Summary of Appeal Against Sentence (Anonymised)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal against sentence brought with leave of a single judge following convictions and sentencing in the Crown Court at Harrow. On 23 September 2024 the Appellant changed her plea to guilty to one count of possessing a prohibited firearm and one count of possessing ammunition without a firearms certificate. On 9 April 2025 the Appellant was acquitted by a jury, on the judge's direction, of a count of possessing a firearm with intent to endanger life. On 13 June 2025 the Appellant was sentenced to a total of 46 months' imprisonment. A co-defendant pleaded guilty to a range of drugs and firearms offences and received a longer sentence.

The facts as found by the court were that on 29 August 2023 a Remington 1911 handgun was recovered from the Appellant's shared home. The weapon was concealed in a make-up box on top of a wardrobe in a household that included young children. The firearm contained a single unfired cartridge and was found in a black plastic bag bearing the Appellant's fingerprints on the inside. Police investigations, including phone analysis, connected a co-defendant with possession of another firearm and with supplying class A drugs. The Appellant admitted possession of the Remington for around two weeks and gave a prepared statement alleging that she had been coerced into taking the firearm.

At sentencing the trial judge (referred to in the record as the Recorder) considered pre-sentence and psychological reports. The Appellant was 23 at the time of the offending, of previous good character, had been working while on bail, and had psychological diagnoses including an emotionally unstable personality disorder with co-morbid PTSD and bipolar disorder. The judge rejected a true duress defence but accepted that the Appellant had acted impulsively and with some fear of reprisals. The judge found exceptional circumstances sufficient to disapply the statutory five-year minimum term for the prohibited firearm offence, applied the Sentencing Council Guideline to reach a notional sentence and ultimately imposed 46 months' imprisonment (with specified credits for time on qualifying curfew).

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the trial judge erred in categorising the harm caused by the Appellant's possession of the firearm (Category 2 versus Category 3 under the Sentencing Council Guideline).
2. Whether the judge failed properly to distinguish between the Appellant and the co-defendant when locating culpability and harm within the guideline.
3. Whether, having found exceptional circumstances that disapplied the statutory minimum term, the judge should have applied Table 2 of the guideline or otherwise given reasons for not doing so.
4. Whether the judge failed to make an appropriate additional downward adjustment to the starting point to reflect the disconnecting effect of exceptional circumstances on the minimum-term-related starting point (as discussed in Otero and Rehman).
5. Whether the judge failed to adjust the sentence to reflect a lower element of culpability for the Appellant.
6. Whether the treatment of time spent on a non-qualifying "doorstep curfew" was lawful and whether the statutory reference and credit for qualifying curfew were correctly applied.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (represented by Attorney Zentler-Munro)

• The judge wrongly assessed harm as Category 2 rather than Category 3; the presence of the gun in the household did not mean the harms identified in the guideline had occurred or were likely (relying on a reported authority cited in the grounds).
• The judge failed to distinguish adequately between the Appellant's position and that of the co-defendant, who had the firearm for longer and for criminal purposes.
• Having found exceptional circumstances, the judge should have either applied Table 2 of the guideline or given reasons for not doing so; alternatively, following a reported authority, the judge should have made an explicit additional reduction to reflect the effect of disconnecting the statutory minimum term.
• The judge did not make a sufficient reduction for exceptional circumstances and mitigation, and did not sufficiently adjust the range to reflect lower culpability.
• The judge made no adjustment to the range to reflect lower category culpability which should have reduced the sentence further.

Prosecution's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the prosecution's legal arguments on these points.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appellate court began by rejecting the challenge to the trial judge's assessment of harm and culpability. It emphasised that the trial judge had heard all evidence at trial and was best placed to assess risk and harm, including the location of the offence, number and vulnerability of people exposed (children), and the accessibility/visibility of the weapon, all factors expressly identified in the guideline. The court found no error in the judge's decision to treat harm as Category 2 or in her use of Table 1.

The court accepted that the judge addressed the circumstances of the Appellant and the co-defendant separately and had distinct reasons for the sentences imposed upon each. It therefore rejected the submission that the judge failed to distinguish between the two defendants.

The appellate court then considered a point of principle arising from the judge's finding of exceptional circumstances. The court reviewed authorities addressing how a finding of exceptional circumstances interacts with Table 1 starting points that are influenced by statutory minimum terms. It concluded that where exceptional circumstances have the effect of disconnecting the deterrent/starting‑point inflation attributable to a statutory minimum, the court should (depending on the circumstances) make a further reduction from the Table 1 starting point beyond ordinary mitigation discounts. The court found that the sentencing notes had not drawn the trial judge's attention to those authorities and that the trial judge had therefore omitted to make any separate reduction for the effect of exceptional circumstances.

The appellate court also identified a technical error in the treatment of time spent on a non-qualifying "doorstep curfew." The trial judge had indicated that the Appellant should receive 75 days' credit taken into account "as per section 240A," apparently in addition to qualifying curfew credit. The court observed that days spent on a non-qualifying doorstep curfew do not fall under the statutory scheme and the reference to section 240A was therefore inappropriate; rather than being applied as statutory credit, the time could be acknowledged by a discretionary reduction of the custodial term. The court exercised the necessary corrective reduction on appeal.

The court recalculated the notional sentence after trial to be three-and-a-half years (rather than the trial judge's notional four-and-a-half years), applied the 15% discount for plea (resulting in 35 months after rounding), and then reduced that figure by a further one month to give effect to the judge's intention to recognise the time on non-qualifying curfew. The result was a sentence of 34 months' imprisonment.

Finally, the court confirmed that the Appellant had spent 647 days on qualifying curfew and that the correct statutory provision for credit was section 325 of the Sentencing Act 2020 (which replaced the repealed section 240A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003). The Appellant was entitled to a credit of 324 days under section 325 against her sentence.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appellate court quashed the original custodial sentence of 46 months and replaced it with a sentence of 34 months' imprisonment. The court confirmed that the Appellant is entitled to 324 days' credit for qualifying curfew under section 325 of the Sentencing Act 2020.

Implications:

• The direct effect is that the Appellant's sentence has been reduced from 46 months to 34 months and qualifying curfew credit is affirmed under the correct statutory provision.
• The appellate judgment clarifies and reiterates the principle that, when exceptional circumstances are found which disapply a statutory minimum term, sentencing judges should consider making a further reduction from Table 1 starting points (which may be inflated by reference to the minimum term) independently of ordinary mitigation. The extent of that reduction will vary according to the nature of the exceptional circumstances.
• The court corrected the treatment of time spent on non-qualifying curfew, emphasising that such time cannot be treated as statutory credit and must be recognised, if at all, by a discretionary adjustment to the custodial term.
• No novel legal rule was created; the decision applies and explains existing authorities and their interaction with the Sentencing Council Guideline and statutory provisions concerning credit for curfew periods.