Summary of Judgment (Anonymised)

Factual and Procedural Background

This judgment was delivered by Judge Humphreys on 10 February 2026 in proceedings brought by the Plaintiff under Order 84 and the domestic regulations transposing Directive 2003/4. The Plaintiff sought access to environmental information from Company A about a proposed windfarm. Company A initially treated the request as too general, the Plaintiff refined it, and Company A refused access on 11 December 2018. Following an implied internal-review refusal, the Plaintiff appealed to the Defendant on 25 February 2019. The Defendant partially remitted the request to Company A on 22 November 2019. Company A refused again on 20 February 2020 (affirmed on internal review on 26 March 2020). The Plaintiff appealed again and the Defendant later referred issues to the High Court under the domestic regulations on 15 September 2021. The High Court decided an interlocutory legal issue in a related judgment in 2023. Thereafter, the Defendant formed a view in mid‑2024 that the matter should be remitted again to Company A and, after a period in which another appeal was selected as the lead case, formally remitted the Plaintiff’s appeal back to Company A on 19 December 2024. Company A made a further internal-review decision on 18 March 2025, and the Plaintiff appealed on 17 April 2025. The referring court stayed the proceedings and referred questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether Article 6(1) and/or (2) of Directive 2003/4, Article 9(1) and/or (4) of the Aarhus Convention and/or Article 47 of the Charter, insofar as they require remedies to be timely/expeditious/effective, oblige a national competent authority acting under Article 6(2) to exercise its functions to the maximum extent possible so as to make a final, ex nunc decision (including findings of fact and evaluative judgements) rather than remit to the public body, in circumstances where remittal would more likely than not cause further delay (and in particular where the matter has already been remitted previously).
2. If the first question is answered in the affirmative, whether that obligation applies independently of: (a) backlogs of other decisions before the competent authority; (b) administrative convenience or resource savings from remittal or desirability of a fresh decision in light of an intervening domestic judgment; and (c) delay by the public body in responding to requests from the competent authority.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

• The relevant EU-law provisions require the competent authority to make a final, ex nunc determination wherever possible and to direct disclosure rather than remit; remittal is exceptional and compatible only where objectively the quickest lawful route to final determination.

Defendant's Arguments

• The Defendant accepts an obligation to decide in a timely manner but contends that the appropriate procedural steps depend on case-specific circumstances; remittal may, in some cases, be the most appropriate course. The Defendant acted in good faith and identified efficiency and caseload management as reasons for remittal in this instance.

The State's Arguments

• The State submits that the provisions do not impose a general obligation to decide to the maximum extent possible; competent authorities retain procedural autonomy and discretion to remit even if remittal may occasion further delay; timeliness and effectiveness are important but not sole considerations.

Amicus's Arguments (Company B)

• The amicus adopts the Plaintiff's position: the requirement for timely/expeditious/effective remedies requires the competent authority to reach a final ex nunc decision where remittal would likely delay resolution.

Referring Court's Position

• The referring court proposes answers in line with the Plaintiff and amicus: the Directive's purpose of timely access requires the competent authority to act in the most expeditious manner unless it is not reasonably possible to do otherwise; second or subsequent remittals are inherently likely to compound delay and are especially undesirable; backlogs, administrative convenience and delay by the public authority do not justify remittal in the circumstances of this case.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The referring court analysed the Directive's object and purpose as requiring timely access to environmental information and observed that delay diminishes the practical value of information. The court found that remittal to the public body is permissible but must be exceptional where it would compromise the timeliness and effectiveness of the remedy. The court noted that in the present facts the Defendant began to favour remittal before 2 July 2024 and that selection of another appeal as a lead case from September 2024 made remittal likely; the formal second remittal occurred on 19 December 2024. The referring court identified three salient features of the contested remittal decision: (i) efficiency/administrative convenience was the stated reason; (ii) the Defendant did not apply a test establishing that remittal was the most expeditious means to resolve the request or that avoiding remittal was not reasonably possible; and (iii) the Defendant expressly acknowledged that remittal would cause further delay and apologised for that delay.

The court emphasised that a second or subsequent remittal is particularly likely to compound delay. It considered that factors such as backlogs, administrative convenience, selection of a lead case and delays by the public authority cannot, without more, justify remittal where the effect is to frustrate the Directive's requirement of timely and effective remedies. The court relied on comparative and domestic authorities illustrating the problem of judicial review being backward‑looking and of administrative processes that "evade review", and cited guidance (CEPEJ) supporting limits on repeated remittal in order to address backlog‑related delay. Applying these principles to the facts, the referring court concluded that if EU law requires the national competent authority to decide where it can do so expeditiously, then the Defendant erred in remitting this case for the second time without clearly showing that remittal was objectively the quickest lawful route to final determination or that no reasonable alternative was available.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court ordered that the questions framed in the judgment be referred to the CJEU pursuant to Article 267 TFEU, and that the substantive determination of the domestic proceedings be adjourned pending the CJEU's judgment, without prejudice to appropriate procedural or interlocutory matters.

Implications: The direct effect is that the domestic substantive proceedings are stayed and a preliminary ruling on the two framed questions will be sought from the CJEU. The judgment does not itself decide the European‑law questions posed; rather it seeks authoritative EU guidance. No novel binding precedent on the referred questions was established by the referring court beyond the decision to refer and to adjourn the substantive proceedings.