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Killeen v Higgins Trading As Regan McEntee & Partners Solicitors [No. 1] (Approved)
Anonymised Summary of High Court Judgment
Prepared from the provided opinion. All personal and entity identifiers have been replaced with generic placeholders in accordance with the instructions.
Factual and Procedural Background
These proceedings concern an action for alleged professional negligence brought by the Plaintiff against the Defendant, a firm of solicitors described in the pleadings as the Defendant's solicitors (hereafter "Company A"). The alleged negligence arises out of the Defendant's conduct in relation to an earlier set of proceedings (hereafter "the Principal Proceedings"), which had been instituted in July 2006.
The Plaintiff advances two allegations in the professional negligence proceedings: (1) a specific allegation that a motion brought by the opposing party in the Principal Proceedings was struck out for non-attendance and that the Defendant did not seek to reinstate that motion (the court found the factual premise of this specific allegation to be incorrect—only the defendant's motion had been struck out, leaving the underlying Principal Proceedings unaffected); and (2) a general allegation that the Defendant failed to progress the Principal Proceedings with reasonable expedition.
The Plaintiff terminated the Defendant's retainer in March 2015, collected his file in April 2016 and reimbursed certain outlays in March 2016. The Plaintiff took no steps to progress the Principal Proceedings until February 2024, when he issued a motion; the Principal Proceedings were dismissed, by consent, on 24 June 2025.
The professional negligence proceedings were issued on 8 December 2023. The Defendant filed a memorandum of appearance on 13 December 2023. The Plaintiff delivered a statement of claim on 8 February 2024 and later sought judgment in default of defence (motion dated 5 July 2024). The Defendant filed a motion to strike out the proceedings on 29 October 2024. A series of interlocutory applications and technical objections followed. The strike-out motions and related applications were heard in a staggered hearing, and Judgment was delivered by Judge Simons on 4 November 2025.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the professional negligence claim is statute-barred under the Statute of Limitations 1957 (in particular section 11) because the Plaintiff terminated the solicitors' retainer more than six years before commencing proceedings.
- Whether the limitation period was postponed by reason of fraudulent concealment within the meaning of section 71 of the Statute of Limitations 1957.
- Whether the proceedings should be struck out pursuant to Order 19, rule 28 of the Rules of the Superior Courts on the grounds that the claim discloses no reasonable cause of action, amounts to an abuse of process, is bound to fail, or has no reasonable chance of succeeding.
- Whether technical objections to the form of the Defendant's memorandum of appearance and to the form of the Defendant's notice of motion (clerical error in return date and alleged illegible signature) are well founded and, if so, what their procedural consequences should be.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The cause of action in the professional negligence proceedings did not accrue until the Principal Proceedings were dismissed for delay on 24 June 2025; accordingly the professional negligence proceedings (instituted 8 December 2023) were not out of time.
- The running of the limitation period had been postponed by reason of fraudulent concealment by the Defendant; the Plaintiff relied on section 71 of the Statute of Limitations 1957.
- The Plaintiff raised technical objections: (a) the memorandum of appearance was invalid because it was signed in the name of a firm rather than an individual solicitor; and (b) the notice of motion contained a clerical error in the return date and had an illegible signature.
Defendant's Arguments
- The claim is statute-barred because the Plaintiff terminated the Defendant's retainer more than six years before proceedings were commenced and the limitation period therefore expired by reference to section 11 of the Statute of Limitations 1957.
- The Plaintiff's fraudulent concealment argument lacks a credible basis and, in any event, is a matter more appropriately determined at trial.
- The Defendant sought dismissal of the proceedings pursuant to Order 19, rule 28 on the basis that the claim discloses no reasonable cause of action and is bound to fail.
- In response to the Plaintiff's technical objections, the Defendant argued (and the court accepted) that a memorandum of appearance may legitimately record the name of a firm rather than an individual solicitor, and that the clerical error in the return date and an illegible signature did not prejudice the Plaintiff and were cured by the Plaintiff's attendance and participation in the hearing.
Table of Precedents Cited
All case names have been anonymised and are referenced below as "Precedent A", "Precedent B", etc., followed by the principle relied upon and the way the court applied that authority in this judgment (as stated in the opinion).
