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Hickey v Howley and Ors (Approved)
Smart Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
The Plaintiff alleges that he was de-registered for VAT and income tax around 2005 and then re-registered in or about 2011 in error. As a result, the Plaintiff contends that tax assessments and a warrant were incorrectly issued, appeals were wrongly rejected and wrongful enforcement steps were taken, and he attributes various losses to actions by officials of Company A. The Plaintiff commenced proceedings by plenary summons on 28 September 2023. A Statement of Claim was delivered in December 2023 and subsequent pleadings followed; a draft amended statement of claim remained in draft. The First Named Defendant entered an Appearance, delivered a Defence in June 2024 and brought a motion dated 21 July 2025 seeking strike out/dismissal of the Plaintiff's claims against the First Named Defendant on multiple bases. An affidavit grounding the motion was sworn by the First Named Defendant on 17 July 2025 and the Plaintiff swore a replying affidavit on 1 October 2025. The matter was determined by Judge Jackson on 9 February 2026.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Plaintiff's claim against the First Named Defendant should be struck out or dismissed pursuant to Order 19 rule 28(1) RSC on the grounds that it (i) discloses no reasonable cause of action, (ii) amounts to an abuse of process, (iii) is bound to fail, and/or (iv) has no reasonable chance of succeeding.
- Whether the Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction to strike out the proceedings.
- Whether the Plaintiff's claims are barred by section 12 of the Personal Injuries Assessment Board Act 2003 (as amended).
- Whether the Plaintiff's pleadings comply with section 10 of the Civil Liability and Courts Act 2004.
- Whether the Plaintiff's claims are statute-barred under section 3(1) of the Statute of Limitations (Amendment) Act 1991 (as amended) and section 11 of the Statute of Limitations Act 1957 (as amended).
Arguments of the Parties
First Named Defendant's Arguments
- The pleadings disclose no reasonable cause of action against the First Named Defendant and the proceedings are an abuse of process.
- Most pleaded events occurred more than six years before commencement and tortious claims are statute-barred; alleged personal injury claims are statute-barred under the two-year rule.
- The Plaintiff commenced by plenary summons rather than a personal injuries summons and did not file a verifying affidavit where relevant.
- No cause of action arises from the re-registration itself; relevant assessments (particularly VAT) were withdrawn by Company A in February 2014 after the Plaintiff filed returns showing no VAT liability.
- An alleged warrant was not enforced; prosecutions and fines were matters for The District Court and were not appealed and are, in any event, time-barred as a basis for damages against the First Named Defendant.
- Allegations against named officials are vague, lack particularisation and are without foundation or causal linkage; many claims are procedurally defective or statute-barred.
- If struck out, significant court time and costs will be saved; costs should follow the successful defendant.
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The Plaintiff asserts constitutional and human rights claims and alleges failures by Company A officials beginning with an investigation circa 2011–2013 and concluding in April 2023, arguing the matters are not statute-barred.
- The Plaintiff relies on a number of documents and correspondence, asserts unfair procedures and loss arising from enforcement steps, and contends that withdrawal of some assessments was only known to him later via data access requests.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Plaintiff v. Defendant [2016] IESC 16 |
Strike out jurisdiction for abuse of process — to be exercised sparingly. |
Referred to as authority supporting limited, cautious use of strike out for abuse of process. |
| Plaintiff v. Company A [2005] IESC 34 |
Rationale behind strike out for abuse of process; courts protect defendants from defending claims that cannot succeed. |
Used to underline that access to court must be for genuine disputes and to assess whether a stateable case exists. |
| Company A v. Plaintiff [2014] IEHC 525 |
Test whether there is a stateable case in strike out context. |
Referenced for the proposition that a strike out must show no stateable case. |
| Plaintiff v. The State 1 May 1997 |
Test whether a plaintiff has any reasonable chance of success on the merits. |
Invoked to frame the standard of whether the Plaintiff has reasonable prospect of success. |
| Plaintiff v. Defendant [1990] 1 IR 499 |
Procedure for challenging tax assessments: appeals lie to tax appeal mechanism. |
Cited to support that issues arising from tax assessments should proceed through statutory tax appeal routes. |
| Company A v. Plaintiff [2016] IESC 9 |
Strike out appropriate only when no real risk of injustice in doing so. |
Applied to stress caution and to require confidence there is no risk of injustice. |
| Plaintiff v. Defendant [2025] IEHC 582 |
Effect of amendment to Order 19 r.28; codification of inherent jurisdiction limits. |
Used to explain that the amended rule allows limited consideration of merits where there is no credible basis for asserted facts. |
| Plaintiff v. Defendant [2014] IESC 66 |
Limits on assessment of credibility on strike out; plaintiff need only provide a credible basis that evidence may be available at trial. |
Applied to set threshold for what a plaintiff must show to avoid strike out. |
