Summary of Opinion — Judge Hayes

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter concerned a preliminary hearing to determine the validity of a section 21 notice served in respect of a rented property ("the Property") at [Number] Main Street in The City. Company A is the landlord. Assured Shorthold Tenancies were entered into between the Defendants and a previous landlord in 2017 and 2020. Company A acquired the Property in 2022 and Company B acted as the letting agent on Company A's behalf.

Historically the Property had held a House in Multiple Occupation (HMO) licence which expired in 2022 before Company A's acquisition. Company B contacted The Council in late 2022 about Temporary Exemption Notice (TEN) matters and other licensing queries. Company A contends a TEN application or notification was submitted to The Council; the existence and effectiveness of that notification was disputed and not corroborated by The Council.

Procedurally: Company A issued a possession claim on 28.3.2024. A sequence of events followed including strikeout and reinstatement of parts of the claim, directions for disclosure, and an order for a preliminary hearing on two issues (service of the section 21 notice and whether the Property was an unlicensed HMO at the time of service). A late application by Company A to adduce further evidence after the hearing was refused.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether service of the section 21 notice (a notice seeking possession) was invalid because service required (i) a separate notice seeking possession for "each" tenant under section 21(1)(b) Housing Act 1988, or (ii) service directly to each tenant's room rather than to the "accommodation" (i.e. the Property).
2. Whether, at the time the notice seeking possession was served on 9.1.2024, the Property was an unlicensed HMO for the purposes of section 73 of the Housing Act 2004 such that Company A could not rely on a section 21 notice (i.e. whether a TEN or licence application had been "duly given" or was effective).

Arguments of the Parties

Claimant's (Company A) Arguments

• Company A (through Attorney Ayub and Company B) submitted that any required TEN/notification had been prepared and submitted to The Council, pointing to electronic records and a purported TEN application.
• Company A argued the section 21 notice could be served on the "accommodation" under the tenancy clauses (so delivery to the Property/post box satisfied service requirements) rather than requiring delivery to each tenant's room.

Defendant(s)' Arguments

• The Defendants argued that service under section 21(1)(b) required delivery "to the tenant" and, in effect, to each tenant; they also argued service should have been directed to the individual room rather than only to the wider accommodation.
• The Defendants contended the Property was an unlicensed HMO at the time the section 21 notice was served and that no effective TEN or licence application had been made to The Council, so section 75 of the Housing Act 2004 precluded reliance on a section 21 notice.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Judge Hayes structured the analysis around the two issues identified at the preliminary hearing.

Issue 1 — Whether notice had to be given "to each tenant" and the manner of service

The court concluded the section 21 notice did not need to be served by separate notices to each tenant. The reasoning was:

• Interpretation: Section 45(3) of the Housing Act 1988 and the Interpretation Act 1978 permit singular expressions to be read as plural; therefore service on one tenant can constitute service on others in joint-tenancy contexts.
• Practical sufficiency: A single notice naming both tenants, addressed at the Property, was sufficient in the circumstances. The Defence had accepted receipt in substance; the dispute was as to manner rather than notice reaching the tenants.
• Contractual wording and service location: The tenancy clauses referring to "accommodation" (clauses 1.1 and 1.12) were read to permit service at the Property rather than requiring service to an individual room. The court found delivery to the post box at the Property to be effective in this case.
• Statutory and procedural supports: Section 196 of the Law of Property Act 1925 supports personal delivery to the tenant's property where tenancy permits; Civil Procedure Rules provisions on service were not decisive but aligned with the conclusion that the property could be used for service purposes.
• Contract interpretation: The court declined to apply contra proferentem or to find the tenancy ambiguous on this point; it found the contract term clear for the purposes of service in this case.

Conclusion on Issue 1: The notice was validly served at the Property and directed sufficiently to the tenants.

Issue 2 — Whether the Property was an unlicensed HMO at the time of service

The court proceeded to determine whether to admit late evidence offered by Company A and then whether, on the existing evidence, Company A had demonstrated that the Property was not an unlicensed HMO at the time the section 21 notice was served.

On the application to admit late evidence:

• The court applied the Denton framework by reference, finding that the application failed to frame itself against those criteria and that Company A had given no adequate reason for late disclosure.
• The breach of the disclosure order was serious: prior disclosure directions (including a disclosure deadline) had been made and the material relevant to the preliminary issues was not produced by the deadline.
• The absence of direct evidence from Company B (the managing agent) and the reliance on indirect electronic logs reduced reliability and required a major inference to accept the material as proving notification.
• The delay and lack of explanation, the procedural prejudice, the need for proportionality and court resource considerations led the court to refuse admission of the late evidence.

On the substantive issue (with only the properly admitted evidence):

• The Property had historically been licensed as an HMO and, on the date the section 21 notice was served (9.1.2024), appeared likely to meet the HMO criteria (the court accepted on balance the Property required a licence under section 73(1)(a)).
• Company A did not establish that an application for a licence under section 63 or an effective notification under section 62(1) was in force (the court noted Company A did not argue section 73(2)(b) and advanced only a TEN argument).
• The court examined whether a TEN had been "duly given" and whether it was "effective" within the meaning of sections 62 and 72(8). The court found no clear process shown for notification at the material time, no direct evidence from Company B that The Council had been notified, and email evidence suggested The Council could not open or access the TEN application in late 2022.
• The Council had not confirmed notification; accordingly, the court refused to infer that notification had been duly given or that it remained effective at the relevant time without drawing significant inferences unsupported by the record.

Conclusion on Issue 2: On the admissible evidence the Property was an unlicensed HMO at the time the section 21 notice was served, and Company A therefore could not rely on the section 21 notice.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: CLAIM DISMISSED

The court dismissed the possession claim because the Property was an unlicensed HMO at the time the section 21 notice was served, rendering the section 21 notice invalid under the Housing Act 2004 regime. The court also refused to admit the late evidence relied on by Company A to prove that a TEN had been duly given and effective.

Implications:

• Direct effect: The possession claim based on the impugned section 21 notice is dismissed; the court will reconvene to deal with any further matters (including ancillary matters such as costs).
• Precedential effect: The judge noted the decision does not bind other courts and did not purport to set binding precedent; it may assist analysis in similar future cases. The court did not declare any broader new legal principle beyond its application of the statutory provisions and procedural rules to the facts before it.