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Precedent A (decision on criteria for non-lawyer assistance in court) | Sets out criteria under which a named individual who is not legally qualified may be permitted to address the court (McKenzie Friend-related criteria). | The court applied the precedent to explain that the named unqualified individual could not address the court because the required criteria were not fulfilled, in particular due to lack of admissible medical evidence of incapacity by the Plaintiff. |
| Precedent B (Supreme Court decision on firm acting on behalf of an authorised person) | Addresses whether a firm may act and be recorded as the actor on court documents and observations on signing in the firm's name; discusses statutory construction and practicality. | The court relied on the reasoning to support the view that a memorandum of appearance may permissibly record the registered name of a firm of solicitors rather than the name of an individual solicitor, especially where the firm is an LLP. |
| Precedent C (decision on dismissal as bound to fail and abuse of process) | Explains that jurisdiction to dismiss as bound to fail derives from the court's inherent power to prevent abuse of process and that such jurisdiction must be sparingly exercised. | The court used this precedent to frame the high threshold applicable to strike-out applications: the court may dismiss only where it is clear the case is bound to fail, and not as a means to resolve disputed factual or legal questions summarily. |
| Precedent D (decision emphasising unexpected factual turns at trial) | Illustrates that cases at trial often take unexpected factual turns, supporting caution in summary disposal. | Used by analogy to caution against deciding accrual/limitation issues on a summary strike-out application where factual complexity may exist. |
| Precedent E (decision that strike out inappropriate where legal issues are not straightforward) | States that strike-out is not appropriate where the legal issues raised are not straightforward. | The court relied on this authority to justify refusal to determine the accrual question summarily because the issue is legally and factually difficult. |
| Precedent F (decision on accrual in professional negligence context) | General authority indicating that accrual questions in professional negligence cases can be complex. | The court cited this authority as background for the proposition that the question of when a cause of action accrues may be complex and is often a matter for trial. |
| Precedent G (decision involving a barrister where loss had crystallised after judgment) | Demonstrates a factual situation where loss clearly crystallised at a particular judgment, such that limitation issues were straightforward. | The court distinguished the present facts from this authority, holding that the cited case did not directly address the accrual question raised here and so reliance on it was misplaced. |
| Precedent H (decision on requirement of expert evidence in professional negligence) | Explains that professional negligence claims must have a reasonable basis and that expert evidence is often, but not invariably, required depending on the nature of the allegation. | The court applied this authority to accept that no independent expert report was necessary in the present case because the allegation concerns litigation management rather than a technical specialist matter such as clinical negligence. |
| Precedent I (prior jurisprudence referenced about limits of inherent jurisdiction) | Used to describe the jurisprudential background that the limits of the court's inherent jurisdiction to strike out were narrow and should be applied sparingly. | The court treated this prior jurisprudence as informing the reading of the amended rule and the high threshold required to strike out proceedings. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in discrete stages, addressing procedural/technical objections, the legal test for strike out, limitation issues and the need for expert evidence.
Technical objections:
- The Plaintiff argued that the Defendant's memorandum of appearance was invalid because it recorded the name of a firm rather than an individual solicitor. The court examined the Rules of the Superior Courts (Order 12 and the interpretation rule in Order 125) and concluded that words in the rules importing the singular may be construed as importing the plural. The court found it permissible to endorse the registered name of a firm on the memorandum of appearance, particularly where the firm is an LLP. Even on a counterfactual assumption that the memorandum was irregular, the court explained such irregularity would be voidable rather than void and could only be set aside by a court order; the Plaintiff had not timely moved to set it aside and had in any event acted in a manner inconsistent with preserving the objection (waiver/acquiescence).
- As to the notice of motion, the court accepted that a clerical error in the year of the return date occurred but found it produced no prejudice because the Plaintiff attended and participated on the assigned return date; the irregularity was therefore cured. The illegible signature on the notice of motion did not prejudice the Plaintiff because the firm name was typed on the document.
