Factual and Procedural Background
On 14 March 2025, following a trial at The Crown Court, the Appellant was convicted of one count of wounding with intent contrary to section 18 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 and one count of violent disorder contrary to section 2(1) of the Public Order Act 1986. The trial concerned a violent street incident on 4 May 2024 captured on CCTV involving the Appellant and another individual (referred to in the trial material as the Other Defendant) and two unknown males described in the footage. The Other Defendant had allegedly sprayed a corrosive liquid and was charged with that act; the Appellant was charged with offences arising from the subsequent violent confrontation, including stabbing injuries inflicted on the Other Defendant.
Prior to trial, psychiatric material was obtained for both sides. The Appellant's legal team had an earlier psychiatric report (first Rao report) obtained in October 2024 in relation to separate charges, which recorded a history of prior assaults and symptoms consistent with PTSD. The Other Defendant served a Defence Case Statement and obtained psychiatric evidence asserting PTSD. Shortly before and at the start of trial the Appellant sought an adjournment to obtain expert psychiatric evidence specifically linking PTSD to his perception of threat and the level of force he used. The trial judge refused the adjournment, admitted the Other Defendant's psychiatric evidence (which was linked to that defendant's account), proceeded to trial, and the jury convicted the Appellant on the two counts on 14 March 2025. A further psychiatric report from the Appellant's expert (the second Rao report), obtained on 14 March 2025 after conviction, forms the basis of the Appellant's application under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 to adduce fresh evidence and seek leave to appeal. The court below (single judge) referred the application to the full court, which refused both the fresh evidence application and leave to appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the trial judge was wrong to refuse an adjournment to permit the Appellant to adduce expert psychiatric evidence that he suffered from PTSD relevant to his perception of threat and the reasonableness/proportionality of the force he used.
- Whether the second psychiatric report (the second Rao report) should be received as fresh evidence under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 and, if received, whether it would afford any ground for allowing the appeal.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The trial judge erred in refusing an adjournment so that expert evidence on the Appellant's PTSD could be obtained and heard; such evidence was relevant to whether the Appellant genuinely and reasonably believed the level of force used was necessary.
- The Appellant relied on R v Press and Thompson [2013] EWCA Crim 1849 to support the proposition that PTSD evidence can inform a defendant's threat assessment and the defence of self-defence.
- It was submitted that the second Rao report should be admitted as fresh evidence under section 23 CAA 1968.
- Counsel also noted that the judge admitted psychiatric evidence for the Other Defendant and contended that fairness required similar treatment for the Appellant.
Respondent and Trial Judge's Position
- The trial judge concluded that, although the Appellant likely suffered from PTSD, an adjournment was unnecessary because the proposed evidence would not assist the jury on the material issues given the Appellant's defence as presented.
- The judge observed the Appellant's case denied awareness of the presence or use of a knife and did not assert a belief that such force (or a group attack) was a proportionate response; timing and custody limits also weighed against adjournment.
- The Other Defendant's psychiatric evidence was admitted because it was specifically tethered to his account and to features of the incident; that differed from the Appellant's proposed report.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| R v Press and Thompson [2013] EWCA Crim 1849 |
Relevance of expert evidence of PTSD to whether a defendant held an honest belief that he was being threatened and whether he instinctively thought the force used was necessary. |
The Appellant relied on the case to argue PTSD can inform threat assessment. The court acknowledged Press and Thompson establishes that PTSD evidence can be relevant to those questions but applied it to the facts here and concluded the proposed Appellant evidence would not assist the jury. |
| R v Mazzer [2024] EWCA Crim 557 |
Expert evidence must be tethered to the defendant's account and to relevant factual features; general psychiatric opinion untethered to the facts is unlikely to be helpful. |
The court treated Mazzer as stating the relevant principle: expert reports must link diagnosis and opinion to the defendant's account and the evidence of events. The second Rao report was criticised as general and not tethered, supporting refusal to admit it. |
| R v Jacobs [2024] 4 WLR 8 |
Review of authorities stressing the necessity for expert evidence to be connected to the facts and account in issue. |
The court referred to Jacobs (Baroness Carr CJ's review) as part of the line of authority confirming that expert evidence must be tied to the evidence in the case; that principle informed the court's assessment of the second Rao report. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analysed the fresh evidence application under section 23(2) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 and the trial judge's exercise of discretion to refuse an adjournment. The court accepted that the second Rao report was capable of belief and (for present purposes) that there was a reasonable explanation for not adducing it at trial. The key questions were whether the evidence would have been admissible at trial and whether it might afford a ground for allowing the appeal, which required assessing whether the trial judge was correct to refuse the adjournment.
The court emphasised established principles (as in R v Mazzer and R v Jacobs) that expert psychiatric evidence must be tethered to the defendant's account and to specific factual features of the alleged offence, and must explain how the diagnosis and its effects relate to the events in question. The second Rao report was found to be brief, general and largely narrative, repeating the Appellant's account but offering only a general opinion that PTSD could have led to an inflated assessment of risk. It did not link the diagnosis to particular features of the Appellant's conduct in this incident or explain how that would have made the jury more likely to accept the Appellant's specific account.
The court further accepted the trial judge's practical considerations: timing of the adjournment application, custody time limits, and prejudice to other defendants and witnesses. Crucially, the Appellant's case at trial was that he had not initiated the force, was unaware of the presence or use of a knife, and did not assert that he believed extreme force (e.g. knife use) was necessary. Given that defence narrative, and the character of the second Rao report, the court concluded there was no realistic scope for the psychiatric evidence to assist the jury on the core issues.
The court contrasted this with the Other Defendant's psychiatric evidence, which was specifically linked to that defendant's account and the scenario he described; admission of that evidence was open to the trial judge for those reasons.
Holding and Implications
LEAVE TO APPEAL REFUSED; FRESH EVIDENCE NOT ADMITTED
The court refused the Appellant's application both to adduce the second Rao report as fresh evidence under section 23 and for leave to appeal the convictions. The direct consequence is that the Appellant's convictions (and the sentence previously imposed) stand. The court concluded the trial judge did not err in refusing an adjournment because the proposed expert evidence was not sufficiently tethered to the Appellant's account or the core issues such that it would have assisted the jury. The opinion applies established principles regarding the admissibility of psychiatric expert evidence but does not purport to establish novel precedent beyond those principles.