Summary of Court of Appeal Opinion (Sanctions)
Factual and Procedural Background
This judgment concerns sanctions following the allowance of the Appellant's appeal by this court (see [2025] EWCA Civ 1397). The Court of Appeal made orders at the substantive hearing on 22 October 2025 (sealed 28 October 2025) which required specified witness statements to be lodged by 4:00pm on 5 November 2025. A draft judgment circulated prior to that deadline emphasised that compliance was not optional.
The Defendant did not comply with the 5 November 2025 deadline. An email seeking an extension was sent to the Appellant's solicitors minutes before the deadline, but no application or communication was made to the court to vary the order. Two required witness statements (including one by Attorney Hillery) were served late by several hours; Attorney Hillery's second statement ("Hillery 2") was found to be inadequate. A letter of apology from the Defendant to his former solicitor (Attorney Staples) was not sent to the court at that time.
On 7 November 2025, the Appellant's solicitors notified the court of deficiencies. On 13 November 2025, Attorney Turner (new solicitor acting for the Defendant) informed the court that the Defendant was not in a position to rely on the two Hillery statements and acknowledged further breaches of both the Court of Appeal order and an earlier order made by Judge Leong on 25 April 2023.
The court listed a sanctions hearing for 20 November 2025 to consider breaches of the 22 October 2025 order and any consequent sanctions. The Appellant served a skeleton argument on 18 November 2025. On 19 November 2025, in the day before the sanctions hearing, a substantial volume of new material was served for the Defendant, including a second statement by the Defendant (dated 19 November 2025) with an apology and a statement by the Deputy Chief Constable (Attorney Tuckley) appending three further statements (Attorney Gray, Attorney Britton, Attorney Gill). Those late-served statements could not be addressed in the Appellant's skeleton and were dealt with in oral submissions at the hearing.
The new material confirmed that (i) compliance with an earlier April 2023 order had only been achieved on 19 November 2025 (subject to some points of arguable non-compliance), (ii) the initial post-appeal response had been not to comply with the Court of Appeal order and the Defendant may not have realised this until the week of 9 November 2025, (iii) new legal advisers had been engaged (Attorney Turner replacing Attorney Staples), (iv) newly disclosed video material vindicated aspects of the Appellant's account and the audit log showed that a deponent had viewed a video and then attested later that it did not exist, (v) new personnel were required to provide evidence, and (vi) the Defendant referred the matter to the police complaints watchdog (Agency A).
At the sanctions hearing the Defendant attended in person and apologised to the Appellant, the County Court and the Court of Appeal. The Appellant's personal statement of 24 October 2025, describing personal, emotional and financial impact, was before the court. The Defendant's second statement accepted that five video clips had existed and had not been provided until shortly before or after the appeal hearing (named in the statement as McKitton 2, McKitton 4, Rideout 1, Rideout 2 and Virtue 2), and that he remained in breach of paragraph 3 of the April 23 order reiterated by the Court of Appeal. The Defendant also accepted he had been let down by his former solicitor (Attorney Staples) in relation to the missed deadline for the 5 November statement.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether sanctions, and if so what sanctions, should be imposed on the Defendant for breaches of the County Court order and the Court of Appeal order following the Appellant's successful appeal.
- Whether committal to custody (imprisonment) for contempt is appropriate in respect of a Chief Constable acting in an official capacity, including whether a parallel should be drawn with Ministers of the Crown (as addressed in M v Home Office).
- Whether the finding of contempt already made is a sufficient sanction or whether additional sanctions (such as a fine) are required, having regard to aggravating and mitigating factors.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Appellant (through her solicitors) identified multiple deficiencies and non-compliance with the Court of Appeal's order, including late and inadequate witness statements and failure to disclose material (including an apology letter) required by the order.
- The Appellant provided a statement explaining substantial personal, emotional and financial harm caused by the failures to comply.
Defendant's Arguments
- Attorney Basu submitted that committal to custody for contempt would be wrong in principle for the Defendant and drew analogy with Ministers of the Crown, relying on dicta in M v Home Office. He argued that findings against officials in their official capacity can vindicate the rule of law without imposing imprisonment on the individual.
