Pollard, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application by the Solicitor General under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 for leave to refer sentences as unduly lenient. The Defendant pleaded guilty on the day set for trial (7 April 2025) to: (i) controlling and coercive behaviour over a four‑year period against his then partner (the Victim); and (ii) an offence contrary to section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 for an incident at the end of that period in which the Victim's arm was fractured. Sentencing occurred on 13 June 2025 before Judge Sprawson. The judge imposed concurrent suspended sentences of 2 years' imprisonment on each count with ancillary requirements and a 10‑year restraining order. The Solicitor General sought leave to refer the sentence as unduly lenient.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentence imposed (concurrent suspended terms of 2 years' imprisonment) was unduly lenient in respect of the offences of controlling and coercive behaviour and s.20 assault.
2. If unduly lenient, what sentence should be substituted by this Court and what weight should be given to a Goodyear indication given on the day of trial that any sentence "would not be more than 2 years".

Arguments of the Parties

Solicitor General's Arguments

• The appropriate (least) sentence, allowing 10% credit for a late plea on the day of trial, was approximately 32 months' imprisonment (rounded from 3 years less 10%), a sentence which cannot lawfully be suspended.
• The controlling and coercive behaviour should properly have been treated at the highest guideline category (submitted as category 1A with a 2½ year starting point) and the s.20 offence should not have been treated as low culpability/spontaneous; cumulative effects justified a 3‑year total before plea credit.
• Aggravating factors include the previous 2016 conviction and the impact on the children; mitigating factors (change in circumstances, some remorse, employment) did not outweigh those aggravations to justify suspension or as great a reduction as the judge gave.

Defence and Sentencing Hearing Material

• Defence relied on mitigation including time elapsed since the offending, the Defendant's changed circumstances (stable new relationship, employment), positive engagement and family responsibilities; defence counsel had sought and obtained a Goodyear indication on the day of trial.
• Pre‑sentence report recorded partial acceptance of responsibility but continued minimisation; statements from the Former Partner and the New Partner and other mitigation were placed before the judge at sentencing.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
R v Timpson [2023] EWCA Crim 453	Observations on the limited mitigating weight of delay where delay is principally caused by a late guilty plea.	The Court relied on Timpson to question the weight the sentencing judge had given to the passage of time and to support the Solicitor General's submission that delay attributable to late pleas is of limited mitigating value.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined (i) the factual basis of the offending, (ii) the procedural history including the Goodyear indication given orally on the day of trial, and (iii) the materials before the sentencing judge. The Court found significant procedural shortcomings in the Goodyear process: there was no written factual basis, and crucial victim impact material (victim personal statement and a community mental health nurse's letter documenting significant harm to the Victim and a child) was not before the judge when the indication was given. The judge also appeared to have taken into account mitigation at the Goodyear stage (contrary to the prescribed approach), and did not address guideline categorisation for each offence with sufficient precision.

Leaving those procedural errors aside, the Court accepted the Solicitor General's assessment of guideline categorisation and the balancing of aggravating and mitigating features: a custodial sentence of about 32 months (after 10% plea credit) represented the least sentence that should have been imposed. However, the Court explained that fairness required that the Goodyear indication not be disregarded entirely. Taking account of the imperfect process but also of the expectation created by the Goodyear indication and the Defendant's positive response to the suspended sentence (including some unpaid work completed and a favourable pre‑appeal report), the Court concluded that a limited adjustment should be made.

Holding and Implications

The Court quashed the suspended sentence order and substituted an immediate custodial sentence of 2 years' imprisonment concurrent on each count (not suspended).

Implications and direct consequences:

• The substituted sentence is immediate custody; the suspended sentence requirements are removed.
• The 10‑year restraining order imposed by the sentencing judge remains in force; other ancillary orders (such as surcharge) are unaffected.
• The Defendant must surrender to The Town police station by 4:00 pm on the day specified by the Court (failure to do so carries serious consequences).

The Court noted that the substituted sentence is lower than the sentence it regarded as strictly appropriate (circa 32 months) but was chosen as a fair compromise in light of the Goodyear indication and the procedural context; no wider novel precedent was established.