Factual and Procedural Background
This is an appeal against sentence raising a single short point about reductions in sentence for a guilty plea entered after the start of the trial. The Appellant was convicted on 29 March 2024 of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm and on 28 November 2024 was sentenced to an extended sentence of 13 years (an 8-year custodial element and a 5-year extended licence period).
The basic facts were that the Victim had been staying with long-standing friends, including Witness, and her partner. The Appellant was allowed to stay at their home when he became homeless. There were tensions between the Appellant and the Victim in the days before the offence, including accusations about use of the Appellant's phone and threats by the Appellant. On 24 September 2023 the Appellant was seen holding a kitchen knife and another knife was later found in his pocket. Shortly after midnight on 25 September 2023, when the Victim knocked at the locked front door, the Appellant opened it with a kitchen knife in his hand and stabbed the Victim between the neck and the collarbone. The Victim escaped and received emergency treatment that prevented more serious injury.
The Appellant denied the offence at interview and in a Defence Statement served on 26 February 2024; the Defence Statement required attendance of certain witnesses at trial. Trial preparation was completed, the jury were sworn and the trial began. No evidence was called on the first day. On the second day of the trial the Appellant changed his plea to guilty on the wounding count and was convicted; the attempted murder count was not proceeded with and an acquittal was directed. The sentencing judge (Judge Lewis) concluded that the statutory test for dangerousness was met and imposed the extended sentence set out above.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the sentencing judge erred in making no reduction or giving no credit for the guilty plea entered on the second day of the trial.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Attorney Greenhalgh submitted that the sentencing judge was wrong to refuse any reduction for the late guilty plea.
- He argued that the plea avoided the need for the Victim and other witnesses to give evidence, and allowed release of interpreters engaged for trial; the trial had been listed for three days and the time freed could be used for other cases, producing a saving of resources that justified a reduction in sentence.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| R v Appellant A [2022] EWCA Crim 1830; [2023] 2 Cr App R (S) 8 |
Recognises that even after the start of a trial there may be some reduction for a guilty plea; the Sentencing Council guideline leaves much to the judge's discretion and each case is fact-sensitive. It illustrates that some credit may be appropriate even where a trial has started. |
The court relied on this authority to reject a categorical rule of no credit once a trial has started and to emphasise that some modest reduction (well below 10%) could be appropriate depending on the facts. |
| R v Appellant B [2024] EWCA Crim 779 |
Affirms that a sentencing judge may allow a reduction even after the start of trial; the reduction should be assessed on the facts and the judge should not treat the weight of the evidence as a relevant factor in deciding whether to allow credit for a plea. |
The court cited this case to support the proposition that sentencing judges have a discretion to allow less than the guideline maximum (or even no reduction) but must apply the guideline correctly and not rely on inappropriate factors; it informed the court's approach to assessing whether some credit was due in the present appeal. |
| R v Appellant C [2022] EWCA Crim 1884; [2023] 1 Cr. App. R. (S) 52 |
Referenced as an earlier authority considered in subsequent cases addressing reduction for late guilty pleas. |
It was cited in the chain of authority relied upon by the court but the opinion does not elaborate further principles from this authority beyond its inclusion in the authorities considered. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by identifying that the only ground of appeal was the refusal by the sentencing judge to give any reduction for the guilty plea entered on the second day of trial. The sentencing judge had recorded that the Appellant did not admit offending at arrest or at any stage until the second day of trial, criticised the Appellant's lack of remorse and observed that the Appellant had been represented throughout by competent counsel yet sought to blame his lawyers.
The court considered the statutory framework: section 73 of the Sentencing Act 2020 requires the court to take into account the stage in the proceedings at which a guilty plea was indicated and all the circumstances; section 59 requires adherence to Sentencing Council guidelines absent interests of justice to the contrary. The Sentencing Council guideline on Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea was described, including the guideline's sliding scale (up to one-third reduction if the plea is at first opportunity; maximum one-quarter after first stage; up to one-tenth on the first day of trial; and a reduction that may be reduced further, even to zero, if the plea is entered during the trial).
The court reviewed authorities addressing late pleas (notably R v Appellant A and R v Appellant B). Those decisions recognise a sentencing judge's discretion after the start of trial, that some credit may still be appropriate, and that the precise level of credit is a matter of judgment dependent on the facts. The court emphasised that it would be incorrect as a matter of principle to state categorically that no credit can ever be given once a trial has started.
The court then applied these principles to the facts. It noted the limited benefits achieved by the late plea: the case was a short one listed for three days; there was no indication of a forthcoming plea until the second day; investigations and trial preparation were complete and the trial had started (though no evidence had been called on the first day); the plea produced some saving of resources and spared the Victim and Witness from testifying, but did not reduce the effect of the crime on the Victim. On balance, these facts justified a limited reduction well below 10%.
Weighing the limited public and witness benefits, the court concluded that a modest reduction of about 5% (4 months) was appropriate. The court therefore allowed the appeal to that limited extent and adjusted the sentence accordingly.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The court allowed the appeal in a limited respect. It quashed the previous extended sentence of 13 years and substituted an extended sentence of 12 years and 8 months, comprising a custodial element of 7 years and 8 months and an extended licence period of 5 years.
Implications: The direct effect is the reduction of the Appellant's sentence by 4 months. The court clarified that, as a matter of principle, a sentencing judge should not treat the start of a trial as automatically precluding any credit for a guilty plea; rather, the Sentencing Council guideline and relevant authorities allow a sentencing judge to exercise judgment, case by case, and to grant a modest reduction where appropriate. The opinion does not purport to establish a new rule beyond applying those existing principles to the facts of this case.