Jeong, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

Judge Holgate delivered an opinion concerning an Appellant who stood trial at Kingston Crown Court between 12 and 23 January 2015 on a 19-count indictment alleging sexual and physical abuse of two step-children identified in the record as C1 (male) and C2 (female). Counts 1–14 related to alleged offences against C1 across various periods and statutory provisions; counts 15–19 related to alleged offences against C2. On 23 January 2015 the Appellant was convicted on counts 1, 3–11 and 15–19, acquitted on counts 12–14 and the jury failed to reach a verdict on count 2. On 10 July 2015 the Appellant, then aged 47, was sentenced to a total term of imprisonment of 22 years (14 years on count 4 and a consecutive eight years on count 19, other sentences concurrent). The Appellant renewed an application for an extension of time (3,493 days) for leave to appeal against conviction and sought leave under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 to rely on fresh evidence said to undermine the evidence of M, C1 and C2.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the fresh evidence relied upon by the Appellant is admissible under section 23(2) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 and, if admitted, whether it affords any arguable ground for concluding that any conviction is unsafe.
2. Whether the Appellant has provided adequate justification for the very long extension of time sought to apply for leave to appeal.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Appellant relied entirely on fresh evidence said to undermine the credibility of M and, through her, the credibility of C1 and C2, rendering the convictions unsafe.
• The items of fresh evidence included: (a) a recording of a telephone call between Witness L and M dated 6 November 2015; (b) a handwritten document said to be signed by M dated 13 November 2015; (c) witness statements from Witness L, Witness Ha and Attorney Jung; and (d) immigration records obtained from the South Korean Embassy showing the Appellant's movements between the UK and South Korea between 2004 and 2014.
• The Appellant submitted that the immigration records contradicted the complainants' evidence of continuous offending and frequency of assaults during 1999–2009.

Prosecution / Trial Case (as described)

• The prosecution relied primarily on the evidence of C1 and C2 (ABEs and trial testimony) and on M's evidence that she was not aware of the sexual abuse and only learned of physical abuse in 2009.
• The defence at trial was that the allegations were fabricated by C1 and C2, motivated by divorce and financial dispute; the Appellant denied the offences and gave evidence denying being alone with the children.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court identified the central question as whether it is arguable that any conviction is unsafe on the basis of the fresh evidence; if not, the long extension of time cannot be justified. The court applied section 23(2) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, having regard in particular to: (a) whether the evidence appears capable of belief; (b) whether it may afford ground for allowing the appeal; (c) whether it would have been admissible at trial; and (d) whether there is a reasonable explanation for failure to adduce it at trial.

The court examined each item:

• Witness Ha's statement (9 August 2024) was relevant only to justification for delay (difficulty locating M) and did not bear on safety of conviction.
• Attorney Jung's statement (21 August 2024) described steps taken to obtain evidence and exhibited immigration records supplied in 2016 showing periods the Appellant was in South Korea; the court observed those records covered about 20–21 weeks in 2004–2006 but noted that counts were specimen counts requiring proof of an event on at least one occasion during each period, and that the Appellant had opportunities at trial to raise the issue and the passport/evidence could have been produced earlier. The court treated the immigration evidence as not genuinely fresh and, in any event, vulnerable to section 23(2)(d) reasoning given no satisfactory explanation for non-production at trial.
• The material chiefly relied upon (the recording of 6 November 2015 and the handwritten note dated 13 November 2015 produced by Witness L) was analysed in detail. The court found significant problems: parts were hearsay; the recorded telephone conversation showed Witness L exerting pressure and asking leading, multiple questions that rendered any apparent admissions by M equivocal; M's recorded answers were, when read fairly, ambiguous and could not be taken as unequivocal retractions; the handwritten note (translated) did not amount to the admissions asserted by Witness L and did not retract M's trial evidence nor demonstrate that C1 or C2 had lied in material respects.
• The court noted that certain points in the newly produced material were matters of inference (M's opinion that C1's recollection was wrong because she washed him) and were matters for the jury; other points could and should have been raised at trial by the Appellant, and thus failed the test of genuineness as fresh evidence.
• Applying the cited authorities (notably Pendleton), the court concluded that even if the evidence had been before the jury it would not reasonably have affected the jury's decision on the counts resulting in guilty verdicts. The Appellant made no complaint about the trial directions or conduct of defence counsel; the jury had been properly directed about cross-admissibility, collusion, inconsistencies and standard of proof.

Holding and Implications

THE APPLICATION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME AND LEAVE TO APPEAL IS REFUSED.

Direct effect: the Appellant's convictions and sentences remain in force; the court found no arguable basis that the fresh evidence rendered any conviction unsafe and therefore there was no justification for granting the lengthy extension of time. The opinion does not establish a new legal precedent beyond application of existing authorities on fresh evidence; no broader or novel legal rule was announced.