Legal test for strike out:
- The court set out the amended Order 19, rule 28 (as amended in 2023) and explained that the amendment codifies prior jurisprudence that the jurisdiction to dismiss as bound to fail is derived from the court's inherent jurisdiction and must be sparingly exercised. The court confirmed that it may look, to a limited extent, at the underlying merits where it can be established there is no credible basis for the pleaded facts and the proceedings are bound to fail.
- The court emphasised that summary dismissal is only appropriate if there is no reasonable chance of the plaintiff being able to answer a statute-barred plea and if there is no reasonable possibility that evidence might be forthcoming at trial that would support the plaintiff's position.
Limitation and accrual issues:
- The Defendant argued the action was statute-barred because the retainer was terminated more than six years before proceedings commenced. The Plaintiff contended that the cause of action did not accrue until the Principal Proceedings were ultimately dismissed on 24 June 2025, and alternatively pleaded fraudulent concealment under section 71.
- The court observed that the central question is when a real and meaningfully measurable loss was sustained. It recognised that there is a respectable argument on both sides: (a) the cause of action could be said to accrue once the retainer was terminated (Defendant's position), or (b) accrual might await the point at which the Principal Proceedings had become unanswerable to a dismissal application (Plaintiff's position). The court found neither position obviously correct on the material before it.
- The court refused to decide this difficult accrual question on a strike-out application because it involves mixed questions of fact and law and potentially complex factual inquiry (including whether the Principal Proceedings were already amenable to dismissal more than six years prior to the professional negligence claim). The court emphasised that the higher threshold for strike out had not been met and that the limitation issue should be determined at trial or on a suitably constituted preliminary issue.
- The court also noted that the Plaintiff's fraudulent concealment argument is a mixed question of fact and law requiring trial examination and therefore declined to decide it on the present summary application.
Expert evidence:
- The Defendant contended the claim should not proceed without an independent expert report. The court referred to authority that there is no immutable rule requiring an expert report in professional negligence cases but that the plaintiff must have a reasonable basis for the claim. The court concluded that, because the allegation concerns litigation management (a matter the court does not regard as requiring an expert to establish the basic standard of reasonable expedition), the absence of an independent expert report did not justify striking out the claim at this stage.
Holding and Implications
Primary Rulings:
- The Defendant's motion to strike out the professional negligence proceedings is refused.
- The Plaintiff's counter-motion seeking to invalidate the Defendant's strike-out motion is refused.
- The Plaintiff's motion for judgment in default of defence is refused.
- The Defendant is ordered to deliver a defence within twenty-eight days of the date of the judgment.
- The court's provisional view on costs is that each party should bear their own costs; any party seeking a different costs order may file written submissions within the timeframe set out by the court.
Implications:
- The court held that the high threshold required for summary dismissal under the amended Order 19, rule 28 was not satisfied on the material before it. Accordingly, the limitation and fraudulent concealment issues remain open for full trial determination (or for determination on an appropriately constituted preliminary issue), and no dispositive finding was made on the merits of those points in this judgment.
- The judgment confirms that: (a) a memorandum of appearance may, in appropriate circumstances, record the registered name of a firm (especially an LLP) rather than an individual solicitor; and (b) trivial clerical errors in a notice of motion will not vitiate proceedings where no prejudice results and the parties have participated in the hearing.
- The court emphasised that the decision does not purport to set a binding new precedent on the accrual question in professional negligence cases; rather, it records that this difficult question requires fuller factual and legal inquiry at trial.
Additional Observations from the Judgment
The court criticised the Plaintiff for repeatedly raising technical objections of marginal merit (in particular, the memorandum of appearance objection) and warned litigants in person to be cautious of unqualified advisers who encourage reliance on spurious procedural arguments rather than addressing substantive issues.
Outcome (Short Form)
- Defendant's strike-out motion: refused.
- Plaintiff's counter-motion re: strike-out of the Defendant's motion: refused.
- Plaintiff's motion for judgment in default: refused.
- Defendant to deliver a defence within 28 days.
- Provisional costs order: each party to bear their own costs unless written submissions are filed as directed.
Representation at Hearing (Anonymised)
The Plaintiff appeared as a litigant in person. Company A (the Defendant) was represented by Attorney McCann and Attorney Devine, instructed by Company A's solicitors.
End of anonymised summary.
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