| O'Sullivan v. HSE [2023] IESC 11 |
Limits on re‑argument in draft judgment procedure; caution about treating JR as a trial. |
Cited for procedural guidance on draft judgment engagement and to warn against re‑litigation in comments on draft judgment. |
| O'Sullivan v. Sea Fisheries Protection Authority [2017] IESC 75 |
Warning about approaching administrative review as if a criminal trial. |
Used as supporting authority for the court's approach to draft judgment procedure and proportionality of post‑draft submissions. |
| Friends of the Irish Environment v. Government of Ireland [2020] IESC 49 |
Recognition of binding legal obligations to address climate change (contextual climate law principles). |
Placed the windfarm decision in the broader climate context informing planning policy considerations cited in the decision. |
| Toole v. Minister for Housing (II) [2024] IEHC 610 |
Domestic jurisprudence concerning climate context. |
Referenced to support the broader discussion of the climate legal framework relevant to planning policy in the judgment. |
| Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v Switzerland (ECtHR/other international authorities) |
International recognition of states' obligations on climate change. |
Used as part of the judgment's exposition of the climate context and obligations informing national planning policy. |
| Sweeney v. Fahy [2014] IESC 50 |
Judicial review concerns legality not merits. |
Applied to emphasise that the Court reviews lawfulness not correctness and should not substitute its view for decision‑taker's merits judgments. |
| State (Keegan) v. Stardust Compensation Tribunal [1986] I.R. 642 |
Separation of functions between decision‑maker and court. |
Reinforced the point that JR is not an appeal on merits. |
| Meadows v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] IESC 3 |
Judicial review standards and onus of proof (applicant bears onus). |
Used to restate onus remains on applicant unless limited exceptions apply. |
| R (Cart) v. Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28 |
Limits to dressing up merits as law points; caution against recharacterisation. |
Adopted as part of general principle distinguishing law from merits in JR. |
| R (Hoareau and Bancoult) v. Secretary of State [2019] EWHC 221 |
Judicial review should not be "politics by another means." |
Quoted to underline separation of powers and proper scope of JR. |
| Sinnott v. Minister for Education [2001] IESC 63 |
Separation of powers and judicial restraint. |
Applied as general principle of deference to administrative/political choices. |
| T.D. v. Minister for Education [2001] IESC 101 |
Similar principle on separation of powers. |
Used to support the court's approach to reviewing planning policy choices. |
| B. v. Child & Family Agency & Ors. [2025] IESC 2 |
Separation of powers in administrative law context. |
Reinforced the court's caution about entering policy territory. |
| M.E. v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2008] IEHC 192 |
Weight of evidence and evaluative conclusions are primarily for decision‑maker. |
Referenced to explain that evaluative judgments are for the Commission and reviewable on an irrationality standard. |
| Sherwin v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IESC 13 |
Evaluative planning judgments and standard of review. |
Applied to show that many of the Applicants' complaints are merits‑based and do not disclose justiciable error. |
| Graymount House Action Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 327 |
Evaluative judgments and leave to appeal considerations. |
Used to demonstrate the court will not re‑weigh merits that are within planning discretion. |
| M.R. (Bangladesh) v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2020] IEHC 41 |
Decision should be read in a way that makes sense; avoid hyper‑technical parsing. |
Applied to read the Commission's decision as a whole and not to quash it based on micro‑textual criticism. |
| Rostas v. DPP [2021] IEHC 60 |
Similar principle on interpreting decisions sensibly. |
Applied as authority for permissive, contextual reading of administrative decisions. |
| St. Margaret's Recycling v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 94 |
Contextual reading of decisions and avoiding strained constructions. |
Used to support reading the decision in a way that avoids unnecessary invalidation. |
| E.M. v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2024] IESC 3 |
Reading of decisions fairly and in context. |
Referenced in support of reasonableness in interpreting administrative decisions. |
| R (Blewett) v. Derbyshire County Council [2003] EWHC 2775 |
Avoid legalistic over‑parsing of decisions. |
Quoted to caution against over‑technical attacks on reasons where a valid reading exists. |
