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Tanga, R. v
Smart Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
This is an application by the Attorney General under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 for leave to refer a sentence as unduly lenient. The issue is whether the sentencing judge was wrong not to impose consecutive minimum terms for two murders committed by the same Defendant.
The Defendant, aged 42, was convicted on 27 June 2025 at The Court before Judge Tipples and a jury of the murder of Victim A, an offence that occurred in The Prison on 29 or 30 September 2022. On 3 July 2025 the Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 26 years and four months for that murder; the judge set a minimum term of 27 years and six months to reflect both murders.
The Defendant had earlier committed a fatal assault on 10 May 2021 at a property in The City, resulting in the death of Victim B on 24 May 2021; the Defendant was convicted of that murder on 19 April 2024 and sentenced on 3 May 2024 to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 25 years (adjusted for time on remand). The second murder (Victim A) occurred while the Defendant was remanded in custody for other offending and while released under investigation for the first murder. The Attorney General applied for leave to refer the sentence imposed for the second murder as unduly lenient; leave was granted and the court reconsidered the minimum term for the second murder.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the sentencing judge was wrong not to impose consecutive minimum terms for a second life sentence where the offender was already serving a life sentence.
- Whether the minimum term imposed for the murder of Victim A was unduly lenient in light of the Defendant's overall criminality and the principle of totality.
Arguments of the Parties
Attorney Polnay's Arguments
- The judge should have imposed consecutive minimum terms, with the second minimum term starting at a specified future point, to ensure transparency.
- The overall sentence did not adequately reflect both murders because the second sentence increased the earliest release date by only five years and two months.
Attorney Malik's Arguments
- A consecutive minimum term may be legally available, but the sentencing judge was not wrong to structure the sentences as she did.
- A minimum term of 27 years and six months for the murder of Victim A (with a 15-year starting point) could not sensibly be described as lenient.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| R v Stewart [2022] EWCA Crim 1063; [2022] 4 WLR 86 |
Focus on the offence before the court when setting minimum term; judge may adjust the minimum term to achieve just punishment and overall proportionality. |
The sentencing judge relied on Stewart for approach to uplift for a second murder; the court warned that Stewart's facts (notably extreme age consequences) affect proportionality and can mislead if applied without attention to overall criminality. |
| R v O'Brien [2006] EWCA Crim 1741; [2007] 1 WLR 833 |
Authority that there is no provision preventing the imposition of consecutive indeterminate sentences. |
The court relied on O'Brien to support the proposition that consecutive indeterminate sentences can be imposed (via section 384 of the Sentencing Act 2020). |
| R v Hills [2008] EWCA Crim 1871 |
Illustrates that a determinate sentence can be ordered to run consecutively to a life sentence; no principle preventing such structuring. |
The court cited Hills to show no reason in principle to prohibit consecutive structuring between determinate and indeterminate sentences. |
| Attorney General's Reference (No 4 of 1989) 11 Cr App R(S) 517 |
Sets out principles governing Attorney General's References: court should only interfere where judge has erred and the sentence is unduly lenient. |
The court applied these principles when deciding whether to exercise its discretion to increase the sentence. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court set out the relevant statutory framework: mandatory life sentences for murder, requirement to set a minimum term or whole life order (Sentencing Act 2020 and Schedule 21), the 15-year starting point for adult offenders not in specified categories, and the Sentencing Council guideline on totality. The court extracted five propositions of law, including that consecutive indeterminate sentences are permissible, that determinate sentences can run consecutively to indeterminate sentences, and that when imposing a further life sentence the court must ensure the minimum term reflects overall criminality if not made consecutive.
The court observed that the sentencing judge had not been referred to the authorities establishing the availability of consecutive indeterminate sentences and that it had been assumed at trial that consecutive minimum terms were not possible. The court held that the judge was entitled to structure the sentences without making the second minimum term expressly consecutive, but that she remained required to reflect all criminality arising from both murders and to account for time already served.
The court accepted that the issue of whether the overall sentence reflected the Defendant's criminality was arguable and granted leave for the Reference. It analysed proportionality and totality: for a 42-year-old offender, an uplift of only five years and two months did not fairly reflect the additional criminality of the second murder. Starting from 15 years for the second murder and having regard to aggravating and mitigating features, the court concluded a minimum term of at least 17 years was required for the second murder alone before totality adjustment. To achieve transparency and reflect totality, the court added ten years to the outstanding portion of the first minimum term.
Holding and Implications
Decision: The Reference is allowed in part. The court substituted a minimum term of 32 years and six months for the minimum term of 27 years and six months imposed for the murder of Victim A.
Implications: The direct effect is that the Defendant's overall minimum term is increased from 27 years and six months to 32 years and six months (with consequent movement of the earliest possible release date). The court also clarified propositions of law concerning the permissibility of consecutive indeterminate sentences and the requirement that sentencing reflect overall criminality and totality; the court exercised its discretion under Attorney General reference principles to increase the minimum term in order to achieve proportionality between the sentences for both murders.
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