Anonymized Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant challenged the Defendant's decision to revoke a Low Traffic Neighbourhood scheme ("the Scheme") in The Area. The Scheme had been implemented between January 2020 and March 2022 and originally included 14 road closures. The newly elected Mayor of The Borough decided on 20 September 2023 to remove the Scheme but to retain one road closure (on "[Street]"). The Appellant is a local resident and member of a residents' group. The Interested Party (Company A) has a strategic transport interest across The Region. The Appellant sought judicial review; the claim was dismissed by Judge Fordham on 17 December 2024. The appeal before the court addressed three discrete issues and resulted in the court allowing the appeal on the first issue and dismissing the others.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Defendant's decision to revoke the Scheme breached its duty to implement its third Local Implementation Plan under section 151(1)(a) of the Greater London Authority Act 1999.
2. Whether the Defendant unlawfully failed to have regard to the contents of its Local Implementation Plan (LIP).
3. Whether it was so unfair as to be unlawful that the Defendant did not re-consult the public in respect of an amended proposal ("Option 3") that was not adopted.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The LIP contained a timetable and the Scheme had been implemented; section 151(1)(a) therefore imposed an ongoing duty to retain the implemented Scheme (including to the LIP's end date).
• If the Defendant wished to remove the Scheme it should have followed the statutory procedure to revise the LIP and obtain the Mayor of London’s approval.
• The Defendant unlawfully failed to have regard to the LIP and did not show that removal was consistent with the Mayor of London's transport strategy.
• The failure to re-consult on Option 3 (which included features such as ANPR cameras and other amendments) was unfair because Option 3 differed materially from the consulted options and might have unified community views.

Defendant's Arguments

• The Judge was correct to find Table 18 of the LIP did not contain a sufficient timetable to make an ongoing duty enforceable.
• The projects listed required further public consultation and statutory traffic orders at the time of LIP approval; contingencies meant no continuing duty to retain.
• Even if no continuing statutory duty existed, normal public law constraints (reasonableness) would still apply and the decision-making was lawful here.
• On consultation, it was open to officers to develop a middle way and Option 3 did not introduce fundamentally different measures requiring re-consultation.

Interested Party (Company A) Submissions

• Once the LIP had been approved by the Mayor of London, the Defendant was under a statutory obligation under section 151 to implement the LIP and not to act inconsistently with it unless and until lawfully revised.
• Parliament intended Part IV of the 1999 Act to be practical and effective; the statutory scheme requires orderly revision and Mayor of London approval for changes inconsistent with an approved LIP.
• The Defendant had received significant funding linked to the LIP and had not produced or sought approval of a revised LIP before removing the Scheme.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed the three issues sequentially.

On the section 151(1)(a) issue, the court rejected the Judge's narrower focus (which asked whether the LIP provided sufficient timetable detail to enforce a continuing duty in hypothetical non-implementation cases). Instead the court reasoned that, where a council has implemented measures in accordance with an approved LIP, the statutory concept of "implement" in context must be read to include an obligation not to act inconsistently with that approved LIP (i.e. an obligation to retain the implemented measures unless the LIP is lawfully revised). The court concluded that "implement" therefore carries both positive and negative aspects; removal of an implemented scheme without following the statutory revision/approval procedure (including Mayor of London approval) was unlawful.

The court addressed concerns that this interpretation might unduly fetter the Defendant's ongoing traffic management duties. It held the statutory duties must be read harmoniously: the Defendant remains subject to its Traffic Management Act duties and to public law constraints (reasonableness), but those duties do not negate the section 151 negative obligation to avoid acting inconsistently with an approved LIP without following the revision procedure.

On the second issue (failure to have regard to the LIP/MTS), the court found it unnecessary to determine the point in light of the section 151 conclusion. Nevertheless, the court agreed with the Administrative Court that, on the facts, the Defendant had taken the LIP and the Mayor of London's transport strategy into account in its Officers' Report; there was no obvious material consideration relating to the LIP that was unreasonably omitted.

On the re-consultation issue, the court applied established consultation principles (the Sedley/Gunning criteria and subsequent authorities, including the Keep Wythenshawe formulation). The relevant test is whether the process was so unfair as to be unlawful, assessed by reference to the nature and extent of any difference between consulted proposals and the decision-maker's intended course. The court held that Option 3 was a foreseeable, derivative middle way arising from consultation; the public had opportunities to comment and the Officers' Report conscientiously considered consultation responses. The material differences were insufficient, and the process was not so unfair as to be unlawful. The court therefore dismissed the re-consultation ground.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED ON ISSUE 1; OTHER GROUNDS DISMISSED

Holding: The court held that the Defendant's decision to revoke the Scheme without seeking approval of a revised LIP was in breach of section 151(1)(a) of the Greater London Authority Act 1999. The court rejected the Appellant's remaining grounds concerning failure to have regard to the LIP and unfairness of the consultation/re-consultation process.

Implications: The direct effect is that the Defendant's revocation decision was unlawful; the court indicated a quashing order would be the appropriate remedy subject to submissions on remedy. The opinion did not purport to set a wider, definitive precedent beyond the statutory interpretation applied to the facts of this case; normal public law constraints and the statutory revision procedure remain the means for lawful change to an approved LIP.