| R. (Friends of the Earth Ltd & others) v. Heathrow Airport Ltd [2020] UKSC 52 |
Caution about over‑formalism in environmental and planning judicial review. |
Used to reinforce court's approach to reasonableness and public law review scope. |
| Walsh v. Jones Lang Lasalle Ltd [2017] IESC 38 |
Limits on micro‑analysis of administrative texts. |
Applied to resist parsing that would create illegitimate bases for certiorari. |
| G.T. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2007] IEHC 287 |
Pleas about procedural fairness and the required standard of reasons. |
Quoted for the proposition that reasons must address main issues and be understood in context. |
| X.E. v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2018] IEHC 402 |
Procedural and evidential points regarding review. |
Used as contextual authority on evidentiary expectations in JR. |
| B.D.C. (Nigeria) v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2018] IEHC 460 |
Procedural standards in JR. |
Cited in the court's survey of JR principles. |
| Okunade v. Minister for Justice [2018] IESC 56 |
JR is not an exercise in pointless formalism. |
Applied to the court's balanced assessment when evaluating alleged procedural or factual failings. |
| RAS Medical Ltd v. Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland [2019] IESC 4 |
Where conflict of admissible evidence exists without cross‑examination, resolve against party with onus. |
Applied in discussing onus of proof and resolution of conflicts in evidence in JR proceedings. |
| Koulibaly v. Minister for Justice [2004] IESC 50 |
Court may prefer written affidavit evidence in appropriate circumstances. |
Noted as an example of the court evaluating evidence credibility where needed. |
| Doorly v. Corrigan [2022] IECA 6 |
Failure to explain relevant questions may undermine credibility of averments. |
Used to highlight limits on accepting unparticularised assertions in affidavits. |
| DPP v. Barnes [2006] IECCA 165 |
Court as fact‑finder is not bound to accept "only account available". |
Referenced to underline court's fact‑evaluation powers where evidence is internally defective. |
| Connelly v. An Bord Pleanála [2018] IESC 31 |
Reasons standard: must provide main reasons on main issues; reasons may be found in inspector's report. |
Applied to hold that the Commission's reasons, taken with the inspector's report, satisfied the required standard. |
| Balscadden Road SAA Residents Association Ltd v. An Bord Pleanála (No.1) [2020] IEHC 586 |
Standards for reasons in planning decisions. |
Used to support the court's position on sufficiency of reasons. |
| Atlantic Diamond v. An Bord Pleanála [2021] IEHC 322 |
Obligation to give main reasons rather than discursive narrative. |
Applied to show no need for an issue‑by‑issue textual response to every submission. |
| Grassridge v. Dun Laoghaire Rathdown County Council [2024] IEHC 669 |
Reasons and standards of adequacy. |
Used to support the court's approach to why the Commission's reasons were adequate. |
| Pat O'Donnell v. Dublin City Council [2024] IEHC 671 |
Reading reasons in the round; reasons may be in inspector's report. |
Applied to justify reliance on inspector's report when assessing sufficiency of reasons. |
| Sherwin v. An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 26 |
Where a decision‑maker disagrees with a council, that is a main issue requiring reasons. |
Referenced for the proposition of main issues objectively identifiable. |
| Clonres CLG v. An Bord Pleanála & Ors. [2021] IEHC 303 |
Inspector report adoption and when disagreement with subordinate body is main issue. |
Used when discussing what counts as a main issue requiring reasons. |
| Oguekwe v. Minister for Justice [2008] IESC 25 |
No obligation for micro, submission‑by‑submission reasoning. |
Applied to counter argument that every submission must be responded to in decision text. |
| Rawson v. Minister for Defence [2012] IESC 26 |
Need for a reasoned but not discursive ruling. |
Used to temper expectations on level of detail required in reasons. |
| Killegland Estates v. Meath County Council [2022] IEHC 393 (and [2023] IESC 39) |
No obligation to state reasons for what is obvious; consistency of conditions reading. |
Applied to explain harmonious reading of conditions and absence of need to state obvious reasons. |
| Shadowmill v. An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 157 |
Reasons may be found outside the decision itself. |
Used to support reliance on inspector's report for reasons. |
| Rana v. Minister for Justice [2024] IESC 46 |
Reasons may be implicit from context. |
Applied to justify implicit reasoning by the Commission. |
| Industrial Development Agency v. Information Commissioner [2024] IEHC 649 |
On reasons and administrative explanation standards. |
