TPD, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

On 6 June 2025 at The Court the Appellant pleaded guilty to four counts of breaching the terms of a Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures ("TPIM") notice. On 2 October 2025 at The Court before Judge Trowler the Appellant was sentenced to a special custodial sentence of 27 months (a custodial element of 15 months and a further 1-year special licence period), concurrent on each offence, and a 3-year Serious Crime Prevention Order ("SCPO") in the draft terms before the court. The Registrar referred the Appellant's applications for leave to appeal the sentence and the SCPO to the full court. Leave was granted and the appeals were dismissed.

Background facts (from the opinion): the Appellant, previously convicted in June 2019 of a series of terrorism-related offences committed in 2016–2017, completed that sentence on 1 December 2023 and was made subject to a TPIM notice (renewed November 2024). The TPIM notice imposed residence at approved premises provided by Company A, strict controls on communication devices and internet access, GPS monitoring, daily reporting to police, and restrictions on meetings and places of worship. In January–February 2025 the Appellant met on four occasions with two individuals (referred to in the opinion as O and H), both asylum-seeking Syrian nationals. The Appellant later emailed Company A seeking to add those two individuals to his approved list. He was arrested on 26 February 2025 and charged with four breach offences. The Appellant's father suffered terminal pancreatic cancer in 2024 and died on 14 April 2025 while the Appellant was on remand. The Appellant initially pleaded not guilty but changed his plea to guilty on 6 June 2025 and was sentenced as above.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentencing judge erred by not giving adequate weight to the Appellant's reported reformed mindset and progress addressing radicalisation when sentencing for breach of a TPIM notice.
2. Whether the judge mischaracterised harm and culpability in applying the analogous Criminal Behaviour Order ("CBO") guideline to breach of a TPIM notice.
3. Whether the judge failed to give adequate weight to uncontested medical expert evidence (psychological evidence) bearing on culpability and mitigation.
4. Whether the judge failed to give adequate weight to other mitigating factors (age/maturity, prior compliance, early notification and cooperation).
5. Whether the judge was wrong to impose the SCPO as unnecessary or disproportionate on the evidence.

Arguments of the Parties

Attorney Kherbane's Arguments

• The sentencing judge failed to give adequate weight to the Appellant's reformed mindset and progress addressing radicalisation as reported by the Religious Mentor, which should reduce culpability and harm.
• The judge miscategorised harm and culpability under the CBO guideline and should have treated risk (without actual harm) as a lower category per the General guideline.
• The judge gave insufficient weight to the uncontested psychological evidence (Doctor Halsey) showing depression/anxiety reduced the Appellant's capacity and thus culpability.
• The judge failed adequately to mitigate for age/lack of maturity, prior compliance over 14 months, early notification to Company A and full cooperation.
• The SCPO was unnecessary and disproportionate given the evidence; its terms mirrored TPIM restrictions and should not have been imposed.

Attorney Faure Walker's Arguments

• The judge properly weighed the Religious Mentor's evidence as one factor among many; progress was not determinative.
• The judge was entitled to assess high risk of harm: material on O and H's phones depicted Islamist militancy and posed a risk that the Appellant could be influenced through association; the Appellant's late notification and failure to disclose prior meetings were properly treated as aggravating.
• The judge properly assessed culpability given four separate breaches constituting persistent/repeated conduct and was entitled to regard the breaches as deliberate.
• The judge appropriately limited the effect of Doctor Halsey's evidence on culpability and took mental health and family circumstances into account as mitigation; no error in sentencing discounting was shown.
• Appeal against the SCPO is limited to a review under section 24(11) of the Serious Crime Act 2007 and related order; there was no procedural error and the SCPO was not disproportionate.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court set out the statutory framework for TPIM notices under the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, emphasising conditions C and D (necessity for protecting the public from terrorism risk and for preventing/restricting the individual's involvement in terrorism-related activity) and the requirement that the Secretary of State keep these conditions under review (section 11). The court explained the permission process and the role of OPEN and CLOSED material in initial and review hearings.

In the absence of an offence-specific sentencing guideline for TPIM breaches, the judge and the court applied the analogous CBO guideline to assess culpability and harm. The court held that culpability for breach of a TPIM is assessed by the nature of the breach (one-off/brief versus repeated/persistent) and that reasons or mindset for breach may provide mitigation but do not alter culpability, which focuses on intent to breach the restriction.

On the psychological evidence, the court concluded the sentencing judge correctly treated Doctor Halsey's report as mitigating but found only a limited connection between the Appellant's depression/anxiety and the deliberate nature of the breaches; the expert evidence did not show the Appellant lacked understanding that he was breaching the TPIM requirements.

On harm, the court held that a sentencing court must treat the harm/risk associated with breach of a TPIM notice as very serious because TPIMs are imposed only where conditions C and D are met and the Secretary of State continually reviews those conditions. The sentencing court will not have access to the CLOSED material underpinning the TPIM decision and therefore should proceed on the basis that any breach exposes the public to a risk of terrorism. The court rejected the submission that absence of actual harm required moving to a lower harm category under the General guideline.

Accordingly, the court found no error in the sentencing judge's application of the analogous CBO guideline, her weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors (including the effect of the Appellant's father's illness and the Religious Mentor's report), or her refusal to reduce the sentence for age/immaturity. The court also concluded there was no procedural or substantive error in the making of the SCPO and that the appellate review was limited by statute.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED

Holding: The court granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeals against sentence and against the SCPO. The sentencing judge's assessment of culpability and harm, application of the analogous CBO guideline, treatment of psychological and other mitigation, and decision to impose the SCPO were upheld.

Implications: The Appellant's sentence (special custodial sentence of 27 months with a 15-month custodial element and a 1-year special licence, imposed concurrently on each offence) and the 3-year SCPO remain in force. The decision affirms that breach of a TPIM notice will generally be treated as involving a very serious risk of harm for sentencing purposes and that appellate review of SCPOs is limited to correcting wrongness or serious procedural irregularity; the opinion does not purport to establish a novel precedent beyond these applications to the facts of this case.