| Plaintiff v. The State [2014] IESC 21, [2014] 2 IR 301 |
Authority on summary disposal and caution against resolving issues of fact on strike out. |
Referenced in support of restraining summary resolution of factual disputes. |
| Plaintiff v. The State [2019] IESC 27, [2022] 2 IR 635 |
Strike out not appropriate where legal issues are not straightforward. |
Used to caution against strike out where complex legal questions exist. |
| Plaintiff v. The State [2025] IECA 59 |
Interpretation of new O.19 r.28; relation to inherent jurisdiction and abuse of process. |
Adopted to explain overlap between the rule and inherent jurisdiction and that pursuing claims bound to fail is an abuse. |
| Plaintiff v. Defendant [2019] IEHC 822 |
Instances where strike out on limitation grounds may be justified. |
Referenced to show strike out for limitation can be appropriate in some cases. |
| Company A v. Company B [2024] IECA 235 |
Recent appellate authority on strike out and limitation. |
Used as supporting authority that limitation-based strike out can sometimes be warranted. |
| Plaintiff v. Defendant [2014] IESC 721 |
Interpretation of civil action definitions under PIAB 2003 and related procedural considerations. |
Cited in connection with whether PIAB provisions were fatal to proceedings. |
| Plaintiff v. Company A & Anor [2011] IEHC 478 |
Procedural discussion referenced regarding affidavit evidence on strike out applications. |
Referred to in context of evidential approach on strike out applications. |
| Salthill Properties (as referenced) |
Illustrative approach on assessing factual allegations for strike out. |
Used by analogy to explain evaluating whether evidence could ever substantiate assertions. |
| Sun Fat Chan (as referenced) |
Experience shows trials can take unusual turns; relevance to caution on strike out. |
Invoked to support caution in concluding no evidence could emerge at trial. |
| Jodifern (as referenced) |
Commentary on limits of summary disposal procedures. |
Referred to as part of jurisprudential background on summary disposal. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by reference to the amended Order 19 r.28 and the inherent jurisdiction, recognising the jurisdiction to strike out is to be exercised cautiously and may permit limited inquiry into the merits where there is no credible basis for the Plaintiff's factual assertions. The Court had regard to the pleadings and to affidavit evidence adduced by the First Named Defendant (the grounding affidavit stating the pleadings disclose no chance of success and are statute-barred) and to the Plaintiff's replying affidavit. The Court identified two first-order questions: (i) whether, assuming the Plaintiff's pleaded facts to be true, those facts disclose a cause of action against the First Named Defendant; and (ii) whether there is any reasonable basis to believe that evidence could become available to support the Plaintiff's factual assertions.
On the undisputed facts the Court found: the Plaintiff was trading during the period in question; he failed to file required returns; upon re-registration Company A raised assessments for the unfiled period; enforcement steps (including lodging a warrant with The City Sheriff) were initiated but not executed; the Plaintiff subsequently filed returns which showed no VAT liability and Company A withdrew the VAT assessments by 26 February 2014; the Plaintiff was prosecuted in The District Court for failure to file returns, convicted and fined, and no appeal or judicial review was pursued. The Court found many allegations against Company A officials to be vague, imprecise and lacking causal linkage to the asserted losses.
Applying limitation statutes, the Court concluded that the tortious claims (other than personal injuries) are subject to a six-year limitation and had long expired by the 2023 commencement. Any personal injury claims were either not particularised or related to events crystallising before mid-March 2014 and thus are statute-barred under the two-year personal-injury limitation provisions. The Court accepted that strike out on limitation grounds is exceptional but determined that here the pleadings and evidence showed no reasonable possibility the Plaintiff could answer the statute-bar limitation plea.
Taking the pleadings at their height, and having reviewed exhibits and affidavits, the Court concluded there was no reasonable cause of action disclosed against the First Named Defendant, no reasonable prospect of success, and no reasonable basis for believing evidence would become available to substantiate the Plaintiff's general allegations. Accordingly the Court found the proceedings as framed were abusive or frivolous and were bound to fail.
Holding and Implications
The Court granted the First Named Defendant's motion and struck out the Plaintiff's proceedings against the First Named Defendant.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The Plaintiff's claims against the First Named Defendant are dismissed on the grounds stated (disclose no reasonable cause of action, bound to fail, no reasonable chance of success, and statute-bar).
- Costs: The First Named Defendant is presumptively entitled to costs; the Plaintiff was given 14 days to file a short written submission (limit 1,500 words) if he sought a different costs order, with a corresponding 14-day right of reply for the First Named Defendant.
- Broader precedent: The judgment applies existing strike out principles and limitation law to the facts; no novel legal principle or new precedent is asserted beyond application of established authorities and statutory provisions.
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