Cited in relation to when reasons must be provided. |
| Ironborn v. Dun Laoghaire Rathdown County Council [2023] IEHC 477 |
No obligation to give reasons for rejecting legally incorrect points; severability of reasons. |
Applied to argue there was no need for reasons where a point was legally incorrect; to consider severability. |
| Murtagh v. An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 345 |
Severability: good reasons may sustain a decision. |
Used to consider whether any bad reasons could be severed from good ones. |
| Element Power [2017] IEHC 550 |
Severability of reasons and link between reasons. |
Referenced when considering whether multiple reasons are severable. |
| K v. Minister for Justice [2022] IEHC 582 |
Reasons should not be created ex post facto. |
Quoted to caution against post‑hoc justification absent contemporaneous reasons. |
| RPS Consulting Engineers Ltd v. Kildare County Council [2015] IEHC 113 |
Reasons that existed at the relevant time can be evidenced after the event. |
Referenced to balance the court's approach to evidence of reasons. |
| Commission v Ireland (C‑50/09) |
EIA standard: EIA must be as complete as possible; AA standard to use best scientific knowledge. |
Used to explain standard required for environmental assessments. |
| R. (Champion) v. North Norfolk District Council [2015] UKSC 52 |
AA and EIA principles; role of decision‑taker in evaluative conclusions. |
Applied to show AA/EIA evaluation is primarily for the decision‑taker. |
| Smyth v. RPA [2010] IEHC 290 |
Relevant to consideration of noise nuisance and statutory defences. |
Referenced by Applicants; the court treated this as a merits point, not a basis for certiorari. |
| Holohan v. An Bord Pleanála (C‑461/17) |
Requirements on outlining reasonable alternatives (Article 5(3)(d))—outline required, not full assessment of alternatives; reasons for choice required. |
Applied directly to Core Ground 8: the court held that the EIAR met the outline requirement and that the Applicants had not shown inadequacy evidentially. |
| Coöperatie Mobilisation for the Environment UA & Vereniging Leefmilieu v. College van gedeputeerde staten (joined C‑293/17 & C‑294/17) |
Role of national courts to carry out in‑depth examination of AA scientific soundness. |
Referred to when explaining AA standards and the court's supervisory role. |
| Commission v Ireland (C‑392/96) |
Project as whole principle in EIA to prevent splitting. |
Applied to describe tests for when sub‑projects must be treated as part of larger project for threshold purposes. |
| Commission v Spain (C‑227/01) |
EIA principles on project splitting and thresholds. |
Used in the summary of EU law on project splitting. |
| Brussels Hoofdstedlijk Gewest & Others v Vlaamse Gewest (C‑275/09) |
Project as whole and EIA thresholds. |
Cited in the court's EIA law survey. |
| Salzburger Flughafen GmbH v Umweltsenat (C‑244/12) |
Project as whole and EIA assessment. |
Referenced in the project splitting discussion. |
| Marktgemeinde Straßwalchen and Others v Bundesminister (C‑531/13) |
Project as whole; cumulative effects considerations. |
Used in the court's exposition of cumulative & in‑combination effects. |
| WertInvest Hotelbetriebs GmbH v Magistrat der Stadt Wien (C‑575/21) |
Project as whole and EIA thresholds (recent CJEU authority). |
Applied to confirm project‑as‑a‑whole principles for thresholding. |
| Ecologistas en Acción‑CODA v Ayuntamiento de Madrid (C‑142/07) |
Geographical proximity, similarities and interactions relevant to project as a whole. |
Cited to explain factors relevant to determining whether sub‑projects are part of larger project. |
| Byrne v. Fingal County Council [2025] IEHC 204 |
Recent domestic case on EIA/project splitting. |
Referenced in connection with project‑as‑a‑whole principles. |
| R. (Wyatt) v Fareham Borough Council [2022] EWCA Civ 983 |
AA/EIA principles in UK appellate authority. |
Used in the EIA principles discussion. |
| H.A. v. Minister for Justice [2022] IECA 166 |
On the shift of onus where an error is demonstrated. |
Applied to explain that once an error is shown the onus shifts to other parties to show harmlessness. |
| Reid v. An Bord Pleanála (No.1) [2021] IEHC 230 |
Onus in EIA/AA challenges; need for evidence to demonstrate flaws. |
Used to support the court's articulation of applicants' evidential onus in EIA/AA challenges. |
| An Taisce v. An Bord Pleanála & Ors [2022] IESC 8 |
Onus and evidence in EIA/AA judicial review. |
Applied to reinforce the requirement that applicants must displace decision‑maker's conclusions with evidence. |
| Carrownagowan Concern Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 300 |
Onus and evidential burden in environmental assessment challenges. |
