Summary of Judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

This judgment, delivered by Judge Andrews, concerns an appeal against conviction heard following a trial in The Crown Court on 18 July 2025. The Appellant was convicted by a jury of two counts of rape, one count of assault by penetration and three counts of sexual assault; he was acquitted on a number of other counts. The convictions primarily related to acts alleged to have been committed against Complainant 2; one conviction related to an incident after Complainant 2 had left the premises. Sentencing had not yet been imposed at the time of the judgment.

Reporting restrictions under the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply in this case in respect of the two complainants (referred to in the judgment as C1 and C2); the Appellant was also subject to anonymity protections under section 45 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 because he was 16 at the time of the proceedings. The Appellant is identified in the trial record by a random set of initials; in this summary he is referred to as "Appellant".

Factual core: Complainant 1 and Complainant 2 were 16-year-old school friends. The Appellant (then 15) and Complainant 1 had a prior relationship. On 25 May 2024 the Appellant and an associate (referred to in the trial as Individual J) met the two complainants at a train station and went to a flat in The City. Complainant 2 gave an account of being given, or smoking, a substance she believed to be cannabis, experiencing adverse effects, being physically forced and threatened, and subsequently being subjected to various non-consensual sexual acts by the Appellant. Complainant 1 reported becoming aware the same night and later provided an account to police of an incident the following morning. The Appellant denied the allegations in interview and at trial; he gave evidence consistent with his prepared defence statement.

Procedurally, leave to appeal on three grounds was granted by the single judge; leave was refused on a fourth ground which the Appellant sought to renew before the court on this appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the jury were misdirected in a way that permitted an adverse inference to be drawn from the Appellant's failure to mention matters relating to cannabis use in his police interview (the "adverse inference" ground).
2. Whether there was a real risk that the jury were given the impression that Complainant 2's capacity to consent was in issue when it was not, and whether the jury received inadequate direction on that point (the "capacity" ground).
3. Whether the jury were invited to draw impermissible inferences from non-expert opinion evidence or prosecuting counsel's characterisation of the effects of cannabis (the renewed ground refused by the single judge).
4. Whether any errors concerning the counts involving Complainant 2 rendered unsafe the single verdict of guilty on the count concerning Complainant 1 by virtue of cross-admissibility.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as advanced by Attorney Rose)

• There was a misdirection permitting the jury to draw an adverse inference from the Appellant's failure to mention cannabis-related matters in his police interview.
• The jury may have been led to treat Complainant 2's capacity to consent as an issue, without receiving appropriate directions, creating a real risk of confusion and unsafe verdicts.
• Prosecuting counsel and the Judge invited impermissible inferences from non-expert descriptions of cannabis effects (phrases such as "knocked out" / "knocked her sideways"), which could have suggested incapacity to consent.
• Any unsafe verdicts on counts concerning Complainant 2 would undermine the safety of the conviction relating to Complainant 1 due to cross-admissibility.

Prosecution's Arguments

• Cross-examination about who supplied the cannabis and its effects was a permissible line of inquiry; the question was factually relevant to credibility, consent and motive.
• No expert evidence was necessary about cannabis effects because the complainants and witnesses gave lay descriptions that the jury could assess.
• The Judge's section 34 ("no comment") direction, as revised and given, did not invite an adverse inference about cannabis or suggest incapacity to consent; it focused on failure to mention facts about consent and initiation.
• The jury's verdicts reflected credibility assessments and there was no real risk that any alleged misdirections rendered them unsafe.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined each ground in turn and applied established principles about misdirection, admissibility of lay evidence about intoxication, and the proper scope of section 34 directions.

On the renewed ground about impermissible inferences from non-expert descriptions of cannabis effects, the court concluded the ground was unarguable. The court held that lay descriptions by the complainants of how they felt after smoking cannabis were matters the jury could assess without expert evidence, and that prosecuting counsel's characterization of those effects did not amount to inviting an impermissible inference that Complainant 2 lacked capacity to consent.

Regarding capacity, the court observed that capacity was not put in issue by the prosecution: Complainant 2 consistently described herself as having the capacity to consent but not having consented, and the prosecution did not allege incapacity. The court accepted that, in hindsight, a direction clarifying that Complainant 2 had capacity or explaining the law about consent under the influence might have been helpful, but held that the absence of such a direction did not render the convictions unsafe. The court found no real risk that the jury were misled into thinking that the cannabis rendered Complainant 2 incapable of consenting.

On the section 34 ("no comment") direction, the court analysed the direction given and noted that an earlier draft had been modified to remove any suggestion that failure to mention cannabis was a basis for an adverse inference. The direction as given identified specific matters the Appellant had not mentioned in interview (sexual intercourse, asserted free consent, and that Complainant 2 had initiated contact). The judge also reminded the jury of the Appellant's explanation that he was acting on legal advice. The court concluded that the direction did not permit the jury to draw an adverse inference about cannabis and that the inclusion of the short phrase "and not under the influence of drugs" was not sufficient to create a real risk of an unsafe verdict.

Overall, the court emphasised that the case fundamentally turned on credibility: the jury believed Complainant 2's account and disbelieved the Appellant. The court found that any shortcomings in phrasing or the absence of supplemental directions did not materially affect the safety of the jury's verdicts given the totality of the trial.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The court refused the renewed application for leave on the ground previously refused by the single judge and dismissed the appeal on the grounds for which leave had been granted by the single judge.

Implications: The dismissal upholds the jury convictions described in the background (sentencing remained outstanding). The court determined that no misdirections or improper inferences identified by the Appellant established a real risk of unsafe verdicts. The opinion does not purport to establish a new legal precedent beyond the application of existing principles to the facts of this case.