Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion concerns regulatory proceedings arising from the operation of heavy goods vehicles. Company A held an operator's licence for seven HGVs. Appellant (Individual), the company's sole director, was driving an HGV on 26 October 2022 that was stopped in England. No criminal prosecution followed, but regulatory proceedings were pursued by Agency A.
On 6 June 2024 a Presiding Officer (PO) of Agency A, after a public inquiry, decided: (i) to revoke Company A's operator's licence; (ii) that Appellant (Individual) had lost good repute as transport manager and was disqualified indefinitely from acting as transport manager; and (iii) that Company A and Appellant (Individual) were disqualified from holding or obtaining an operator's licence for 12 months on revocation. The PO relied in part on a roadside interaction on 26 October 2022 and described a catalogue of repeat and significant regulatory failures indicating a culture of non‑compliance.
During a post‑stop interview with Agency A, after a caution, Appellant (Individual) gave some "no comment" answers. The PO referred to that interview. The appellants appealed to the Upper Tier Tribunal (UTT), which dismissed the appeal by decision dated 10 November 2025, finding it was permissible to draw an adverse inference from the after‑caution no comment responses. The appellants applied for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal; the UTT refused permission on 12 January 2026. This application to the Court of Appeal followed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the UTT erred in law in concluding that it was permissible and/or appropriate to draw an adverse inference in regulatory (civil) proceedings from an after‑caution PACE interview in which the interviewee answered "no comment".
- Whether there is a compelling reason or important point of principle or practice warranting the Court of Appeal granting leave to appeal despite the UTT having already considered the matter.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The UTT erred in law in permitting an adverse inference to be drawn from Appellant (Individual)'s after‑caution "no comment" responses; that inference fed into findings of loss of good repute and the resulting disqualifications and licence revocation.
- The potential for the UTT ruling to establish a wider precedent permitting adverse inferences in civil/regulatory proceedings from silence at after‑caution interviews is a compelling reason for this court to hear the appeal.
- Reliance was placed on authorities concerning the drawing of adverse inferences in civil proceedings (including Wisniewski and Royal Mail Group Ltd v Efobi) to challenge the UTT's approach.
Respondent's Arguments
- The PO's overall findings were supported by a catalogue of prior regulatory infringements and audits; the PO's conclusions about conduct were valid independent of any adverse inference from the after‑caution interview.
- Agency A accepted the correct general principle (as advanced by the appellants) that an after‑caution no comment response in the context of potential criminal prosecution should not, without more, found an adverse inference in related civil or regulatory proceedings.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Martin v HMRC [2006] NICA 56 |
Approach to leave to appeal from the Upper Tribunal: whether there is a compelling reason to permit a further appeal. |
Used to explain the high threshold for granting leave where two tribunal tiers have already determined the issue. |
| McMahon t/a Irish Cottage Trading v Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs |
Endorsed approach regarding compelling reason for further appeal (as applied in Martin). |
Referenced as part of the appellate principles explaining when leave should be granted. |
| Tanfern v Cameron-MacDonald and Anor [2000] 1 WLR 1311 |
Primacy of the first appellate court's decision; limited circumstances for a second appeal to the Court of Appeal. |
Quoted to reinforce the limited grounds for granting leave to appeal. |
| MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] 2 All ER 65 |
Courts should approach appeals from expert tribunals with caution; such tribunals are primary judges of fact. |
Applied to caution against overturning tribunal factual findings absent clear legal misdirection. |
| Shawe-Lincoln v Dr Arul Chezhayan Neelakandan [2012] EWHC 1150 |
That whether and what inference should be drawn depends on the facts of the case. |
The UTT relied on it to support fact‑specific assessment of inferences; the Court of Appeal found that reliance misplaced in the after‑caution interview context. |
| Wisniewski v Central Manchester Health Authority [1998] PIQR P324 |
General position on drawing adverse inferences from failure to give evidence in civil proceedings. |
Relied upon as part of established law on adverse inferences in civil contexts. |
| Royal Mail Group Ltd v Efobi [2021] UKSC 33 |
Adverse inferences in civil proceedings should be a matter of common sense and context; relevant factors listed at para 41. |
Used to show tribunals may draw inferences by applying common sense to the context and facts. |
| Magdeev v Tsvetkov [2020] EWHC 887 |
Observation that reliance on adverse inference principles is to be deprecated and will arise in relatively few cases. |
Quoted to caution against frequent application of adverse inference reasoning. |
| Murray v UK (1996) 22 EHRR 29 |
Right to remain silent and privilege against self‑incrimination are fundamental components of a fair procedure under Article 6 ECHR. |
Referred to when distinguishing criminal rights to silence from use of evidence in civil/regulatory contexts. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court set out the applicable leave-to-appeal test (Appeals from the Upper Tribunal to the Court of Appeal Order 2008) and emphasised appellate caution when reviewing expert tribunals (Martin; Tanfern; MA (Somalia)). The PO had made a range of factual findings based on multiple regulatory encounters and an Agency audit; the PO recorded that Appellant (Individual) had given "no comment" responses after a PACE caution and treated that as indicative of an absence of commitment to cooperate.
The UTT upheld the PO, concluding an adverse inference could be drawn from the after‑caution interview, relying in part on the fact Appellant (Individual) had answered some questions before caution and on Shawe‑Lincoln's proposition that inferences depend on the facts. The Court of Appeal found that Shawe‑Lincoln was a poor fit for an after‑caution silence issue and that the UTT had gone too far in holding an after‑caution "no comment" interview could found an adverse inference in related regulatory proceedings without further analysis. The court accepted the general principle that post‑caution silence in the context of potential criminal prosecution should not, without more, justify an adverse inference in civil/regulatory proceedings.
Despite identifying that legal error, the court analysed the PO's decision as a whole. The PO had independently established extensive regulatory failings (detailed list of prior infringements and a DVA audit rating), had warned the appellants about their good repute, and had made findings that did not depend solely on any adverse inference from the after‑caution interview. The Court concluded the PO's substantive decision was sound on its own terms.
Holding and Implications
GRANT LEAVE TO APPEAL
The Court of Appeal found that the UTT's decision involved an error of law in treating an after‑caution "no comment" interview as a proper basis, by itself, for an adverse inference in regulatory proceedings. The court corrected that legal point.
Implications: The court declined to set aside the UTT's decision under its statutory powers because, on the material before it, the PO's decision was independently supported by a prima facie case of multiple and serious regulatory infringements. The substantive effect is that the PO's decision (revocation, disqualifications) stands and the stay is lifted. The court made no wider novel precedent beyond clarifying that post‑caution silence should not automatically found adverse inferences in related regulatory proceedings; the result preserves the PO's outcome on the facts of this case.