Relied upon to show applicants must establish scientific/factual shortcomings by evidence. |
| Salmon Watch Ireland, Inland Fisheries Ireland, Sweetman & Ors. v. Aquaculture Licences Appeals Board [2024] IEHC 421 |
Onus to adduce evidence in environmental judicial review. |
Used to emphasize evidential requirements for applicants. |
| Minoa Ltd v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 704 |
Onus to adduce evidence in environmental cases. |
Referenced in the court's survey of authorities requiring applicants to present admissible evidence. |
| Nagle View Turbine Aware Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 603 |
Onus and evidence on noise/AM in EIA; similar failed points. |
Adopted as closely analogous authority — plaintiffs' claims on noise/AM previously failed for want of evidential foundation. |
| Eco Advocacy v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IESCDET 74 |
Failure to displace decision‑maker's lawful conclusion (non‑precedential determination). |
Referenced to demonstrate that failure to adduce evidence to displace decision‑maker is fatal to challenge. |
| Joyce Kemper v. An Bord Pleanála [2020] IEHC 601 |
A mere assertion without evidence cannot discharge onus. |
Applied to dismiss complaints that were unparticularised and unsubstantiated. |
| Murphy v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 59 |
Mere assertion does not create scientific doubt for AA purposes. |
Applied to the Applicants' shadow flicker and noise complaints. |
| Harrington v. An Bord Pleanála [2014] IEHC 232 |
Non‑expert assertions do not substitute for expert evidence. |
Used to underline that technical points require admissible expert evidence. |
| Duffy v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 558 |
On proof required for scientific aspects of environmental assessment. |
Cited for consistency with requirement of evidential showing of shortcomings. |
| Massey v. An Bord Pleanála (No.2) [2025] IEHC 206 |
Project splitting and EIA; harmless error doctrine affirmed by Supreme Court (determination). |
Referenced for project‑splitting principles and harmless error doctrine; Supreme Court determination affirmed harmless error doctrine (cited). |
| Gemeinde Altrip and Others v Land Rheinland‑Pfalz (C‑72/12) |
Harmless error doctrine in EIA context. |
Applied at length to explain when procedural defects do not require quashing of decisions. |
| Walton v. Scottish Ministers [2012] UKSC 44 |
Harmless error doctrine. |
Used as authority for court's power to refuse to quash where error was harmless to outcome. |
| Canterbury City Council v. Secretary of State [2019] EWHC 1211 |
Harmless error analysis and court's assessment role. |
Adopted in explanation of harmless error approach. |
| R. (Hudson) v. Windsor and Maidenhead Royal Borough Council [2021] EWCA Civ 592 |
Harmless error and materiality tests in JR. |
Referenced in the discussion of harmlessness. |
| UH v. An tAire Talmhaíochta Bia agus Mara and Others (C‑64/20) — AG opinion (Bobek) |
Commentary on harmless error and procedural default (advocate general's view). |
Used to support harmless error jurisprudence cited by the court. |
| Commission v Ireland (Derrybrien Wind Farm) (C‑261/18) |
Where error would have had material effect, certiorari is normally required. |
Referenced to show that when an error would materially affect outcome, remedy is certiorari (exceptional approach to after‑the‑event assessments). |
| Independent Newspapers v. I.A. [2020] IECA 19 |
Discretionary remedies where domestic law breaches occur. |
Cited to note court's wider discretion in purely domestic law errors. |
| Frescati Estates v. Walker [1975] I.R. 177 |
Concepts around vexatious/unnecessary applications and property rights. |
Discussed as background for the argument that applications by those without property rights may be impermissible — court explained correct test involves whether intrusion into property rights is warranted by the common good. |
| Baile Eamoinn Teoranta v. An Bord Pleanála [2020] IEHC 642 |
Contextual statements about conceivability versus reasonableness in harmlessness inquiries. |
Used to explain the court's position that "any conceivable possibility" is not determinative; the court excludes unreasonable or remote possibilities. |
| Webster v. Meenacloghspar (Wind) Ltd [2025] IEHC 587 |
Procedural comment on modularisation risks. |
Referred to in the judgment's discussion of modularisation and parties' conduct between modules. |
| Fahybeg Windfarm Opposition Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 310 |
On interpretation of conditions where one is a standard and another a fallback; approach to shadow flicker conditions. |
Applied in explaining harmonious reading of conditions 1 and 9 (standard and fallback) in the present decision. |