- Attorney Basu relied on first-instance authority (including R (Bempoa) v London Borough of Southwark) to suggest that a public finding of contempt, and publication of judgment, can in some cases constitute sufficient sanction.
- The Defendant (through Attorney Turner) accepted breaches, explained changes in legal representation and some factual and evidential developments, and apologised in person and in his second statement for prior inadequacies and ongoing breaches.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| M v Home Office [1994] UKHL 5; [1994] 1 AC 377 |
Authority for the proposition that a finding of contempt can be made against a minister (or official) in an official capacity to vindicate the rule of law; discussion of strict liability for compliance with orders and the possibility that the official may have acted on advice. |
The court considered the dicta from M v Home Office as relevant to whether imprisonment for contempt is available or appropriate against an official. The court held that while M v Home Office provides useful analogy, it was not necessary to carry out a full comparative analysis here; ultimately the court concluded that committal to custody was unavailable in principle and unnecessary on the facts for the Defendant. |
| R (Bempoa) v London Borough of Southwark [2002] EWHC 153 (Admin) |
Illustrates an approach where the judge held that the gravity of contempt could be marked by delivery of judgment in public and no further sanction was imposed. |
The court rejected the analogy with Bempoa on the facts of this case, distinguishing the role and responsibilities of a Chief Constable and the seriousness of breaches involving arrest and infringement of liberty. The court concluded that Bempoa was not apposite and that a greater sanction than a mere public finding was required here. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded from the established facts in the record: there had been repeated failures to comply with court-ordered deadlines and disclosure obligations both prior to and after the Court of Appeal hearing. The Court noted that a finding of contempt had effectively been accepted by the Defendant on 22 October 2025 when the appeal could not be contested on the facts.
The court considered whether imprisonment for contempt was available and appropriate. It addressed Attorney Basu's submission drawing analogy with Ministers of the Crown and the dicta in M v Home Office, recognising that a finding of contempt against an official in an official capacity can vindicate the rule of law. The court observed that a full legal analysis comparing Ministers and Chief Constables (including consideration of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947, the County Police Act 1839 and the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011) would be required to reach a fully concluded view, but such detailed argument had not been advanced and was unnecessary in this case.
The court expressed the view that it would be highly exceptional for an official such as a Chief Constable to be imprisoned for contempt for acts in an official capacity. The court rejected the submission that Chief Constables are entirely in the same position as Ministers of the Crown. It emphasised that the Defendant here stood as a defendant in his official capacity and that the majority of wrongful acts were performed by others acting on his behalf; thus imprisonment was both unavailable in principle and unnecessary on the facts.
Nevertheless, the court determined that a sanction beyond the mere finding of contempt was required. In reaching this conclusion the court took into account aggravating factors (the long duration of non-compliance both before and after the first Court of Appeal hearing; repeated inaccurate and incorrect statements from personnel) and mitigating considerations (the public funding of police forces and the impact that any fine would have on front-line policing). The court also took into account the substantial personal impact on the Appellant.
Balancing these factors, the court concluded that a financial penalty would appropriately reflect the gravity of the breaches while recognising the budgetary implications for the police force.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The court imposed a fine of £50,000 on the Defendant as a sanction for breaches of the County Court and Court of Appeal orders. The court confirmed the earlier finding of contempt but held that committal to custody (imprisonment) was unavailable in principle and unnecessary in this case.
Implications:
- The direct consequence for the parties is that the Defendant must pay a £50,000 fine, to be met from the budget of Company A (the Defendant's police force as referred to in the judgment).
- The earlier finding of contempt remains on the record; the court determined that additional sanction beyond that finding was required and the fine is the sanction imposed.
- The court did not state that it was establishing a new or broad precedent that Chief Constables can never be imprisoned for contempt; rather, it indicated that imprisonment in such circumstances would be highly exceptional and, on the facts before this court, was inappropriate. The court noted that a full consideration of the legal position of Chief Constables compared to Ministers of the Crown was not necessary in this case.
Judgment endorsed by Judge Coulson and Judge Asplin.