Summary of Opinion — Judge Cubie

Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiff, a company formed to represent local interest in education on The Island, sought judicial review of the Defendant's decision of 7 March 2025 selecting a preferred site for a new 2-18 single-site campus. The Defendant is the local authority responsible for education on The Island. The Defendant had earlier (20 December 2024) determined to proceed with a single-site campus (a "like for like" replacement) after obtaining funding via the Funding Programme (LEIP) and adopting a Learning Estate Strategy. A competitive funding bid was submitted and accepted into phase 3 of LEIP. Following public engagement and a call for sites, four short-listed sites were scored by officials. Shortly before the elected members' meeting, Persons A and B (landowners of Site B) sent a letter offering to gift their site subject to collaboration on adjacent housing infrastructure. The Plaintiff and Community Group A advanced surveys and commentary favouring split-site options. The Defendant's elected members met on 7 March 2025 and confirmed "Site 4 - Town A South" as the preferred site; that decision is challenged in these proceedings.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the petition is competent — i.e. whether the Defendant's site-selection decision of 7 March 2025 is amenable to judicial review.
2. Whether the Defendant acted unlawfully by failing to make adequate enquiries about the offer from Persons A and B (the landowner gift letter).
3. Whether the Defendant's site-selection decision was irrational because of inadequate consultation with the island community (including treatment of the Community Group A survey).
4. Whether the procedure used at the 7 March 2025 meeting (including recording of dissent and standing orders) involved a procedural flaw invalidating the decision.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

• The Defendant failed to inform itself and elected members adequately about the landowners' offer to gift Site B, and therefore proceeded without material facts.
• The Defendant acted irrationally by presenting members with options premised on closure of education provision in Town A and by failing to conduct adequate consultation with the wider island community.
• The Defendant failed to comply with its standing orders and constitutional voting procedure at the meeting, vitiating the decision.

Defendant's Arguments

• The petition is incompetent because site selection was part of the LEIP/RIBA process and contractual/administrative stages not susceptible to review; alternatively, any decision was within the Defendant's discretionary statutory powers.
• The Defendant had no obligation to make the further enquiries sought by the Plaintiff in the stage-0/RIBA context; the landowners' letter invited negotiation and was not an unconditional gift susceptible to de plano acceptance.
• There was no general common-law duty to consult beyond engagement; the Defendant's engagement steps were reasonable and, in any event, a December 2024 decision rejecting a split-site made further consultation on that option immaterial.
• The meeting procedure complied with standing orders: no competent amendment or alternative motion was moved, and recording of dissent requires a competent motion or amendment under the standing orders.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first addressed competence. Applying Stannifer and subsequent authorities (including Redcroft and AXA), the court held that the discrete decision of 7 March 2025 selecting a preferred site was amenable to the supervisory jurisdiction because it flowed from statutory educational powers and could affect all persons within the statutory remit. The challenge was therefore competent.

On the Knights' (Persons A and B) letter, the court applied the Tameside/Plantagenet principles on the duty to inquire. The court held the obligation was to take such reasonable steps as were appropriate in context (RIBA stage 0 and the LEIP/funding constraints). The landowners' letter was read (and supported by the landowner's affidavit) as a conditional statement of intent inviting further work and collaboration rather than an unconditional gift. Given the stage-0, desk-based appraisal process, the use of independent valuation and the prospect that acquisition/procurement issues were matters for later RIBA stages, the court concluded no unreasonable failure to inquire arose. The Tameside threshold for intervention was not met; no reasonable council in possession of the material would have been compelled to make the further enquiries the Plaintiff demanded.

On consultation, the court analysed the applicable principles (Plantagenet, Gunning and related authorities). It held there is no general common-law duty to consult; such a duty arises only in limited circumstances (statute, promise, established practice, or exceptional conspicuous unfairness). The court found the Defendant's engagement steps constituted engagement rather than a legally enforceable promise to consult on precise shortlisted sites; the prior December 2024 decision to reject a split-site option materially limited what consultation could achieve. Even if a duty to consult had been arguable, the court concluded the engagement undertaken addressed the substantive matters relevant to site selection and did not give rise to conspicuous unfairness. Accordingly the consultation-related challenge failed.

On procedural challenge to the meeting/vote, the court accepted the Defendant's explanation of standing-order practice: absent a competent amendment or alternative motion, the officer recommendation stood as the proposition before the council. Members who sought their dissent to be recorded had not moved a competent motion or amendment required by the standing orders. The court found no procedural irregularity sufficient to vitiate the decision.

Overall the court sustained the Defendant's preliminary pleas on competence aspects it advanced, rejected the Plaintiff's primary substantive grounds (failure to inquire; inadequate consultation; procedural flaw) and concluded the March decision was lawfully reached.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED

Holding: The petition for judicial review is dismissed. The court held:

• The 7 March 2025 site-selection decision is amenable to review (action competent).
• No unlawful failure to make further inquiry arose from the landowners' letter; the decision not to pursue further enquiries at stage 0 was reasonable.
• There was no legal obligation to conduct wider consultation in the manner urged; the engagement undertaken was adequate and failure to consult did not produce conspicuous unfairness.
• There was no procedural irregularity in the council meeting/vote sufficient to vitiate the decision.

Direct effect: The Defendant's decision of 7 March 2025 remains in force and the Plaintiff's petition is dismissed. The court ordered that the Defendant's pleas in law numbers 4, 5 and 6 be sustained and the Plaintiff's pleas be repelled; costs issues were left for agreement or further enrolment.