Anonymized Summary of Court Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion, delivered by Judge Edis, considers multiple applications under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 made by the Attorney General seeking leave to refer sentences as unduly lenient. Nine such applications were before the court; a tenth matter concerning another individual had previously been dismissed as outside the court's jurisdiction because that person had not been convicted of an offence within the unduly lenient sentence regime. Two applications for leave to appeal against sentence were also before the court in respect of two defendants. One application for leave to appeal by a defendant was formally abandoned before the hearing and is not determined here.

The offences arose from a gang grooming investigation that produced an indictment with many counts. The trial took place in the Crown Court at The City before Judge Medland and a jury between October 2024 and early February 2025, with sentencing hearings on 28–29 April 2025. The victims in the case are all entitled to lifelong anonymity under the Sexual Offences Act 1992; that anonymity has not been waived.

Most defendants were convicted by the jury after trial; some entered guilty pleas at various stages (notably one defendant pleaded guilty in October 2023, and another pleaded guilty on the day of his trial after being severed for ill health). The offending principally involved multiple sexual offences against teenage female victims, the principal victim (referred to in the trial as V1) being subjected to repeated rape and other sexual offending in a property described in the judgment as a focal location for the offending. The offending against the principal victim took place mainly in the first three months of 2018 and ceased shortly after her 15th birthday. The overall offending spanned about 30 months, though individual involvement varied between defendants.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Attorney General should be granted leave to refer specified sentences as unduly lenient under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
2. Whether, in any referred case, this court should increase the sentences imposed by the trial judge to reflect the totality of offending and applicable sentencing guidelines.
3. Whether leave to appeal against sentence should be granted to two defendants who individually applied for such leave.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court set out a structured analytical approach grounded in the material contained in the sentencing exercise and in established guideline considerations as they were described in the judgment. The court's reasoning proceeded in a number of connected stages, each derived from the material in the opinion:

• Respect for the trial judge: The court emphasised that the sentencing judge had presided over the lengthy trial, heard the live evidence of victims and defendants, and had before him detailed pre-sentence reports and other personal material for each defendant. That assessment meant the appellate court should show respect to the trial judge's holistic assessment of relative culpability and harm when considering referrals under the unduly lenient sentence regime.
• Role of guidelines: The court explained that offence-specific guidelines provided a starting point and range for individual offences (for example, the guideline for rape and for assault by penetration that applies where the victim is over 13), and that other guidelines (youth, guilty plea credit, and totality) were also relevant. It noted that the guidelines give limited practical assistance when dealing with multiple offences and the totality guideline provides general guidance to achieve proportionality across multiple counts.
• Campaign of rape benchmark: The court quoted the rape guideline's statement that some cases may involve a "campaign of rape" warranting sentences of 20 years and above, stressing that "campaign of rape" is not a technical term but a judicial benchmark indicating that a starting point of 20 years is appropriate where engaged, with no fixed upper limit.
• Delay as mitigation: The court analysed the delay between offending and final sentence (roughly seven years) and identified principal causes: the complexity and scope of the investigation, the Covid-19 pandemic's systemic effects, and delays attributable in part to defendants' early denials or late pleas. The court concluded that, except for one defendant who pleaded early, the mere passage of time did not operate generally to reduce appropriate sentences; any mitigation for delay had to be assessed individually and could be offset by delay caused by defendants' own refusal to admit guilt.
• Application to individual defendants: After preliminary observations, the court considered each defendant briefly, focusing on culpability, aggravating or mitigating features, the sentencing judge's starting point and adjustments, and whether the Attorney General's challenge justified intervention under the unduly lenient sentence regime. The court noted the judge had in most cases applied the appropriate guidelines and had balanced aggravating and mitigating factors (including age, health, prior record, role in the offending, use or supply of drugs, and any early guilty pleas).
• Assessment of the Attorney General's overall challenge: The court observed that the Attorney General sought to refer all sentences imposed by the judge and recognised the practical difficulty of substituting the appellate court's view for the trial judge's comprehensive and fact‑based judgments across multiple defendants. It stated that while it was unlikely every sentence was incorrect, some individual sentences might be arguable; the court therefore exercised restraint and intervened only where it concluded the sentencing was not within the reasonable range available to the judge.

The court's factual analysis of each defendant was confined to the particulars provided by the trial judge and the appendix to the judgment (offence counts, ages, convictions, pleas and sentences). The court explained, for each defendant considered, why it either granted leave and increased sentence, granted leave but dismissed the reference, or refused leave to refer.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The court allowed one reference and increased the sentence in respect of that one defendant (Offender A). For the remaining defendants the court either refused leave to refer or granted leave but dismissed the References. Two individual applications for leave to appeal against sentence were refused where they were made and without merit.

More specifically, and stated in anonymized form consistent with the material in the opinion:

• Offender A (Darbyshire): The court concluded that this defendant was significantly more culpable than the others, having committed numerous offences against multiple victims and having played a leading role in persistent predatory behaviour. The court quashed the previously imposed concurrent sentences on the three specified lead counts of rape and substituted concurrent sentences of 18 years and six months' imprisonment for those counts. The court reached that result by raising the pre-discount starting point to 22 years on each of those counts, then reducing by one year for a serious health condition and applying a discount slightly in excess of ten per cent for late guilty pleas, producing the 18 years and six months term.
• Offenders for whom leave was granted but the Reference was dismissed: The court granted leave in the cases of Offender C, Offender E, Offender F (these correspond to the named defendants who the court said were "arguable") but dismissed the References because, after review, the court concluded the sentences, while perhaps arguable, were not unduly lenient to require increase. The court explained its reasons in each case in brief summary, noting factors such as the judge's application of youth discounts, assessment of culpability within guideline ranges, and available mitigating material.
• Offenders for whom leave was refused: In the cases of several defendants (including Offender B, Offender D, Offender H and Offender I as set out in the appendix), the court refused leave to refer; the court concluded the Attorney General's submissions did not persuade it that the sentences were unduly lenient or outside the range reasonably open to the sentencing judge.
• Other orders: Except for the adjustments to Offender A's sentences described above, all other orders made by the trial judge (including concurrent/consecutive determinations, notification requirements, Sexual Harm Prevention Orders, restraining orders and similar ancillary orders) were left in place and unaffected by this process.

Implications:

• The court emphasized that its intervention under the unduly lenient sentence regime is limited and must respect the trial judge's proximity to the evidence and individualized sentencing material. This judgment illustrates the appellate court's reluctance to disturb sentences that fall within a reasonable range of judicial discretion, even in cases involving multiple and serious sexual offences, unless a sentence can fairly be described as unduly lenient.
• The only substantive change resulting from these references was the increase to the lead rape counts in Offender A's case; no wider or novel sentencing principles were established beyond the court's application of the established guidelines and general principles stated in the opinion.
• Victim anonymity orders remain in force for all victims; the court reiterated that the statutory anonymity has not been waived.

Appendix: Individual Sentences (Anonymized References to Appendix Material)

The opinion contains an extensive appendix listing, for each defendant, ages, plea/conviction status, the counts of conviction, statutory references for each offence, the sentence imposed on each count, and ancillary orders (for example, notification periods, Sexual Harm Prevention Orders, restraining orders, and victim surcharge orders). The court relied on this material in its consideration of each referral. This appendix was summarized in the body of the judgment and informed the brief individual assessments recorded above.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to information contained in the provided opinion and has been fully anonymized. No additional facts, precedents, or reasoning have been inferred beyond the text supplied.