Dymeter, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from convictions and sentences imposed by the Crown Court at The City on 4 July 2024 and sentencing on 24 July 2024. The Appellant pleaded guilty to a multi-count indictment comprising burglary, attempted burglary, theft (including theft of a motor vehicle), taking a conveyance without authority, dangerous driving, driving while disqualified, and two related summary road traffic offences dealt with under section 51 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. The Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of ten years' imprisonment and disqualified from driving for a period comprised of discretionary and extended elements under the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988. The Appellant obtained leave to appeal against sentence from a single judge.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the overall sentence was manifestly excessive, having regard to the principle of totality and the appropriate concurrency or consecutiveness of sentences for counts 1, 2 and 3 (the related burglaries and theft of the vehicle).
2. Whether the Recorder erred in applying minimum sentence provisions to attempted burglaries.
3. Whether certain sentences and/or the Crown Court's jurisdiction were unlawful in relation to an offence under section 35 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (failing to stop when directed), given the magistrates' court's withdrawal of that offence.
4. Whether the Crown Court had jurisdiction to endorse the Appellant's driving licence for offences under counts 2 and 4.
5. What the correct substituted sentences and the correct period of disqualification should be if errors are identified.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as advanced by Attorney Noble)

• The Recorder should have ordered that sentences on counts 2 and 3 run concurrently with count 1 because count 2 arose directly out of count 1 and count 3 related to the same property; concurrency would better reflect the single course of criminality.
• The overall sentence was manifestly excessive because insufficient weight was given to totality. Using the appellant's assumed credit and the Recorder's starting points, the Appellant submitted the aggregate sentence after trial would be equivalent to a significantly higher term and thus excessive when totality is applied.
• The Appellant advanced numerical breakdowns demonstrating how the implicit sentences after trial and the guilty plea credits produced an overall sentence which, when properly aggregated and reduced for totality, required a substantial reduction from the ten years imposed.

Respondent's Arguments (as advanced by Attorney Harris)

• The Recorder was not constrained to limit credit on count 1 to 20% because the Recorder imposed a sentence greater than the statutory minimum term; accordingly the notional sentence after trial for count 1 was six years, not five.
• The sentence for count 2 should be treated as factored into count 1 (same incident / same victim) and count 3's starting point was justified by its seriousness (returning with an accomplice, carrying a knife, targeting a recently burgled and therefore vulnerable victim), such that a sentence after trial of nine years for counts 1–3 was justifiable (equating to six years after credit).
• The attempted burglaries (counts 9–12) merited a consecutive sentence after trial of four years in total; dangerous driving merited 12 months consecutive; counts 4–7 (theft offences) merited a consecutive total after trial of three years, and on this basis a substantial overall sentence after trial (and after allowance for totality) was appropriate.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in stages: it first addressed the substantive sentencing appeal (totality and concurrency/consecutiveness) and then the jurisdictional/unlawfulness issues.

On sentencing, the court accepted that different reasonable structures of sentencing could be adopted provided the overall sentence before and after credit was not manifestly excessive. The court found that the notional sentence after trial for all offending (as structured by the Recorder) amounted to 15 years, which the court considered to be manifestly excessive and disproportionate to the overall criminality when regard was had to number and type of offences, number of victims and the time period over which offending took place. The Recorder had erred in suggesting minimum-term provisions applied to attempted burglaries; the court noted that authority is clear they do not, though that error did not affect the sentences imposed.

The court accepted that count 2 (the theft of the Range Rover) related to the same incident and victim as count 1 and should have been concurrent with count 1; nonetheless it treated count 2 as an aggravating factor. It regarded the conduct on count 3 (returning to the property with an accomplice, carrying a knife, confronting the occupier) as sufficiently serious to justify a consecutive sentence (or a significant uplift on count 1).

The court identified a reasonable alternative structuring: for counts 1–3 combined, a sentence after trial of at least 6 years 9 months was justified (computed as five years for count 1, 1 year 9 months concurrent for count 2, and 1 year 9 months consecutive for count 3), and, after full credit for guilty pleas, the substituted terms would be 40 months (count 1), 14 months concurrent (count 2) and 14 months consecutive (count 3). The court treated counts 1–3 as a separate group not to be further aggravated by other offences.

The court preserved the consecutive 12-month sentence for dangerous driving (count 8) after credit for the guilty plea. It also deemed it appropriate to impose a consecutive aggregate sentence of three years for the attempted burglaries in counts 9–12 (after credit), reflecting the criminality of those offences.

These adjustments reduced the overall sentence after credit from ten years to eight years six months.

On unlawfulness and jurisdictional matters, the court accepted that the magistrates' court had withdrawn the offence under section 35 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and therefore the Crown Court lacked jurisdiction to deal with that offence (both conviction and sentence). Following established practice it reconstituted as a Divisional Court, granted permission for judicial review, abridged time and, on merits, quashed both the conviction and sentence for the section 35 offence.

The court also agreed with the parties that the Recorder had no jurisdiction to endorse the Appellant's licence with convictions under counts 2 and 4 because those offences are not listed in Part 2 of Schedule 2 to the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988; that part of the order was quashed.

The court substituted specific terms: quashing and substituting the sentence on count 1 to 40 months, quashing the consecutive two-year sentence on count 2 and substituting a concurrent term of 14 months, quashing the consecutive three-year sentence on count 3 and substituting a consecutive sentence of 14 months, and quashing a concurrent three-year sentence on count 9 and substituting a consecutive sentence of three years (the combined effect producing an overall term of eight years six months).

Finally, the court quashed the Crown Court's disqualification order and substituted a new disqualification period of five years and nine months, to run until the Appellant passes an extended driving test. The five years and nine months was broken down as 18 months discretionary disqualification, an extension period of six months under section 35A, and an uplift period of three years and nine months under section 35B of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED IN PART

Holding (direct effects):

• The Crown Court's conviction and sentence in relation to the offence under section 35 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 were quashed for lack of jurisdiction; the appellate court granted permission for judicial review and quashed that conviction and sentence.
• The portion of the Crown Court's order endorsing the Appellant's licence with convictions under counts 2 and 4 was quashed because those offences are not listed in Part 2 of Schedule 2 to the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988.
• The court quashed and substituted several custodial terms resulting in an overall sentence of eight years six months' imprisonment (reduced from ten years).
• The Crown Court's disqualification order was quashed and replaced with a disqualification of five years and nine months, thereafter until an extended driving test is passed (18 months discretionary + 6 months under s35A + 3 years 9 months under s35B).

Implications:

The decision reduces the Appellant's overall custodial sentence and corrects jurisdictional and sentencing errors identified by the appellate court. The court applied established sentencing principles (including totality) and corrected errors of law (jurisdiction to deal with the section 35 offence and the basis for licence endorsement). The judgment does not purport to establish a new sentencing precedent beyond the particular application of established principles to these facts.