.P.C. 41 |
Three elements normally required for breach of confidence: (1) information has the necessary quality of confidence, (2) imparted in circumstances importing obligation of confidence, (3) unauthorised use to the detriment of the confider. |
Adopted as the standard test to assess confidentiality, duty and misuse. |
| Prince Albert v. Strange (1849) 1 Mac. & G. 25 |
Third party in possession of confidential information may be subject to duty of confidence. |
Cited to support principle that third parties can be restrained from publishing confidential materials. |
| Duchess of Argyll v. Duke of Argyll [1967] Ch. 302 |
Authority for duty of confidence applying to third parties. |
Cited as part of authorities establishing third-party obligations. |
| Imerman v Tchenquiz & Ors [2011] 2 WLR 592 |
Duty of confidant includes not examining, copying, retaining or supplying copies of a confidential document without authority; injunctions to prevent such acts are appropriate. |
Relied on for the proposition that looking at or copying documents known to be confidential can itself constitute actionable conduct and justify injunctions and orders for return/destruction. |
| Mahon v Post Publications Limited [2007] 3 IR 338 |
Restatement of confidential information principles in Irish law; caution about public bodies creating blanket confidentiality. |
Cited in considering locus standi/enforceability and in distinguishing this private-party case from tribunal/public-body cases. |
| Attorney-General v. Observer Ltd. (Court of Appeal transcript cited) |
Discussion of enforceability of rights of confidence against third parties, analysed in equitable terms. |
Referenced among authorities supporting third-party liability for confidential information. |
| O.Mustard and Son v. Dosen (Note) [1964] 1 W.L.R. 109 |
Once information is in public domain it will not normally be confidential. |
Used in assessing whether parts of the CD had lost confidential character. |
| Woodward v. Hutchins [1977] 1 W.L.R. 760 |
Information in the public domain cannot generally be regarded as confidential. |
Applied to the analysis of documents that may already have been published. |
| Collins v FBD Insurance plc [2013] IEHC 137 |
Section 7 of the Data Protection Acts establishes a statutory duty of care but damages require proof of actual loss; s.7 does not impose strict liability or automatic compensation. |
Applied to the Counterclaim: court required proof of loss or damage under section 7 and found none proved. |
| Duggan v Commissioner of An Garda Síochána [2017] IEHC 565 |
Section 7 is not actionable per se; damages require proof of actual damage. |
Relied on to support dismissal of the Defendant's counterclaim for damages for failure to prove loss. |
| McCann v JM [2015] IECA 281 |
Authority referenced on the need to prove damage under section 7. |
Used as supporting authority in considering the Counterclaim. |
| Murphy v Callinan [2018] IESC 59 |
Referenced in the context of remedies under data protection legislation and damages. |
Referenced in the Court's consideration of the Counterclaim and required proof of damage. |
| Grant Thornton v Scanlan [2020] IEHC 509 |
Earlier decision rejecting argument that High Court lacked jurisdiction for certain claims under the Data Protection Acts. |
Noted as precedent on jurisdiction and upheld by Court of Appeal; used in considering locus standi and scope of Plaintiff's claim. |
| Other authorities (Terrapin, Roxborough J. remarks, Kelly J., etc.) |
Various principles concerning confidentiality, public domain and the limits of blanket confidentiality. |
Referred to in exposition of general principles; applied as part of the contextual analysis. |