Anonymized Summary of Judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an anonymized summary of a High Court judgment delivered by Judge Heslin on 31 October 2025 concerning a personal injuries claim. The Plaintiff issued a personal injuries summons on 9 August 2013, arising from an alleged injury on 13 August 2011 when, according to the pleadings, an aircraft "landed heavily" during a flight between two cities and the Plaintiff's upper body was forced into a seat. The defendants in the proceedings are two corporate entities referred to here as Company A and Company B.

The defendants applied to dismiss the Plaintiff's claim for want of prosecution due to prolonged and cumulative delay. The court's analysis and decision were informed by recent reformulation of the applicable test in Kirwan v. Connors & Ors. ([2025] IESC 21), and the earlier authority Primor Plc v. Stokes Kennedy Crowley ([1996] IR 459). The defendants' application was grounded on an affidavit sworn by Attorney Brick on 14/15 August 2024 and associated exhibits. The Plaintiff did not swear an affidavit in opposition and, insofar as the court records show, the Plaintiff largely failed to engage in progressing the proceedings for extended periods.

Key procedural milestones included: an appearance entered for the defendants in August 2014; a notice for particulars raised by the defendants in August 2014; significant delays by the Plaintiff in responding to that notice (replies to particulars were not delivered until 4 January 2018); defendants' Defence delivered 18 October 2018; the Plaintiff sought voluntary discovery on 2 September 2019 but did not pursue motions to compel discovery thereafter; extensive further periods of silence followed the defendants' detailed responses on 3 April 2022; and the present motion to dismiss for want of prosecution was issued on 15 August 2024. The court found that the Plaintiff's cumulative inactivity for which she was solely responsible exceeded seven years.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Plaintiff's proceedings should be dismissed for want of prosecution because of the prolonged and cumulative period of inactivity by the Plaintiff.
2. How the reformulated test in Kirwan v. Connors & Ors. (with its emphasis on the passage of time and articulated thresholds at two, four and five years of inactivity) applies to the facts of this case.
3. Whether there has been acquiescence or active encouragement by the defendants (Company A and Company B) such that dismissal would be inappropriate.
4. Whether there exists a "pressing exigency of justice" or other compelling reason that would justify permitting the case to proceed despite the long period of inactivity.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants' Arguments

• The Plaintiff has caused prolonged and cumulative delay in prosecuting the claim, including multi-year lapses at various stages (notably more than seven years' cumulative inactivity since an appearance was entered).
• The defendants actively sought to progress the case through notices, requests for particulars, motions and correspondence; they did not acquiesce in inactivity.
• The passage of time has materially prejudiced the defendants' ability to defend the proceedings, particularly as the case depends on oral evidence and expert evidence and witness recollection will inevitably degrade over time.
• On the basis of the Kirwan framework, the quantum of inactivity places the case within the category where the court has broad power to dismiss unless a pressing exigency of justice exists; no such exigency is identified.
• The defendants seek an order dismissing the claim for want of prosecution and an award of costs.

Plaintiff's Position

• The Plaintiff did not file any affidavit in opposition to the defendants' motion.
• At the hearing the Plaintiff's solicitor, Attorney McCarten, explained that his firm had not had communication with the Plaintiff for approximately three years and had been unable to obtain instructions; the solicitor sought an adjournment and had filed a motion to come off record (returnable after the hearing of the present motion).
• There were no detailed submissions from the Plaintiff resisting dismissal on the merits of the delay application; no reasons were submitted to the court that identified a pressing exigency or other compelling factor why the proceedings should be permitted to continue.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court set out and applied the legal framework established by the Supreme Court in Kirwan (which emphasises the passage of time and sets out stages at two, four and five years of inactivity). The judge undertook a factual analysis based on the pleadings, the affidavit sworn by Attorney Brick on behalf of the defendants and its exhibits; the Plaintiff did not swear an affidavit in response.

The court's analysis proceeded in these principal steps, based solely on the material before it:

1. Chronology and quantification of delay: the court detailed a chronology showing multiple periods of inactivity and specific missed opportunities by the Plaintiff to advance the claim (for example, a three year plus delay in delivering replies to particulars, further months to deliver full particulars, ten months between service of the Defence and seeking voluntary discovery, and over two years between requests for discovery and any meaningful follow-up). The net cumulative delay for which the Plaintiff was exclusively responsible was found to exceed seven years from the entry of appearance.
2. Characterisation under Kirwan: given the cumulative period of complete inactivity for more than five years, the case fell into the category in Kirwan where courts have a "generous power to dismiss cases" and where dismissal is generally appropriate unless a pressing exigency of justice exists.
3. Assessment of defendant conduct: the court examined whether the defendants had acquiesced or actively encouraged delay. It concluded there was no acquiescence; indeed, the defendants were proactive in attempting to progress the proceedings (requests for particulars, motions, letters, and a motion to compel discovery). The defendants' conduct therefore did not operate as a bar to dismissal.
4. Nature of the case and prejudice: the court noted that the action is dependent on oral evidence from a range of witnesses (including the Plaintiff and expert witnesses) about events occurring in 2011, and that the case is therefore susceptible to the degradation of witness memory. Even though no specific witness was identified as now unavailable, the court accepted that the passage of time (potentially up to 15 years between the event and any trial) produced a real risk of prejudice to the defendants' ability to defend the claim.
5. Absence of a pressing exigency of justice: the court explicitly considered the exceptional categories identified in Kirwan (educational/social/economic disadvantage impeding prosecution; unusually important public law issues; serious misconduct by the defendant) and found none applied to this case. The Plaintiff made no evidential showing to justify an exception.
6. Adjournment request and lack of engagement: at the hearing the Plaintiff's solicitor explained an inability to obtain instructions and sought an adjournment; the court declined the adjournment on grounds including the long notice given of the defendants' motion, the public interest in efficient allocation of court resources, and the absence of any suggestion that the motion had not been served. The court emphasised it was not prevented from hearing the defendants' application due to the Plaintiff's non-engagement.
7. Conclusion based on the foregoing: the court concluded that dismissal was the only just outcome, given the prolonged and cumulative inactivity, the dependence on oral testimony, the lack of acquiescence by the defendants, the absence of any pressing exigency of justice, and the risk of prejudice from the passage of time.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The court granted the relief sought by the defendants and directed that final orders would be made at a short further hearing. The judgment indicates that the proceedings are to be struck out / dismissed for want of prosecution (the court described the only just outcome as granting the relief sought by Company A and Company B).

Implications:

• Direct effect on the parties: The Plaintiff's claim will be dismissed (struck out) for want of prosecution. The defendants, having been wholly successful, have a presumptive entitlement to costs and the court indicated an intention to make a costs order in their favour at the final orders hearing. The case was listed for final orders on 7 November 2025.
• No novel precedent: The court applied and followed the framework set out in Kirwan and did not purport to establish a new legal principle. The decision operates as an application of the established Kirwan thresholds and principles to the particular facts of lengthy, cumulative inactivity.
• Practical consequence: The judgment underscores that prolonged and cumulative inactivity by a plaintiff—particularly in cases reliant on oral evidence—can justify dismissal absent compelling, exceptional factors; proactive attempts by defendants to progress litigation do not amount to acquiescence that would prevent dismissal.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to the content and assertions contained in the provided opinion. No information has been invented or inferred beyond what appears in that text. All parties and individuals have been anonymized consistently.